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Observers will find at least one common economic theme running through the 20th century:
financial market development (as impressively documented by Kindleberger [1984]). From the
wide range of aspects related to finance and growth, to which this entire volume of Focus on
Austria is dedicated, this introductory paper highlights three selected issues that are fundamental
to finding adequate policy prescriptions for economic policy decision-making and that are key to
the current discussion: (i) does finance matter, (ii) what are the essential functions of financial
markets and the important characteristics of financial market transactions, and (iii) which
financial system is preferable, a perennial topic of debate. The paper concludes that first, almost
by definition, functional efficiency is the priority a financial system needs to fulfill from a
macroeconomic point of view. Factors determining the transfer of financial funds to investors are
essential for the potential level of investment and the growth path of the economy to be realized.
Second, combining the different historical, economic policy and financial market perspectives,
there seems to be a clear need for a paradigm shift in economics, in the direction of a
macroeconomic theory integrating financial markets and their impact on real developments into
the core of the analysis.
Stock Markets, Shareholder Value and Investment 95
The paper explores the effects of stock markets on business investment. Next to the direct finance
effect several indirect channels are identified and discussed, i.e. the allocation of investment, the
effects through balance sheets on the stability of the financial systems, the wealth effect on
consumption and corporate governance effects. Among these, the intuitively appealing direct effect
and the indirect corporate governance effect are discussed most extensively. The empirical evidence
regarding the financing effect is clear, if surprising. Stock markets play little role in financing
investment and investment reacts little, if at all, to changes in share prices. Changes in corporate
governance have become prominent recently. The paper proposes a post-Keynesian model thereof
and presents evidence that the increase in shareholder power may have reduced investment.
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This paper discusses the link between financial development and macroeconomic volatility by
exploring some of the ways through which financial development may affect business cycle
fluctuations. To be specific, we examine whether stock market development exerts an unambiguous
effect on macroeconomic volatility. Building on theoretical work related to two different strands,
we also investigate the role financial development has in the propagation of real and monetary
shocks. Using a panel data set covering 22 OECD countries over the period 1971 through 2000
we find a robust relationship between stock market development and the severity of the
macroeoconomic cycle, and evidence that well-developed financial systems magnify monetary shocks
and dampen real ones. The results also indicate that the size of the stock market matters when
interacting with stock market volatility.
A Financial Decelerator in Europe? Evidence from Austria 133
This paper analyzes some reasons for the apparent success of financial liberalization in Austria.
Against the odds, Austrias ambitious program of deregulation between 1977 and 2000 did not
result in a financial crisis, but yielded large and tangible benefits. While the Austrian experience
has so far not attracted much attention in the literature, it may contain important lessons on
policy best practices, and on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Three implications
emerge from this study: First, gradualism worked well. The slicing of reforms into manageable
pieces avoided a cumulation of risk factors and the emergence of financial bubbles. Second,
financial reform was timed in a countercyclical manner, which added stability to the economy.
Finally, a large banking sector may be more diverse and able to stabilize itself. The predominance
of financial networks and nonprofit banks in Austria gave rise to countercyclical lending behavior,
i.e. a financial decelerator.
Banking Structure and Investment in Austria: Some Empirical Evidence 150
This study confirms that the liquid-assets-to-capital ratio is an important determinant of
investment. Furthermore, given the characteristics of the Austrian financial system, this paper
investigates the role of lending relationships on the investment of a sample of Austrian firms. It is
found that the existence of a house bank matters for investment, but the direction of the change is
not always as expected. This study also deals with the effect of banking structure on investment.
Contrary to expectations and to findings for other countries, small firms benefit more by having
narrow lending relationships with a large bank.
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The title of this volume Finance for Growth can be read in two different ways:
First, it asks whether financial sector development has an impact on economic
growth, an issue which has become a major topic of empirical research on
economic growth. Second, it involves a normative query: Which structure of
the financial system at the respective development stages of the economy may
better foster growth? This second connotation of our Finance for Growth
subject has found its way into the growth literature only recently, despite the
fact that economists and policymakers have debated the relative merits of bank-
based versus market-based financial systems for over a century.
With regard to the first issue, despite the econometric difficulties encoun-
tered, a consensus about the significant role of the financial sector in growth has
been emerging, a finding that has also been confirmed by recently developed
dynamic panel techniques. But part of the literature makes the case that deeper
financial market development may be more vulnerable to crises. When
regulatory capabilities lag behind financial sector development, this may lead
to crises that inhibit growth. Concerning the second issue — which financial
structure better supports growth — the empirical findings in the literature are
less clear. While a recent OECD study has shown that stock market
development has promoted growth in high income countries (Leahy et al.,
2001), Hahn (2002) has found that the significant positive coefficient of stock
market development on growth becomes insignificant when a stock market
indicator is used that is less sensitive to share price effects.
This volume puts together papers presented at the Workshop of the
Oesterreichische Nationalbank on Finance for Growth on January 27,
2003. The studies are related not only to these two lines of research, they also
tackle new issues in the area of financial sector development and its impact on
the real economy. The first contribution by Peter Mooslechner (Finance for
Growth, Finance and Growth, Finance or Growth ...? Three Perspectives on
the Interaction of Financial Markets and the Real Economy) highlights three
selected aspects that are key to economic policy decision making. First, the main
lines of economic research on financial markets are reviewed and contrasted
with real life phenomena and our insights derived from historical studies. While
economic history literature attributes an essential role to the financial sector in
determining the real economy, mainstream economic theory has only recently
begun to account for some of the financial market failures in its models, though
the list of failures covered is far from complete. Second, the characteristics of
financial transactions that are fundamentally different from transactions on
product markets and the multiple, mutually nonexclusive functions of financial
markets are analyzed. Third, the debate of the relative merits of a market-based
and a bank-based financial system that was sparked at the end of the past
century is reviewed. While the recent literature does not attest either of the
two models a particular advantage with respect to economic growth, research
has increasingly focused on the developmental state of the financial sector,
concluding that well-developed financial markets have a positive impact on
overall economic performance. Finally, the author is supportive of a paradigm
shift in economics that integrates financial markets and their impact on real
developments into the core of the analysis.
Editorial
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The paper by Engelbert Stockhammer (Stock Markets, Shareholder Value and
Investment) explores the effects of stock markets on business investment. The
author tests whether the development of a market for corporate control and the
reorientation of management priorities along the lines of creating shareholder
value (financialization) have reduced growth in investment. The study finds
strong support for the hypothesis that financialization led to a slowdown in
accumulation in the United States and France, some support for the United
Kingdom and none for Germany.
While the empirical literature linking financial sector development and the
real economy focuses almost exclusively on the impact of the financial sector on
economic growth, only few studies have so far investigated its impact on
the business cycle. Two papers explore this novel research focus. Franz Hahn
(Financial Development and Macroeconomic Volatility: Evidence from OECD
Countries) examines the linkage between financial development and business
cycle fluctuations in 22 OECD countries over the period 1970 through 2000.
More specifically, the role financial development has in the propagation of real
and monetary shocks is explored. In line with economic theory it is shown that
both market-based and bank-based financial systems magnify monetary shocks
and dampen real shocks. Interestingly, the tentative results indicate that stock
markets destabilize the business cycle.
Closely related to the issue of financial sector linkage with macroeconomic
volatility is the study by Benedikt Braumann (A Financial Decelerator in Europe?
Evidence from Austria). The paper more generally analyzes the history of
financial liberalization in Austria, whose financial markets ranked among the
most repressed in Europe until the late 1970s. There are many reasons why
financial market liberalization was not associated with financial crises. Special
attention is given to the large Austrian banking sector, which tended to dampen
monetary shocks through a system of endogenous buffers, and the prevailing
impact of relationship lending that sharply reduced the role of the bank lending
channel. Maria Valderrama (Banking Structure and Investment in Austria: Some
Empirical Evidence) investigates the impact on investment behavior of these
bank-lending relationships, which are important in Austria. This innovative
work determines the effects of banking structure, firm characteristics and lend-
ing relationships simultaneously within one model. It is found that the existence
of a house bank matters for investment in Austria. Interesting results are
reported for the effect of banking structure and firm characteristics on
investment. Contrary to expectations and to findings for other countries, for
example, small firms benefit more from narrow lending relationships with a
large bank.
Klaus Gugler (Corporate Governance, Investment, and the Implications for
Growth) tests the influence of cash constraints on the investment decisions of
firms and shows for Austrian nonfinancial firms that corporate governance has
important implications for the nexus between finance and growth: For family-
controlled firms positive investment-cash flow sensitivities indicate cash
constraints and underinvestment, while positive investment-cash flow sensitiv-
ities found for state-controlled firms suggest managerial discretion and over-
investment. The author does not find cash flow-induced investment spending
for bank-controlled firms.
Editorial
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The workshop closed with a panel discussion on the issue: What Kind of
Financial System Works Best for Europe? This volume concludes with a reprint
of the statements by the panelists of the workshop. For Engelbert Stockhammer, the
issue of which financial system is preferable should be based not only on
functional efficiency criteria, but also on political economy considerations.
He mentions distribution effects that are closely related to financial
structures and the room for maneuver of national economic policy that can
probably be implemented more easily in bank-dominated financial systems. Peter
Mooslechner argues along similar lines. He states that financial systems have to be
designed to optimize multiple goals, while he also makes the point that the
strong regional differences between European financial systems require
different policy prescriptions. In Austria, e. g., it seems that the implicit risk
allocation that has historically evolved between the state, financial markets and
private agents is no longer viable. A substitute has to be found that serves the
multiple goals of a financial system and safeguards financial stability. Franz Hahn
considers the difference between market- and bank-based financial systems
minor with regard to their financing function. However, the systems diverge
in the way in which they allocate and diversify risks. The governance function
plays only a small role in both systems given the fact that insiders tend to
instrumentalize outsiders.
With respect to the determinants of financial sector development, Engelbert
Stockhammer argues against the prevailing wisdom that the financial system is the
outcome of a natural process, a point which is made by Franz Hahn, according to
whom the transformation towards a market-based financial system is closely
related to the development of civic society. The financial system, according to
Engelbert Stockhammer, is a product of the society it serves: This setup can be
changed, but it takes a genuine will to change it.
Helene Schuberth
Martin Schu‹rz
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R e p o r t s
Austria
October 2002
4 An amendment to the Personal Income Act 1988 (Federal Law Gazette Part I
No. 155/2002) paved the way for the introduction of new state-sub-
sidized personal pension plans as of 2003.
The subsidy for contributions to these new schemes is 5.5% — the same
rate applicable to payments into subsidized pension savings plans as
introduced by the tax reform in 2000 — plus the rate applicable to
savings plans with building and loan associations; thus, the subsidy
currently totals 10%. The maximum contribution qualifying for the
10% subsidy is EUR 1,800, as opposed to EUR 1,000 for other state-
subsidized investment instruments. At least 60% of the pension plan
assets must be invested in stocks which were initially listed at the stock
exchange of an EEA member country; the total stock market capital-
ization of the stocks initially listed in this EEA member country must not
exceed 30% of the national GDP. At the same time, pension plan
members must get a capital guarantee of 100% of contributions plus
the interest credited to the members account.
10 According to a study by the Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO),
the introduction of euro cash did not push up prices on a large-scale.
However, there have apparently been some areas where the cash change-
over was used as a chance for euro profiteering.
December 2002
5 Reference Rate Cut
Following the monetary policy decision taken by the Governing Council
of the ECB at its meeting on December 5, 2002, to cut the interest rate
on the marginal lending facility by 0.50 percentage point to 3.75% with
effect from December 6, 2002, in Austria the reference rate is reduced by
0.50 percentage point to 4.00% with effect from December 6, 2002, as
required by the first euro-related amendment to civil legislation (Federal
Law Gazette Part I No. 125/1998) and as specified in the corresponding
regulation (Federal Law Gazette Part II No. 27/1999, as amended).
10 Base Rate Cut
The marginal interest rate on the main refinancing operation of the
European Central Bank to be settled on December 11, 2002, is
2.82%, down by 0.55 percentage point against the interest rate calcu-
lated for the main refinancing operation (3.37%) settled immediately
after the latest change of the base rate (November 9, 2001). Thus, in
accordance with Article 4 of the corresponding regulation (Federal Law
Gazette Part II No. 27/1999, as amended) the base rate is reduced by
0.55 percentage point to 2.20%, with effect from December 11, 2002.
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European Union
September 2002
6—8 At its informal meeting in Copenhagen, the Ecofin Council discusses the
world economic situation, the Report on Financial Regulation, Super-
vision and Stability by the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC),
the amendment of the European Investment Bank (EIB) statutes to
account for enlargement, the cross-border clearing and settlement
arrangements, the work of the European Convention and the impact
of the floods in Austria and Germany. Moreover, the meeting serves to
prepare the Annual Meeting of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
The informal Ecofin Council agrees that EU Member States are to
include collective action clauses in new sovereign bond issues.
9 The Joint Employment Report 2002 states that unless efforts are stepped up
to adjust wages and raise the level of qualification and flexibility, mass
unemployment may occur in the problem regions, in particular in the
ten EU accession countries, possibly triggering migration to the more
prosperous regions of the EU.
10 The U. K. Treasury publishes a set of 14 economic test criteria (e.g.
concrete control of budget deficits, possible inflationary effects follow-
ing the introduction of the euro) in preparation for a nation-wide
referendum on joining the single currency. This step means a toughening
of the previous five economic tests to be met by the U.K. and is thus
likely to be a stumbling block on the way to EMU entry.
11 The latest Eurobarometer survey on financial services (survey period:
August/September 2001) shows that consumers feel powerless vis-a‘-
vis financial services suppliers and ill-informed about financial products.
For reasons of convenience, cash remains the preferred means of pay-
ment (47%). 56% of consumers refuse to use the electronic purse,
while 80% have no experience with distance payment, i.e. payment via
telephone or the Internet.
12 The European Commission promises to provide funds of up to EUR 1 billion
for flood relief in Austria, Germany and France by end-2002. The
money is earmarked for reconstruction in the flood-stricken areas.
12/13 The EU Convention holds a plenary meeting in Brussels. The main focus
of the debate is the simplification of instruments and procedures in the
European Union (EU). Apart from a first round of orientation talks on
this topic, two working groups (on Legal Personality and on Sub-
sidiarity) present their interim results. Moreover, the Convention
agrees on the establishment and composition of four additional working
groups (External Action, Defence, Simplification of Instruments
and Procedures and Security/Justice).
13 For the first time, the European Commission presents to the EU accession
countries a working document containing an estimate of their
prospected contribution payments to, and receipts from, the EU budget
for the first three years following EU entry.
According to this working paper, four of the ten applicant countries
would be net contributors in their first year of membership, unless EU
Member States make lump-sum compensation payments, as suggested
Calendar of Monetary and Economic Highlights
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by the Commission. The Commission paper goes on to state that the ten
new Member States stand to receive EUR 8.8 billion net from the EU
budget during the first three years of membership.
22—24 At the Fourth Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) Summit in Copenhagen the
heads of state or government and the president of the European
Commission discuss world economic developments.
They agree, inter alia, on strengthening the economic and fiscal policy
dialogue and on developing joint action plans for financial markets and
capital movement.
24 Given the unfavorable cyclical situation, the European Commission post-
pones the demand for balanced budgets in the euro area countries from
2004 to 2006. According to European Commission president Romano
Prodi, this decision does not alter the Stability and Growth Pact, as the
Pact does not lay down any deadlines but merely commits euro area
countries to achieve budget positions close to balance or in surplus in the
medium term. The 2004 deadline is defined in the Broad Economic
Policy Guidelines for 2002.
25 The European Commission opens the excessive deficit procedure (Article
104 EC Treaty) against Portugal. This is the first time such a step is taken
vis-a‘-vis a Member State. The move was triggered by the official
confirmation that Portugals general government deficit had come to
4.1% of GDP in 2001, thus clearly exceeding the agreed 3% threshold.
The deterioration of Portugals budgetary position is only partly
attributale to cyclical factors.
October 2002
1 In reaction to the excessive deficit procedure (Article 104 of the Treaty
establishing the European Community) launched against Portugal by the
European Commission, the Portuguese government passes a 2003 draft
budget which envisages 10% cuts in current expenditure at all minis-
tries; by these means, the general government deficit is to be brought
down to 2.5% of GDP in 2003, well below the Maastricht Treaty
reference value of 3% of GDP. Especially administrative costs and invest-
ment are to be reduced, whereas tax revenues are to be raised.
8 The finance ministers of the Eurogroup approve a proposal put forward by
Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs Pedro Solbes as to
the application of the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact: 11
euro area countries, i.e. all member countries with the exception of
France, commit themselves to reducing their cyclically adjusted deficits
by a minimum of 0.5 percentage point every year starting from 2003.
Also, the 12 finance ministers pledge to avoid excessive new debts and
to achieve balanced budgets in the medium term.
Issues on the agenda of the ECOFIN council meeting include taxes (taxation
of savings and energy), the streamlining of the annual economic and
employment policy coordination cycles, the evaluation of the European
employment strategy, budgetary and financial aspects of EU enlarge-
ment, insurance for airlines, and Russia. As to financial stability, super-
vision and integration, the EU finance ministers approved a report on
Calendar of Monetary and Economic Highlights
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harmonized regulatory rules for securities markets, banks and insurance
companies. The proposals on the regulation of European securities
markets drawn up under the chair of former Belgian central bank
governor Alexandre Lamfalussy are to be applied to banks and insur-
ance companies other fields of business.
9 In its Regular Reports and the Enlargement Strategy Paper, the European
Commission proposes that the EU heads of state and government conclude
accession negotiations with Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hun-
gary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia by the end
of the year. Bulgarias and Romanias efforts to achieve their objective of
EU accession by 2007 are to be supported. As regards Turkey, the
European Commission proposes stepping up preaccession assistance.
The accession countries are called upon to make further improvements,
especially in public administration and in the legal system, in order not
to jeopardize the ratification of the accession treaties by the Member
States. Close monitoring and regular reports by the European Commis-
sion are to keep the accession countries on the track of economic
reform. The European Commissions findings will be reviewed by the
European Council at its meeting on October 24 and 25 in Brussels.
18 European Commission President Romano Prodi harshly criticizes the Stability
and Growth Pact, demanding more financial room for maneuver for
Member States. Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs
Pedro Solbes defends the pact. The European Central Bank (ECB)
reiterates its calls to comply with the provisions of the Stability and
Growth Pact.
19 In a second referendum, a clear majority of Irish voters (62.83%) turns
out in favor of the ratification of the Treaty of Nice, the basis for EU
enlargement. The Treaty of Nice was negotiated in December 2000 and
is to be ratified by end-2002.
21 In Sweden, Prime Minister Go‹ran Persson presented his new cabinet.
Political commentators suggest the ministers have been picked also with
a view to the referendum on the introduction of the euro in Sweden,
which is expected to take place in 2003. The Swedish ambassador to the
EU, Gunnar Lund, was appointed deputy finance minister.
21/22 EU foreign ministers meeting in Luxembourg approve the European Commis-
sions recommendation to conclude accession negotiations with ten
accession countries.
24 Germany accepts the excessive deficit procedure the EU is expected to
launch in the near future.
24/25 EU enlargement is the top item on the agenda of the European Council
meeting in Brussels. The European Council approves the European
Commissions proposal on the selection of the ten future EU Member
States. The EU has committed itself to concluding accession negotiations
with these countries at the European Council in Copenhagen on Decem-
ber 12 and 13, 2002, and to signing the accession treaties in April 2003
in Athens. The European Council declares its support for Bulgarias and
Romanias efforts to fulfill the accession criteria by 2007. The elements
Calendar of Monetary and Economic Highlights
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for deciding on the next stage of Turkeys candidature are to be prepared
by the Council in time for the Copenhagen European Council.
Furthermore, the EU heads of state and government agree on the
financing terms for enlargement. If the projected cash flow balance with
the Communitys budget compared to the year 2003 is negative for
individual accession countries in the years 2004 to 2006, temporary
budgetary compensation will be offered.
The European Council hears a report of the president of the European
Convention, Vale«ry Giscard dEstaing, on the progress of the Conven-
tions proceedings.
25 The Governing Council of the ECB decides to enhance the TARGET system
for large-value payments between national central banks. In view of the
upcoming EU enlargement, the present multiple platform system is to
be maintained and supplemented by a shared component. Further-
more, TARGET 2 will have a broadly defined core service, for which
there will be a single Eurosystem-wide price structure. The new system
is to become operational in 2005 at the earliest.
28 On the occasion of the plenary meeting of the European Convention,
President Vale«ry Giscard dEstaing presents a draft structure of a future
Constitutional Treaty. The first part is to consist of constitutional
provisions laying down the institutional architecture, whereas the second
part is to contain provisions dealing with the Unions policies and
actions, which can be amended more easily. The Constitutional Treaty
is to be negotiated by the EU national governments during the second
half of 2003. The ECB is to be given the status of an EU institution.
The Conventions working group on economic governance presents its
final report. As opinions on key questions differ widely, it does not
contain substantial reform proposals. One of the few issues on which
the group has reached agreement is the competence for monetary and
economic policies: the ECB is to retain the exclusive responsibility for
monetary policy, whereas economic policies are to remain in the hands
of the national governments. The ECB is to remain independent of
political influence.
November 2002
5 At their meeting in Brussels, the Eurogroup finance ministers call upon
the European Commission to look into the reasons why inflation rates
are comparatively high in Ireland, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands
and Italy. Euro area inflation is expected to reach 2.3% in 2002, thus
exceeding the ceiling set by the Eurosystem.
The Ecofin Council discusses the framework proposed by Switzerland for
solving the issue of savings taxation, combining a withholding tax on
interest income accrued to EU citizens, voluntary information sharing
(leaving it up to EU nationals whether to pay withholding tax in Switzer-
land or report the savings income earned abroad to their home tax
authorities), cross-country exchange of information on request and a
revision clause. EU Internal Market Commissioner Frits Bolkestein
reports on the current state of negotiations with Switzerland on the
Calendar of Monetary and Economic Highlights
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taxation of savings. According to Mr. Bolkestein, Switzerland is
prepared to introduce a 35% withholding tax from January 1, 2004,
provided that Belgium, Luxembourg and Austria, which will apply a
withholding tax until 2010 instead of the envisaged EU-wide automatic
exchange of information, agree to levy 35% as well, rather than initially
15% and later 20% as envisaged. The Directive on the taxation of savings
income should be adopted by the end of 2002.
The Ecofin Council endorses uniform rules for the approval of
prospectuses (European passport for issuers). The EU finance minis-
ters agree that issuers will be free to select the authority which is to
approve their prospectus above a threshold value of EUR 5,000, i.e. in
approximately 50% of all securities issues.
The Ecofin Council identifies an excessive deficit in Portugal (under
Article 104.6 of the Treaty) and issues a recommendation to remedy this
situation at the latest by 2003.
7 Positions diverge strongly in a plenary discussion of the report submitted
by the European Convention working group on economic governance. A
broad consensus evolves only on the following issues: the mandate and
the tasks of the European Central Bank (ECB) shall remain unchanged;
the division of competences between the ECB for monetary policy and
the Member States for economic policies is to be left unchanged.
Regarding a strengthening of the role of the European Commission in
coordinating economic policies, a clear majority supports the idea of
empowering the Commission to directly issue an early warning to a
Member State that it finds to be running up an excessive deficit.
11 The European Commission publishes its latest Internal Market Scoreboard
(Ten years of the Internal Market without frontiers). Germany is
among the countries with the highest implementation deficit. 80%
of Europeans believe that the Internal Market has enlarged the range
of available products; nearly half of all businesses across the EU say that
the dismantling of internal frontiers has improved their competitive
positions.
12 A study conducted for the European Commission provides evidence that
completing the integration of EU financial markets will continually
boost growth across the EU. Conservative estimates put the integra-
tion-related increase in EU-wide real GDP growth over the next decade
at 1.1% or EUR 130 billion or EUR 350 per capita.
13 The European Commission expects Germany to reach a deficit of 3.8% of
GDP in 2002 and a deficit of 3.1% of GDP in 2003. As a result, the
Commission initiates an excessive deficit procedure (according to
Article 104 of the Treaty) against Germany.
At the same time, Pedro Solbes, EU Commissioner for Economic and
Monetary Affairs, recommends to the Council to send an early budget
warning (as set out in regulation 1466/97 of the Stability and Growth
Pact and in line with Article 99.4 of the Treaty) to France, given the
clear risk that France may breach the 3% deficit threshold in 2003.
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14 According to an ECB review of the international role of the euro, the
euro has asserted itself as a leading currency in the international debt
securities market in the four years since it was introduced. By mid-
2002, the euro had expanded its share in international money market
issuance to 39%, thus even narrowly exceeding the share of the U.S.
dollar (38%). For broadly defined international debt securities, the euro
accounted for a share of 39% of the market as well, compared with a
share of 45% for the U.S. dollar and 6% for the Japanese yen. By
contrast, the euro plays a comparatively small role as an investment
currency and as a transaction currency in international trade.
14 Sveriges Riksbank, the central bank of Sweden, lowers its repo rate from
4.25% to 4%, motivated by expectations that the inflation rate is about
to fall below the target of 2% in 2003.
18 At the EU Council meeting on general affairs, the foreign ministers of the
incumbent EU Member States agree that the enlargement of the EU is to
take effect on May 1, 2004. The accession treaties are due to be signed in
April 2003. This leaves the European Parliament and the accession
country parliaments one year to ratify the accession treaties and to
conduct referendums where necessary. Moreover, the EU foreign min-
isters fix an upper ceiling for farming expenditure that may not be
renegotiated after EU enlargement.
20 The German ministry of finance finds the macroeconomic equilibrium of
Germany to have been distorted; only on such grounds does the national
constitution allow the federal government to run a budget deficit that
exceeds investment expenditure. According to the finance minister, the
federal government budget deficit is set to reach EUR 34.6 billion in
2002, and investment spending EUR 25 billion.
21 The Governing Council of the ECB decides that, starting in 2003, a bank
lending survey is to be conducted among 90 banks in the euro area at
quarterly intervals.
By a large majority, the European Parliament adopts a resolution not to
devolve any additional legislative powers to the European Commission
and to the planned special financial supervision committees as long as
the European Parliament has not been empowered to cancel such dev-
olutions.
26 Mervyn King, currently vice governor of the Bank of England, is
designated to succeed the current governor, Sir Edward George, by
Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown.
29 The Swedish government and all opposition parties agree to hold a
referendum on the introduction of the euro on September 14, 2003.
December 2002
2 The Eurogroup expects euro area GDP growth to come to 2.7% in 2004,
up from a projected 1.8% in 2003; in 2002, GDP growth will remain
0.8% below the forecast.
3 The Ecofin Council holds talks on the cross-border taxation of savings
income in the EU and in nonmember countries, in particular in Switzer-
land, and on the exchange of information between tax authorities. The
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draft directive agreed upon at the EU summit in Feira, Portugal,
requires Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg to levy a 15% withholding
tax from 2004 and to raise this rate to 20% after the first three years.
Switzerland is willing to introduce a 35% withholding tax as of 2004 and
to provide for an automatic exchange of information in cases of tax
fraud, but refuses to report suspicious transactions linked to tax evasion.
These steps might trigger large outflows of capital from the EU to
Switzerland. Since negotiations have not produced results, the Ecofin
Council Presidency agrees to hold an extraordinary Council session after
the European Commission has successfully concluded more detailed
discussions with Switzerland.
The Ecofin Council endorses by a large majority the establishment of
committees at levels 2 (advisory) and 3 as well as of a reconfigured
Financial Services Policy Group (FSPG) as proposed in the Economic
and Financial Committees Report on Financial Regulation, Supervision
and Stability. The issue of delegating the powers to adopt implementing
measures to the European Commission is left open.
Other items on the agenda include the streamlining of the annual eco-
nomic and employment policy coordination cycle, structural indicators,
corporate governance, the Financial Services Action Plan, integration
and efficiency indicators, the proposal on a new directive on investment
services, the Court of Auditors annual report, energy taxation, and a
strengthened coordination of budgetary policies.
5 The Governing Council of the ECB decides to cut the minimum bid rate on
the main refinancing operations of the Eurosystem, conducted as vari-
able rate tenders, by 50 basis points from 3.25% to 2.75%. The interest
rates on the marginal lending facility and the deposit facility were also
reduced by 50 basis points each, to 3.75% and 1.75%, respectively. ECB
President Willem Duisenberg says that the interest rate cut has become
necessary to improve the outlook for the euro area economy; there is
also increased evidence that inflationary pressures are easing.
The Governing Council of the ECB reconfirms the reference value for
M3 growth at 4%.
5/6 On the occasion of the plenary meeting of the European Convention, the
Working Group on Simplification of Legislative Procedures and Instru-
ments recommends that the number of instruments be reduced from
currently 15 to 6 (EU laws, EU framework laws, regulations, decisions,
recommendations, opinions) and that codecision becomes the general
rule for the adoption of legislative acts; in some exceptions to this rule,
the Council of the European Union will have the sole decision-making
power.
11 Despite lively debates and numerous bilateral talks, EU economics and
finance ministers fail to reach an agreement on the cross-border taxation
of savings income at the extraordinary Ecofin Council session. Yet, the
Ecofin Council commits itself to formally adopting the entire taxation
package prior to the European Council meeting in Brussels in March
2003.
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12 Portugals ministry of finance announces that the general government def-
icit will be below 3% of GDP in 2002, thanks to extraordinary revenues,
especially from the sale of the state-owned fixed-line telecommunica-
tions network.
12/13 The European Council of Copenhagen concludes the accession negotia-
tions launched in Copenhagen in 1993 with ten accession countries
(Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia). These countries are
to join the EU on May 1, 2004, which will enable them to take part in
the elections to the European Parliament in June 2004. The new Euro-
pean Commission is to take office on November 1, 2004.
According to the European Council, the target year for Romania and
Bulgaria to join the EU is 2007.
The European Council agrees that it will decide in December 2004
whether Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria. If the Council
decides in favor of Turkey, the EU will open accession negotiations
without delay.
As regards unresolved budgetary and financial issues, the EU heads of
state or government adopt a bundle of measures worth EUR 40.8
billion, including agriculture and structural fund expenditures. These
funds exceed the last proposal put forward by the European Commission
by EUR 408 million.
The European Council decides that the European Convention will
present the results of its work in time for the European Council of
Thessaloniki in June 2003. The ensuing intergovernmental conference
could be launched under Italian EU presidency in November 2003; the
future European Constitutional Treaty would be signed after the acces-
sion of the new Member States in the first half of 2004.
16 The European Commission presents a report which states that most of the
EU Member States pension systems are not sustainable. In order to
defuse the potential pensions time bomb, political and economic
policymakers are called upon to adapt the world of work to demo-
graphic developments. Older workers should be encouraged to stay
longer in employment (the actual retirement age in Europe is to be
raised from the current average of 58 years to 63 years), which would
automatically result in higher contributions being paid into pension
systems. The trend towards early retirement is to be stopped.
17 The European Central Bank launches a new public consultation exercise to
ascertain the views of users and the interested public on the next
generation of the TARGET large-value payment system (TARGET 2).
19 The European Commission issues a communication entitled The introduc-
tion of euro banknotes and coins — one year after. According to the
latest Eurobarometer survey, 49.7% of euro area citizens feel happy with
the euro. A large majority believes that the number of existing denomi-
nations for banknotes (83.7%) and coins (53.5%) is just right. However,
the psychological changeover of Europeans seems to be far from com-
plete: 42.2% of consumers already calculate mainly in euro, but this
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percentage drops to 12.5% when large purchases are being made (e.g. a
house or a car).
20 Greece and Italy present a joint work program for their EU council
presidencies in 2003. It is the first time that two countries have prepared
such a joint program. The priorities of the Council of the European
Union in 2003 will be to finalize the Accession Treaties for signature in
April 2003 and to take forward work towards the completion of struc-
tural and institutional reforms that have become necessary because of
enlargement by opening the Intergovernmental Conference, which is to
conclude its discussion on the basis of the draft constitution proposed by
the European Convention, during the second half of the year.
Furthermore, the presidencies aim to strengthen Europes economic and
social cohesion, to promote sustainable development, to achieve prog-
ress on issues like asylum, immigration and the management of external
borders, and to contribute to global stability.
The European Convention Working Groups on External Action and
Defence present their final reports to the plenary meeting. The Exter-
nal Action working group recommends that the EU should work, where
appropriate, for changes in the statutes of international organizations to
allow for membership for the Union, without prejudice to the status of
EU Member States within these organizations. The euro area members
of the working group express support for a single representation of the
euro area in international financial institutions.
President Giscard dEstaing introduces the work program for the
coming months, according to which the complete draft versions of
the European Constitutional Treaty are to be presented at the European
Council of Thessaloniki on June 20 and 21, 2003.
23 The French government submits to the European Commission its medium-
term budget plan for 2004 to 2006, committing itself to bringing down
the general government budget deficit, which is projected to rise to
2.8% in 2002, to 1% of GDP by 2006.
January 2003
1 Greece assumes the rotating EU Presidency on January 1, 2003, and plans
to focus on the following economic and financial topics: EU enlarge-
ment, strengthening economic policy coordination, particularly in the
area of budgetary policies, resolving the remaining outstanding issues in
the areas of the tax package, integration of European financial markets,
the international effort to restore confidence and stability in global
financial markets, the implementation of the Financial Services Action
Plan, reforms of goods and services markets, employment policy,
structural policy within the framework of the Lisbon process, closer
cooperation on economic and financial issues between the current and
future Member States.
2 In its Review of the International Role of the Euro, the European Central
Bank (ECB) observes that the share of euro-denominated international
securities issued by nonresidents came to 29% at mid-year; this
compares with 44% and 13% for the U.S. dollar and the Japanese
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yen, respectively. The euros role in foreign exchange markets is smaller,
with the euro accounting for about one fifth of global spot trading.
About half of the euro areas external trade is already conducted using
the euro. The share of euro in official holdings of foreign exchange
reserves has stagnated at 13% since 1999 (U.S. dollar: 68%, Japanese
yen: 5%).
8 The European Commission concludes that the 2002 government deficit in
Germany is expected to have clearly exceeded the reference value under
Article 104 of the Treaty, because the underlying deficit has been rising
since the year 2000, because growth in 2001 and 2002 turned out
markedly lower than originally projected, because of the impact of
the corporate tax reform on tax revenues and because of expenditure
overruns, especially in the health care system. Therefore the Commis-
sion has asked for a Council recommendation to Germany urging the
German government to put an end to the present excessive deficit
situation by May 21, 2003.
The European Commission also calls for an early warning to France to
prevent the prospective occurrence of a 2002 government deficit
exceeding the Treatys reference value of 3% of GDP.
In its document The Internal Market Ten Years without Frontiers, the
European Commission notes that along with the steady globalization trend
and the introduction of new technologies, the Internal Market estab-
lished on December 31, 1992, has improved competition and raised
efficiency. The Internal Market is now faced with new challenges:
ensuring the effective operation of an Internal Market after enlargement
in May 2004, and meeting the Lisbon targets.
15 In its Spring Report to the annual Spring European Council on economic
and social affairs evaluating the implementation of the Broad Economic
Policy Guidelines (BEPGs) in 2002, the European Commission focuses on
the progress towards reaching the objective agreed in Lisbon in 2000 of
becoming the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy
in the world. The European Commission notes that moderate progress
has been made and calls on the Member States to foster structural
change, above all on the labor markets and of social systems, to focus
more on promoting future-oriented technology, training and education,
and calls on more competition and reform in the energy, financial,
transport and services sectors and public services contracts.
20 The Eurogroup supports the recommendation aiming at the reduction of
the general government deficit by German government and the early
warning the European Commission issued to France.
21 After a lengthy discussion, the Ecofin Council reaches political agreement
on the tax package (retention and withholding tax, postponement of the
discussion on a draft directive on a Community framework for the
taxation of energy products and on a draft regulation which would
strengthen cooperation between Member States tax authorities to com-
bat fraud relating to value added tax).
The EU finance ministers agreed that 12 Member States are due to
implement automatic exchange of information concerning interest
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income derived from savings in another Member State from January 1,
2004.
Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg will for the time being retain banking
secrecy and apply a withholding tax on savings held by residents of other
Member States (15% from January 1, 2004, 20% from January 1, 2007
and 35% from January 1, 2010) and share the revenue with the country
of residence (handing over 75% and keeping 25%).
Switzerland will also retain banking secrecy and will apply the same rates
of retention and withholding tax as Belgium, Luxembourg and Austria.
Switzerland will share the revenue of the retention tax and will accept
the 75/25 division applied within the Community. Austria, Belgium and
Luxembourg will implement an automatic exchange of information if
and when the EC enters into an agreement by unanimity in the Council
with Switzerland, Liechtenstein, San Marino, Monaco and Andorra to
exchange information upon request and if and when the Council agrees
by unanimity that the U.S.A. is committed to exchange of information
upon request as defined in the 2002 OECD Agreement.
The 15 EU ministers of finance also debate the implementation of the
Stability and Growth Pact by examining the updated Stability and
Convergence Programmes of Germany, Greece, France, Italy, Sweden
and Finland for 2002 to 2006.
On Germany, whose deficit the Federal Statistical Office projects to
come to 3.75% of GDP for 2002, clearly higher than the 3% limit,
the Ecofin Council decides that an excessive deficit exists in Germany
according to Article 104 (6) of the Treaty and issues a recommendation
to Germany according to Article 104 (7) of the Treaty to put an end to
the excessive deficit situation as rapidly as possible.
On France, the Ecofin Council adopts a recommendation in line with
Article 99 (4) of the Treaty with a view to giving an early warning to
France to prevent the occurrence of an excessive deficit.
On Italy, the EU ministers of finance criticize the lack of information on
the additional measures foreseen to achieve the budgetary targets
beyond 2003 to prevent an excessive deficit in 2004.
20/21 The plenary session of the European Convention for the first time deals
with the effect of the increase in the number of Member States following
the forthcoming enlargement on the functioning of the institutions.
There is consensus on the need to retain the three institutions European
Parliament, European Council and European Commission and to make
them more efficient. A majority of the convention members favors a
mixed system for the future institutional structure combining both
federal (dual chamber, joint responsibilities) and confederal elements
(continuation of the status quo). The role and presidency of the
European Council and its relationship with the European Commission
need to be defined more clearly in the Constitutional Treaty. The
German and French proposal to introduce a European Foreign Affairs
Minister meets with a positive echo.
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21 The European Commission proposes that Austria phase out state guarantees
granted by regional or local authorities to state mortgage banks and
some savings banks as a form of state aid.
23 The European Central Bank decides to implement measures to improve the
operational framework for monetary policy. The maturity of the main
refinancing operations will be shortened from two weeks to one week.
Moreover, the timing of the reserve maintenance period will be changed
to start on the settlement day of the main refinancing operation follow-
ing the first Governing Council meeting every month. These two meas-
ures are designed to remove expectations of interest rate changes during
any particular maintenance period and to ensure that the reserve main-
tenance period always starts on a TARGET operating day. They will
come into effect during the first quarter of 2004.
28 The European Commission adopts the Second Progress Report on
economic and social cohesion, which is an update on the state of
Europes regions. The report confirms that there will be an unprece-
dented widening of economic disparities within the Union, that a
geographical shift in the pattern of disparities will take place, and that
the EU will face a less advantageous employment situation, but also that
the economic potential of an enlarged EU will be enhanced. Only long-
term measures will reduce the gaps, with the resources to be allocated
to cohesion policy remaining focused on the least developed regions,
above all the new Member States regions.
Set up on initiative of the European Commission and the European Central
Bank, the Euro Cash User Group meets for the first time. The Euro Cash
User Group meetings are to be hosted and chaired alternately by the
ECB and the Commission and will take place two to three times a year,
alternately in Brussels and Frankfurt. This new group is designed to
continue the dialogue of the Commission with its consultative groups on
issues related to euro cash and is to establish a forum for discussion and
information-sharing on all euro cash related issues among the banking
sector, the vending industry, representatives of retailers, cash in transit
companies, small and medium-sized enterprises and consumers as well
as experts from the Mint Directors Working Group.
29 In the new annual economic report, German government officials have
scaled back the forecast for GDP growth in 2003 from 1.5% as stated
in the December 2002 stability program to 1%.
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1 Overview
After GDP growth had sharply decreased in 2001 with Austrian output even
shrinking in the second half of 2001, economic activity temporarily received
fresh stimulus at the beginning of 2002 as the contribution of net exports to
GDP growth turned positive. In line with tendencies throughout Europe, the
upturn in the first half of 2002 failed to stimulate domestic demand, however.
According to the latest forecasts of the OeNB, the Austrian Institute of
Economic Research (WIFO) and the Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS), real
GDP growth will again have been slightly below 1% in 2002. The unfavorable
international economic situation — particularly in Germany, Austrias most
important trading partner — and the extremely high level of uncertainty
concerning future economic developments resulted in enterprises substantially
cutting their investment plans and households reducing consumption. Govern-
ment consumption did not significantly stimulate growth either due to the
austerity measures implemented within the framework of budget consolidation.
Table 1
Overview of Key Economic Indicators
3rd quarter
2002
2nd quarter
2002
1st quarter
2002
3rd quarter
2002
2nd quarter
2002
1st quarter
2002
2001 2000 1999 1998 1997
on previous year in % on previous period in %, SA trend on previous year in %
National accounts
Gross domestic product,
in real terms 0.9 1.0 0.4 —0.1 0.1 0.5 0.7 3.5 2.7 3.9 1.6
Total exports, in real terms 2.4 1.7 —0.6 0.7 0.3 0.1 7.4 13.4 8.5 8.1 12.4
Total gross capital formation,
in real terms —5.8 —2.8 —8.5 —1.5 —1.4 —1.4 —4.0 2.9 4.2 4.0 3.1
Total imports, in real terms —2.3 0.0 —2.6 0.2 —0.5 —0.9 5.9 11.6 9.0 5.7 12.0
Total government consumption,
in real terms 1.6 1.2 1.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 —0.5 0.0 3.1 2.8 — 1.5
Total consumer spending,
in real terms 0.9 0.3 0.9 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.5 3.3 2.3 2.7 1.7
February
2003
January
2003
December
2002
November
2002
October
2002
September
2002
4 th quarter
2002
3 rd quarter
2002
2002 2001 2000
on previous year in %
Monthly indicators
Total production sector,
O‹ NACE1) sections C-F,
industrial output, NSA, 1995=100 — — — 1.47 0.6 — 1.4 0.6 — 0.8 — 0.4 0.0 0.3 6.9
Production sector, section:
manufacturing, O‹ NACE1) D,
Index, NSA,1995=100 — — 2.35 1.7 — 0.8 2.7 1.0 0.6 0.1 0.5 9.9
Total trade — sales, in real terms — — 2.53 — 1.5 4.2 6.1 1.7 3.0 1.1 — 2.8 2.7
Automotive trade, automotive
repairs, gas stations —
sales, in real terms — — 5.86 — 8.6 2.8 4.2 — 0.4 — 2.2 — 3.5 — 2.1 — 2.1
HICP — overall index — 1.67 1.67 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 2.3 2.0
Index
Economic Sentiment
Indicator (SA) 98.60 98.20 98.20 98.2 98.4 98.0 98.3 97.9 98.1 98.3 99.3
in % of labor supply
Unemployment rate,
according to microcensus
(EU definition), months, SA 4.10 4.10 4.10 4.1 4.1 4.2 4.1 4.2 4.1 3.6 3.6
Unemployment rate
(national definition), total, SA — 6.60 7.20 6.8 6.9 7.0 7.0 7.0 6.9 6.1 5.8
Source: OeNB.
1) O‹NACE = Austrian Statistical Classification of Economic Activities.
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Martin Schneider,
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A look at the confidence indicators reveals that an upturn cannot yet be
expected for the near future. Although the indicators surveyed by the European
Commission have slightly improved recently, the general tendency remains
largely the same. For the first time in a rather long period, the Economic
Sentiment Indicator rose again, climbing 0.4 to 98.6 points in February
2003. The findings of the WIFO Economic Surveys of the first quarter 2003
indicate a continued decline in economic activity. Moreover, the development of
sales price expectations, the assessment of order volumes, the assessment of
inventories and production expectations point to a deterioration of the
economic situation.
In line with the economic decline, the upward trend of prices clearly
decelerated in 2002, to a full-year result of 1.7% (2001: 2.3%). Inflation
peaked in August at 2.1%, but subsequently declined to likewise 1.7% in
December. With an average increase of 2.4% in 2002 year on year, standard
wage rates were significantly higher than the Consumer Price Index for the first
time since 1999. In January 2003 the nominal wage increase dropped to 2.2%.
Due to the economic slump, the Austrian labor market situation is expected
to remain gloomy in 2003. In January 2003 the number of unemployed persons
rose for the twenty-first month in a row. According to the national definition,
the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate amounted to 6.6% in January 2003
and, therefore, was 0.3% below the average of 2002. According to the EU
definition, the unemployment rate was at 4.1% in January 2003 and was thus at
the average level of the previous year. Unemployment figures at comparably
high levels were last reported at the end of 1998.
2 Industrial Output Continues to Stagnate
Mainly due to high levels in the second quarter of 2002, industrial output in
Austria increased by 0.6% in the first half of 2002 compared with the same
period in the previous year. However, in the second half of 2002 industrial
output again dropped by 0.6% and thus remains in a phase of stagnation that has
been observed since the second quarter of 2001. With a decrease of 0.8%,
growth was particularly flat in the fourth quarter of 2002. Altogether, industrial
output in 2002 remained at the previous years level.
An analysis of the development of the individual economic sectors and by
categories of use reveals that this bad result is mainly due to the decline in
building construction (—3.2%) and in the output of durable consumer goods
(—7.3%). Manufacturing output grew by 0.1% in 2002 and was thus only
slightly above the previous years figure. Output in the construction industry
decreased by 0.8%. The output of nondurable consumer goods, however, rose
by 1.2%. While the currently available data do not conclusively suggest that
output growth will expand in the near future, the slight acceleration recorded in
manufacturing output — which is the key pillar of industrial output — since
August 2002 bodes well; this improvement is mainly due to an increase in the
field of nondurable consumer goods. The manufacturing of durable consumer
goods, however, has continuously decreased over the past few months. In
December 2002 it dropped 11.7%, which is the fifth two-digit monthly
decrease in a row. Also, the output decline in the construction industry (notably
building construction), which is the second important manufacturing sector,
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does not seem to be coming to an end in the foreseeable future. The building
construction industry has been especially affected by the current slowdown in
economic activity because two phenomena — the cutting of overcapacities on the
one hand, and low domestic demand on the other — have seriously dampened
construction output. Except for an interim high in April 2002, building
construction output has been continuously declining. The year-on-year drop
of 13.0% in December 2002 was the strongest decline since output indices have
been computed. As opposed to this, civil engineering has been recording
significant growth rates for quite some time. In the fourth quarter of 2002 civil
engineering output grew by 12.3% year on year.
In the field of trade, the impact of the weak development of domestic
demand in early 2002 was partially compensated for in the second half of the
year. Trade sales in real terms rose by a total of 1.1% in 2002. All trade
categories except for the automotive trade industry generated positive growth
rates in the second half compared with the previous year. In December 2002
retail trade grew by 0.9%. The automotive sector, which suffered heavy losses
in the first quarters of 2002 (first half of 2002: —5.5%), has apparently started
to recover, judging from the smaller losses reported in the second half of the
year (—1.3%). While the automotive market thus seems to have started
stabilizing, the full-year result for 2002 was nonetheless a decline of 3.5%.
3 Growth Underpinned by Net Exports,
Domestic Demand is Slack
After a clear slowdown of GDP growth in 2001 and an output decline in the
second half of 2001, economic activity revived at the beginning of 2002. In line
with tendencies throughout Europe, the upswing observed in the first half of
2002 did not gain momentum in the second half of the year, however. The
deterioration in external economic conditions and increased uncertainty
concerning the international economic and political situation seem to have
prevented the initial upturn led by net exports from filtering through to
domestic demand-oriented sectors of the economy. Growth is not expected
to accelerate until the second half of 2003. According to the latest forecasts of
OeNB, WIFO and IHS, real GDP growth will again have been slightly below
1% in 2002. The decreasing momentum in 2002 is evidenced particularly by the
quarterly GDP growth rates. While seasonally adjusted growth on the corre-
sponding periods of 2001 amounted to 0.8% and 0.4%, respectively, in the first
two quarters of 2002, it dropped to 0.1% in the third quarter and was not
expected be higher in the fourth quarter. Both international and domestic
factors seem to have prevented the growth spurt widely expected for 2002
from actually materializing. The unfavorable international economic situation —
particularly in Germany, Austrias most important trading partner — and the
extremely high level of uncertainty concerning future economic developments
resulted in enterprises substantially cutting their investment plans. This devel-
opment is reflected in construction investments, which have been declining for
six consecutive quarters (except in the second quarter of 2002), and in invest-
ment in plant and equipment, which generated declines of 18.8% and 11.2% in
the second and third quarters, respectively.
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Increased consumer spending, which had substantially underpinned
economic activity in the previous years, clearly dropped in 2002, which can
be attributed to the low growth in real income and stagnating employment.
Government consumption did not significantly stimulate growth either due to
austerity measures implemented in the framework of budget consolidation. As
in 2001, GDP growth was led by net exports in 2002. However, the positive
contribution of net exports to GDP growth can be traced basically to the
setback in imports. Exports were increasing, but growth was rather sluggish.
4 Labor Market Situation Remains Gloomy in 2003
As earlier, the Austrian labor market has followed cyclical developments in
economic activity with some delay. Since the economic recovery seen in the
first half of 2002 did not win momentum as the year progressed, the labor
market situation is unlikely to improve at least in the first half of 2003.
At first glance, the employment situation appears to have improved sub-
stantially. In January 2003 the number of employed persons amounted to
3,106,953 and was thus almost 40,000 above the figure recorded in January
2002, after having been growing throughout the second half of 2002. However,
the employment statistics are strongly distorted by the introduction of child-
rearing benefits (or, more precisely, by the extension of entitlement prerequi-
sites) because all recipients of child-rearing benefit payments are recorded
among the employed. If the employment figures are adjusted for the number
of beneficiaries of child-rearing and parental leave payments, which has been
clearly rising since the beginning of 2002, the picture drastically changes:
instead of an increase by 15,000 employed persons in December 2002, a
decrease of nearly 25,000 persons in regular employment becomes evident
(see chart 2). Even judging from the adjusted figures, employment figures have
been stagnating at best over the past few months and thus do not hint at a
turnaround on the labor market. Although typically reacting very flexibly to
changes in demand, labor supply in Austria rose relatively strongly — by more
		
				







	

	





		
	

		




 
!
"


	
 
Economic Background
26 Focus on Austria 1/2003
than 1% — in 2002 despite the low labor demand persisting for more than a year
now. The increased number of child-rearing beneficiaries, structural policy
measures affecting early retirement, tuition fees and joint insurance (coverage
by the national health plan for nonworking childless spouses) as well as
increased quota for foreign workers have caused recent labor supply figures
to rise more strongly than could be expected given general developments in the
employment situation.
In January 2003 the number of unemployed rose for the twenty-first month
in a row. The rise in the number of unemployed persons was, however,
declining substantially in the second half of 2002, falling to just below 6,000
persons in January 2003, which indicates that labor demand has started to
stabilize. Nevertheless, the unfavorable economic situation in the second half
of 2002 might have an adverse impact on employment demand in 2003.
According to the national definition, the seasonally adjusted unemployment
rate amounted to 7.2% in December 2002 and, therefore, was 0.3% above
the average of 2002; according to the EU definition, the unemployment rate
came to 4.1% in January 2003 and was thus at the average level of the previous
year. Unemployment figures at comparably high levels were last reported at the
end of 1998. Apart from the unfavorable economic situation, the increased
unemployment rates were mainly due to the relatively strong rise in labor
supply.
Men continue to be more heavily affected by unemployment than women.
While the number of unemployed men in January 2003 was up 2.9% on the
previous year, the number of unemployed women was up only 0.1%. The
deterioration of the labor market situation hit in particular the problem groups
of young people aged 19 to 25 years and employees older than 55 years. In
January 2003 the unemployment rate for these age groups rose by 5.9% and
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15.1% as compared to January 2002. Furthermore, the unfavorable labor
market situation also affected groups of higher qualified and educated people.
The number of unemployed among skilled workers and high school and uni-
versity graduates rose above average, whereas the unemployment rate among
persons who have completed compulsory schooling and/or an apprenticeship
rose below average.
A look at unemployment figures by sector reveals that the rise in January
2003 was mainly due to increases reported in the manufacturing (+1,915
persons) and other services sectors (+1,719 persons). In the real estate sector,
1,235 persons more than last year were registered as unemployed. In the
construction sector the low seems to have been reached; no further increase
in the unemployment rate was recorded in the three months to January 2003.
The number of registered vacancies, a figure that is well suited as an
indicator for the general employment situation, also reflects the adverse labor
market situation. The developments during the year are, however, boding well.
While the number of job vacancies in June 2002 was 26.6% or 8,847 jobs below
the figure recorded in June 2001, this difference had shrunk to only 5.3% or
1,158 jobs in January 2003. Moreover, the rise in the ratio of registered
unemployed to registered vacancies decreased from 62.2% in June 2002 (as
compared with June 2001) to 7.6% in January 2003.
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5 Falling Imports at a Weak Export Growth Result
in Substantial Current Account Improvement
In the course of 2002, the external sector of the Austrian economy was char-
acterized by a decline in imports due to a marked weakness of the domestic
economy and sluggish export growth.
While exports increased in the first half of 2002 amid the general economic
upswing, growth started slowing as of mid-2002. The most recent data from fall
2002 indicate only a below-average development of exports. From September
to November 2002 goods exports in nominal terms were up 4.8% compared
with the same period of the previous year. Export activities benefited from
higher demand from Germany, whose imports rose slightly in the third quarter
of 2002 after four consecutive quarters of decline. The unfavorable economic
situation in the euro area and the deterioration of Austrias price competitive-
ness abroad due to the development of the euro-dollar exchange rate have
restrained export growth, however. From September to November 2002,
exports to EU Member States augmented by 5.5% (by 5.8% to Germany),
while exports to non-EU countries rose by only 3.9%.
Companies expectations of future export orders, as researched in WIFOs
monthly EU Economic Survey, reflect weak export activity. In January 2003,
the balance of affirmative and negative responses was —41 points, a reading last
recorded during the crisis in Asia in early 1999 and clearly below the long-term
average. In February 2003, this balance surprisingly improved to its long-term
average of —34 points. The only sector to post a strong increase in export orders
in January 2003 was the car industry (+11.3 points). Expectations of export
orders are particularly pessimistic in the food and luxury food sectors (—12.3
points). To put these export figures in perspective: imports of goods decreased
by 2.4% from January to November 2002, reflecting above all the slump in
investment activities.
Based on transaction data, which do not include valuation effects, Austrias
current account showed a small deficit of EUR 761 million in the first three
quarters of 2002, which constitutes a decrease of EUR 2.8 billion compared
with the same period of the previous year. The improvement in the current
account was mainly due to the goods subaccount (+EUR 4.3 billion on a year-
on-year basis). In the same period, the surplus in the income subaccount also
posted an increase (+EUR 1.1 billion), whereas the balance on the transfer
subaccount deteriorated by EUR 0.3 billion the balance on the services
subaccount even by EUR 2.3 billion. The travel balance decreased only slightly
in the first three quarters of 2002.
The improvement of the goods subaccount results primarily from the 3.5%
drop of imports in nominal terms due to the weak domestic economy in the first
three quarters of 2002, while goods exports rose by 4.2% in nominal terms
over the same period. The income subaccount deficit decreased only slightly in
this period, thanks mainly to the improvement in the investment income bal-
ance from other investments by EUR 0.9 billion. The financial account closed
with net outflows of EUR 2.8 billion in the first three quarters of 2002, which
constitutes a decrease of EUR 6.0 billion compared with the previous year. The
main driving force behind this development was the annual increase in other
investments by EUR 5.5 billion.
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6 Decreasing Inflation Development
The upward trend of prices clearly decelerated in 2002, to a full-year result of
1.7% (2001: 2.3%). Inflation peaked in August at 2.1%, but subsequently
declined to likewise 1.7% in December. The main factor contributing to infla-
tion was the services sector, which is the most important subcomponent of the
HICP with a weight of almost 45%. The upward trend in services prices was
surprisingly persistent in the course of the year and slowed only toward the end
of 2002. Energy prices, typically dominated by the price of crude oil, displayed
a different trend. Their contribution to inflation was initially negative, but
turned positive in the course of the second half of the year as crude oil prices
increased. The development of food prices reflects the fact that increases related
to the BSE crisis and the foot-and-mouth disease were dropping out of the
calculation. At the beginning of 2002 a supply shortage triggered by unfavorable
weather conditions temporarily drove up vegetable prices in particular. In the
euro area, HICP inflation rates dropped only in Germany and Belgium in 2002.
Regarding the cash changeover, the statistical evidence is that the introduction of
euro banknotes and coins in 2002 did not have any significant price effects. In
2003, price developments are expected to be strongly impacted by the further
evolution of the euro-dollar exchange rate and crude oil prices.
Inflation measured by the HICP amounted to 1.7% in January 2003. The
strongest upward price trend was recorded for energy (3.4%), services (2.6%)
and processed food, including alcoholic beverages and tobacco (2.3%). A damp-
ening effect on overall price developments was exerted primarily by develop-
ments in prices for nonenergy industrial goods (+0.4%) and nonprocessed food
items (—2.1%).
Preconsumer prices, which are much more volatile than consumer prices,
declined almost throughout 2002. Only toward year-end did wholesale prices
start to inch up again — a tendency that continued in January 2003. On average,
wholesale prices dropped by 0.4% in 2002. The Producer Price Index followed
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a similar pattern, with the exception that prices were dropping throughout the
year. Producer prices declined by 1.2% on average in 2002.
Compared with 2001, standard wage rates rose by an average 2.4% in 2002
and thus remained 0.7% above the level of the Consumer Price Index. In the
public sector, the corresponding increase was rather moderate at 1.1% com-
pared with overall wage increases. In January 2003, the increase in nominal
wages slowed down to 2.2%, with the increase of standard wage rates in the
public sector equaling the overall average. Thus, public sector wages did not
grow more slowly than in the rest of the economy for the first time since 1999.
The relatively strong increase of real income per employee may be surprising in
view of the weak economy, but has to be seen in the light of the losses in real
income suffered in 2000 and the first half of 2001. The unit price labor costs in
manufacturing output very clearly show that the policy of moderating wages in
order to secure international competitiveness was retained. Following an
increase caused by the cyclical behavior of productivity growth by 1.8% in
2001, unit labor costs decreased again by 0.7% in 2002 due to the continued
policy of moderating wages. The price competitiveness could be improved by
0.7% vis-a‘-vis Germany and by 0.8% vis-a‘-vis external trading partners in
general.
Due to higher crude oil prices, energy prices can be expected to rise in
2003. This increase is compensated for by the decelerating upward trend in
prices in the services sector and the low pressure on prices caused by demand,
which will enable HICP inflation to stabilize at the current level.
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7 Confidence Indicators Do Not Hint at Turnaround
For the past few months, the economic climate in Austria can be characterized
as relatively stable at a low level. The indicators surveyed by the European
Commission have slightly improved recently but the general tendency remains
largely the same. For the first time in a rather long period, the Economic
Sentiment Indicator rose again, climbing 0.4 to 98.6 points in February
2003. However, this figure is still below the average recorded in the previous
years. Austrian consumers have become somewhat more pessimistic about the
economic situation than recently; their current assessments are even slightly
below the 2002 average. This pessimism among consumers is, in turn, reflected
in the retail sectors confidence indicators. Although retail confidence recovered
from its historical low in January 2003, it is still very low. Industry confidence
has grown slightly but is still weak. Austrian construction companies, by con-
trast, have become much more optimistic about the economic situation than
most recently. The indicator of construction confidence is slightly above its
long-term average and has sizably improved over the past few months. Many
construction companies expect the decline of overcapacities to be coming to an
end. Moreover, intensified public investment activities and the reconstruction
activities in the wake of the flooding that occurred in August 2002 seem to have
helped improve overall confidence. Among services providers confidence
remains, nonetheless, relatively low.
The industrial sector expects more orders for the next months than most
recently. The balance on order expectations increased to —28 points in February
and is thus nearly 10 points above the average in 2002, with expectations for
orders from abroad slightly trailing the improvement in overall expectations.
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Expectations concerning industrial output in the next few months also
improved slightly in February 2003, but as yet do not unambiguously imply
an increase in economic activity. In February 2003 the balance of affirmative and
negative responses was — at 7 points (January: 4 points) — slightly above the
long-term average and also above the average in 2002.
However, the more recent findings of the WIFO Economic Surveys for the
first quarter of 2003 suggest that economic activity may actually continue to
slow down. Specifically, changes in the assessment of order volumes, sales price
expectations, the assessment of inventory and production expectations point
towards a deterioration of the economic situation. On a positive note, the
assessment of capacity utilization — based on seasonally adjusted data — has
improved compared with the fourth quarter of 2002. Moreover, the findings
of the survey of construction companies within the framework of the quarterly
WIFO Economic Surveys in the first quarter of 2003 suggest that the crisis in
the construction industry may be coming to an end. The assessment concerning
the development of business activity and order volumes was slightly more
optimistic in the fourth quarter of 2002 than it was in the previous quarters,
whereas the assessment of construction price expectations has deteriorated.
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Decline in Total Assets
After an already highly difficult year 2001, 2002 turned out to be even more
challenging for banks operating in Austria, largely because international eco-
nomic conditions continued to be tight. Banks thus had to further downgrade
their profit expectations, and even total assets decreased: After a growth of
EUR 25.04 billion or 4.5% in 2001, 2002 was the first year to record a full-year
decline in total assets (by EUR 14.47 billion or 2.5%) since the start of
electronic reporting in 1978. But this unusual decrease can largely be traced
to restructuring measures following the integration of Bank Austria AG (BA)
with the Bavarian Hypo- und Vereinsbank (HVB) and the ensuing merger of BA
with Creditanstalt AG (CA). Without CA and BA, total asset growth would
actually have amounted to roughly +3%.
As CAwas a joint stock bank, this sectors total assets shrank by EUR 37.33
billion or 28.9%, whereas the savings bank sector (with which BA is affiliated)
boasted an increase by EUR 11.56 billion or 5.7%. State mortgage banks and
Raiffeisen credit cooperatives also reported substantial asset growth at 12.9%
and 4.4%, respectively, followed by special purpose banks at 2.4% and
Volksbank credit cooperatives at 1.5%. Besides joint stock banks, building
and loan associations posted a drop in total assets by 1.8%.
The market share of the five largest independent banks in total assets inched
up 0.4 percentage point to 45.9% against December 2001.
Number of Banks Continues to Fall
Of all banks subject to reporting requirements in Austria, the number of
head offices fell by 10 to 897 in 2002, while that of branch offices sank by
75 to 4,471.
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Loan Growth Deteriorated Markedly against 2001
Whereas loan growth had still come to EUR 7.92 billion or 3.5% in 2001, it
sank to nearly one third of this level in 2002 at EUR 2.72 billion or 1.2%. In the
fourth quarter of 2002, interest payments on loans credited ran to EUR 2.77
billion, that is a rise by EUR 0.31 billion or 12.6% year on year, despite the
further slowdown of average interest rates for euro-denominated loans against
December 2001.1) In 2002, loan growth was largely carried by foreign currency
loans, which accounted for EUR 2.06 billion or more than 75% of the overall
increase. Relatively speaking, foreign currency loans gained 4.9%, after 7.2%
or EUR 2.83 billion in 2001. Euro-denominated loans lost some of their
attractiveness again: They almost stagnated at +EUR 0.66 billion or +0.3%
in 2002 in comparison with +EUR 5.09 billion or +2.7% in the like 2001
period. The absolute increase of foreign currency loans thus exceeded that of
euro-denominated loans again for the first time in two years.
As a consequence, the share of foreign currency loans in banks lending
portfolios went up by 0.6 percentage point to 18.8% year on year.
In a sectoral breakdown, Volksbank credit cooperatives engaged most
strongly in foreign currency loans with a share of 24.9% in overall loans. At
the end of December 2002, savings banks had the second largest share in foreign
Number of Banking Offices in Austria
Joint stock banks
and private
banks
Savings banks State
mortgage
banks
Raiffeisen
credit
cooperatives
Volksbank
credit
cooperatives
Building
and loan
associations
Special
purpose
banks
Total Total number
of head offices
and branch
offices
H B H B H B H B H B H B H B H B
December 31, 2001 61 738 67 1,380 9 164 617 1,725 70 475 5 59 78 5 907 4,546 5,453
December 31, 2002 59 534 64 1,509 9 165 609 1,719 70 481 5 59 81 4 897 4,471 5,368
Change1) —2 —204 —3 129 — 1 —8 —6 — 6 — — 3 —1 —10 —75 —85
Source: OeNB.
H = Head offices.
B = Branch offices and bureaux de change.
1) Changes are traceable to new offices, closing of offices and mergers.
1 Against December 2001, the average interest rate charged on loans to households thus diminished by 0.38
percentage point to 6.51%.
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currency loans at 21.7%, followed by joint stock banks at 20.9% and Raiffeisen
credit cooperatives at 17.8%. Special purpose banks had the lowest share at
3.7%. Building and loan associations are, incidentally, not allowed to extend
foreign currency loans.
In a regional breakdown, the share of foreign currency loans in total loans
was highest in Vorarlberg1) at roughly 44%. Some banks in Vorarlberg and the
Tyrol even recorded a share between 60% and 70%.
A breakdown by loan size reveals that, at year-end 2002, loans of up the
EUR 10,0002) accounted for some 71% of total lending, with the average euro-
denominated loan size running to EUR 32,000. By contrast, the majority of
foreign currency loans (32.1%) amounted to between EUR 100,000 and EUR
500,000; their average size came to EUR 148,000.
Loans Denominated in Swiss Francs Remain Highly Popular
Lending in Swiss francs3) again boomed in 2002, after having been outpaced by
Japanese yen-denominated loans in the years before. In 2002, the share of Swiss
franc-denominated loans in total foreign currency loans jumped up by 4.6
percentage points to 54.9%, whereas Japanese yen-denominated loans retreated
for the first time since the launch of the Economic and Monetary Union from
41.9% in December 2001 to 37.2% in December 2002. This revival of the
Swiss franc may be traceable to both the attractive exchange rate and the
favorable yield differential to the euro. Lending in U.S. dollars has, for years,
been stagnating at a share of 6% to 7%.
Across economic sectors, nonfinancial corporations continued to account
for more than half of the total loan volume. In 2002, they borrowed less (—EUR
2.31 billion or —1.8%), mainly because they invested less amid the adverse
1 The conclusiveness of comparisons between provinces is limited, however, as supraregionally operating banks
are always allocated to the head office location (BA-CA is, for instance, allocated to the province of Vienna).
2 Including overdrafts on current accounts.
3 The data on the currency breakdown are taken from banking data compiled as input to euro area aggregates.
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economic conditions, but their share of foreign currency loans remained
unchanged at 19.2% from the like period of 2001. Households, by contrast,
accounted for some 28% of total loans and expanded their borrowing by EUR
4.14 billion or 6.6% in 2002, after a rise by EUR 3.58 billion or 6.1% in 2001.
Foreign currency loans accounted for 25.0% of overall household borrowing,
against 23.2% in December 2001. Lending to the government sector has, for
years, been stagnating at about EUR 28 billion, as the government increasingly
employs other forms of refinancing, including Bundesscha‹tze (federal Treas-
ury bills available only on the Internet) as of late. The governments share of
foreign currency loans merely ran to some 5%.
As in 2001, the share of home and home improvement loans picked up
much faster in 2002 at EUR 2.48 billion or 5.7% than total loans at +1.2%.
The share of foreign currency loans in total home and home improvement loans
augmented to 17.8%, thus inching closer to the share of foreign currency loans
in overall lending (18.8%). Against December 2001, the average interest rate
for home loans decreased by 0.33 percentage point to 5.28%.
Securitized Loans
In 2002, total securitized loans contracted by EUR 1.89 billion or 8.8%,
compared with —EUR 3.0 billion or —12.3% in 2001. This decline was chiefly
attributable to the subposition public sector debt instruments (other than
federal Treasury bills and notes) eligible for central bank refinancing and posted
a decline by EUR 2.04 billion or 13.4%.
Deposit Growth Down Against 2001
After extraordinary additions to domestic nonbanks deposits in 2001 of EUR
13.77 billion or 7.8%, growth slowed down to EUR 2.11 billion or 1.1% in
2002. Apart from savings banks, which generated the highest deposit growth of
EUR 10.07 billion or 18.2% as a result of reclassifications owing to mergers,
Volksbank credit cooperatives boasted an above-average rise in deposits at EUR
0.51 billion or 4.4%, followed by Raiffeisen credit cooperatives at +EUR 1.93
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billion or +4.1%. By contrast, building and loan associations posted a drop in
deposits by EUR 0.16 billion or 1.0%.
A breakdown by deposit category shows that demand deposits augmented by
EUR 3.19 billion or 8.2%, after a similar rise by 8.3% in December 2001. By
contrast, time deposits, which had still posted a rise by EUR 5.07 billion or
25.1% in 2001, shrank by EUR 3.28 billion or 13.0% in 2002. In 2002, savings
deposits (including interest income of EUR 2.76 billion) merely climbed EUR
2.21 billion or 1.8%, which means that without interest income, savings
deposits would have contracted by EUR 0.55 billion. In 2001, savings deposits
had still increased by EUR 5.73 billion or 4.8%, with capitalized interest on
deposits in the amount of EUR 3.12 billion.
Also the asset growth of mutual funds managed by domestic investment
companies1) slowed down to 3.4% in 2002, after 5.0% in 2001.
The half-year statistics on the number and size of deposit accounts reveal
that over 96% of the 23.69 million deposit accounts hold amounts of less than
EUR 20,000.2) In addition, there were 921 savings passbooks with amounts
between EUR 1 million and EUR 3 million and 152 passbooks with over EUR
3 million.
Direct Domestic Issues
The direct domestic issues of banks operating in Austria decreased by EUR
0.34 billion or 0.6% in the full year 2002. In 2001, this position had still
augmented by EUR 2.2 billion or 4.2%. By direct issue category, debt securities
picked up by EUR 1.96 billion or 7.9%, whereas other forms of securitized
lending registered a decline by EUR 1.92 billion or 6.6%.
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External Business Losing Strength
Both on the assets and the liabilities side, external business deteriorated in
2002: External assets sank by EUR 1.03 billion or 0.7%, external liabilities
by as much as EUR 10.10 billion or 5.8%. Especially business with foreign
banks posted sharp reductions, with assets decreasing by EUR 6.97 billion or
8.5% and liabilities even by EUR 14.82 billion or 17.6%. On the liabilities side,
foreign securitized lending was the only relevant position to register an increase
by EUR 5.95 billion or 11.3%. The downtrend in external business may also be
attributable to a shift in external transactions to the ever growing number of
subsidiaries established abroad by Austrian banks.
Great Momentum of Derivatives Transactions
Derivatives transactions continued to boom in 2002 at +EUR 278.25 billion or
+25.1%, thus driving the ratio of special off-balance sheet financial operations
to the total assets of Austrian banks close to an unprecedented ratio of 2.5.
Interest rate contracts had by far the largest share in derivatives transactions at
EUR 1.14 billion or 82% of total volumes. Trading in derivative interest rate
instruments has been expanding continuously since 1999, reflecting the grow-
ing importance of interest rate swaps for managing both active and passive
portfolios and for controlling interest rate risk.
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Banks Capital Base Going Down
For the first time since the Basel Capital Accord entered into force in 1994, the
capital base of banks operating in Austria shrank at year-end in 2002. Whereas
the capital base had still risen by EUR 4.55 billion or 12.1% in 2001, it declined
by EUR 0.43 billion or 1.0% in 2002.
Tier I capital also sank by 0.4 percentage point to 9.1%. Hence, risk
weighted assets as a percentage of total assets went up by 1.5 percentage points
to 45.8% against December 2001.
Operating Profit Deteriorating Further
The 2002 provisional operating profit of banks subject to reporting require-
ments in Austria ran to EUR 4.22 billion, thus clearly lagging behind the
comparable 2001 period by EUR 0.36 billion or 7.9%. The rise in the operating
profit of individual sectors — building and loan associations (+38.0%), special
purpose banks (+14.5%), Raiffeisen credit cooperatives (+9.7%), state mort-
gage banks (+6.8%) and Volksbank credit cooperatives (+ 2.1%) — was can-
celled out by declines in the sectors affected by the merger between BA and CA,
namely joint stock banks and savings banks, whose operating profit narrowed by
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30.7% and 18.1%, respectively. The ratio of operating profit to average total
assets came to 0.73% at the reporting date, having decreased by 0.08 percent-
age point compared to the same period in 2001. The ratio of operating profit to
the assessment base as stipulated by Article 22 (2) of the Austrian Banking Act1)
was 1.43% in 2002, down by 0.16 percentage point compared to 2001.
In 2002, banks operating in Austria reported a substantial decline in oper-
ating income by EUR 0.34 billion or 2.4% to EUR 13.72 billion. Operating
expenses showed a slight increase by EUR 0.02 billion or 0.2% to EUR
9.50 billion. Consequently, the cost/income ratio deteriorated by 1.8 per-
centage points against 2001, running to 69.3%2) at the reporting date.
In a sectoral breakdown, we can observe that the cost/income ratio of state
mortgage banks (58.1%), special purpose banks (61.8%), Raiffeisen credit
cooperatives (64.5%) and Volksbank credit cooperatives (67.6%) was better
than the average of all banks operating in Austria. The ratio of joint stock banks
(70.2%), savings banks (75.1%) and building and loan associations (80.6%)
lagged behind the average in the banking sector.
Set in relation to average total assets, operating income diminished by
0.12 percentage point and operating expenses by 0.03 percentage point. The
ratio of operating profit to the assessment base as stipulated by Article 22 (2) of
the Austrian Banking Act ran to 4.66% at the reporting date, having diminished
by 0.22 percentage point against the same 2001 period.
1 This ratio is calculated by dividing operating profits by the sum of weighted assets, weighted off-balance-sheet
activities and weighted special off-balance-sheet financial operations.
2 For each euro banks earn, they spend EUR 0.69.
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In a sectoral breakdown, an analysis of the structure of operating profit
reveals that the share of net interest income in total operating profit came to
69.5% with state mortgage banks, to 59.1% in building and loan associations
and to 56.2% with Volksbank credit cooperatives. These sectors thus generated
an above-average share of their income from interest rate business. The ratio of
fee-based income to total operating income of joint stock banks stood at 24.8%,
that of savings banks at 24.5% and that of special purpose banks at 24.1%. These
sectors thus generated a relatively high share of total operating income from
fee-based income.
Net Interest Income Giving Slightly
At the reporting date, net interest income amounted to EUR 7.08 billion, thus
having fallen EUR 0.01 billion or 0.1% behind the figure recorded in the like
period in 2001. But the ratio of net interest income to total operating income
still increased by 1.2 percentage points, standing at 51.6% at the reporting date.
The ratio of net interest income to average total assets came to 1.23%, slightly
down against 2001. At EUR 23.43 billion, interest receivable and similar
income remained EUR 3.39 billion or 12.6% below the comparable 2001
figures (—EUR 0.69 billion or —2.5% in the year 2001). At the same time,
interest payable and similar charges fell by EUR 3.38 billion or 17.1% to EUR
16.35 billion, after a decline by EUR 1.05 billion or 5.0% in 2001. In a sectoral
breakdown, we can observe that building and loan associations (+13.0%),
special purpose banks (+12.1%), state mortgage banks (+11.1%), Volksbank
credit cooperatives (+3.7%) and Raiffeisen credit cooperatives (+2.8%) all
raised their net interest income in 2002. Savings banks surge of net interest
income by 17.9% and joint stock banks plunge of net interest income by 32.9%
must be regarded against the backdrop of the BA-CA merger.
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Income from Securities and Equity Interests
on the Retreat
Income from securities and participating interests ran to EUR 1.77 billion, thus
lagging behind the analogous 2001 period by EUR 0.19 billion or 9.6%. Income
from participating interests picked up by EUR 0.14 billion, but declines were
recorded for income from equity shares in affiliated enterprises (—EUR 0.30 bil-
lion),1) and for income on shares and other equity as well as variable rate
securities (—EUR 0.03 billion).
Balance on Commissions Down by 1.6%
The balance on commissions stood at EUR 3.01 billion, thus continuing its
downward slide and falling EUR 0.05 billion or 1.6% behind the comparable
2001 figure. Whereas fee-based income from lending (+EUR 0.07 billion),
payment systems (+EUR 0.06 billion) and services (+EUR 0.03 billion) was
going up, fee-based income from securities (—EUR 0.14 billion) and from
trading in foreign exchange, currency and precious metals (—EUR 0.07 billion)
posted a decline. In 2002, the continuing gloomy sentiment on international
stock markets and the elimination of currency exchange fees for all predecessor
currencies of the euro considerably dampened fee-based income. Fees payable
on securities slipped by EUR 0.03 billion, while fees payable on payment
transfers picked up by EUR 0.02 billion. The ratio of fee-based income to total
operating income nonetheless inched up 0.2 percentage point to 22.0%.
Despite its decline in absolute terms, fee-based income thus continued to be
a major source of income of banks operating in Austria in the review period.
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interconnected banks, so that double counts cannot be ruled out. Integration measures reduce the number of
double counts.
Money and Credit in 2002
Focus on Austria 1/2003 43
Net Income from Financial Transactions on the Rise
The net income from financial transactions amounted to EUR 0.57 billion,
improving by EUR 0.05 billion or 9.5% in 2002. The performance of the
individual segments was varied: Net income on securities other than financial
fixed assets (+EUR 0.05 billion) and on other financial transactions (+EUR
0.01 billion) posted an increase, whereas income on trading in foreign
exchange, currency and precious metals dropped by EUR 0.01 billion. The
share of proprietary trading in total operating income ran to 4.2%, up by
0.5 percentage point.
Other Operating Income
At EUR 1.28 billion, other operating income clearly trailed the comparable
2001 figure by EUR 0.14 billion or 9.8%, reflecting a decrease by EUR
0.15 billion of any other operating income stemming not from the sale of fixed
assets (essentially income on noncore banking business).
General Administrative Expenses Climb More Moderately
General administrative expenses climbed much more moderately by EUR
0.09 billion or 1.1% than in the like period of the past few years. Staff costs
augmented by EUR 0.10 billion or 2.1% to EUR 4.78 billion. The ratio of staff
costs to total operating expenses stood at 50.3%, against 49.4% in 2001.
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After a surge of other administrative expenses in recent years, they
decelerated slightly by EUR 0.01 billion or 0.4% in 2002, coming to EUR
3.14 billion. The ratio of other administrative expenses to total operating
expenses came to 33.0%, down by 0.2 percentage point compared to the
analogous 2001 period. The cost-cutting measures initiated because of the
difficult income situation already showed first — tentative — results.
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Depreciation and Other Operating Expenses
Depreciation of fixed assets and intangible assets rose by EUR 0.06 billion or
8.8% to EUR 0.73 billion, a development which reflects the high investment
activity of recent years. Other operating expenses shrank markedly by EUR
0.12 billion or 12.6%.
Outlook for Full-year 2002 Results1)
Pending the making of end-year closing entries, the auditing of the annual
financial statements by certified public accountants and their approval by the
decision-making bodies, banks operating in Austria expect to have closed the
2002 business year with a final operating result of EUR 4.18 billion, which falls
short of the comparable result of 2001 by as much as EUR 0.35 billion or
7.8%. The requirements for loan loss provisioning are expected to amount to
EUR 2.04 billion, which is EUR 0.17 billion or 7.9% lower than the very high
2001 estimate, but still above the 2000 level. Loan loss provisions include above
all write-downs of claims on nonbanks (EUR 2.26 billion). Although the
anticipated write-downs clearly lag behind the corresponding 2001 figure,
the difficult economic situation in Austria and abroad calls for high adjustments
of claims on nonbanks also at the end of 2002.
While in 2001 exceptionally high recoveries from provisions for securities
and participations stood to boost the profit for the year, the opposite is expected
for 2002. More provisions will have to be created than can be cancelled so that
the balance — EUR 0.07 billion (2001: —EUR 0.83 billion) — will have to be
expensed in 2002. Especially gains realized upon the sale of balance-sheet asset
items 5 to 8 (securities, shares, participating interests and equity shares in
affiliated enterprises) are estimated to have slowed down in 2002, after having
surged in 2001.
1 Banks operating in Austria transmitted the outlook data in their quarterly report of December 2002. Final
results for the fourth quarter and the full year will be reported to the OeNB upon finalization of year-end
audits.
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With risk provisions and value adjustments accounted for, the projected
income on ordinary activities runs to EUR 2.07 billion, an assessment that falls
EUR 1.08 billion or 34.3% below that of the like 2001 period. Extraordinary
expenses for 2002 are forecast at EUR 0.24 billion, which substantially exceeds
the comparable figure for 2001 of EUR 0.08 billion. At the reporting date,
expected tax liabilities came to EUR 0.39 billion, which equals a small rise of
EUR 0.01 billion or 1.6% against the same period of 2001. Hence, the
annual surplus of banks operating in Austria is projected to amount to EUR
1.44 billion, markedly falling behind the 2001 figure of EUR 2.69 billion by
EUR 1.25 billion or 46.3%.
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At the reporting date, return on equity1) amounted to 5.4%, a clear
reduction by 4.4 percentage points against the year 2001. The return on assets2)
ran to 0.25% in 2002; down by 0.23 percentage point against the 0.48% of the
year 2001
1 Definition of return on equity: ratio of annual surplus to tier I capital.
2 Definition of return on assets: ratio of annual surplus to average total assets.
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— A rise in exports and lower income outflows caused a noticeable improve-
ment of the Austrian current account.
— Austrian direct investment abroad continued to thrive.
— Both on the assets and the liabilities side, securities transactions surged.
1 Current Account
In Austria — as in the euro area — domestic demand did not revive during the
period under review; expectations of an economic upswing in the second half of
2002 could not be met. In the first three quarters of 2002, Austrian real GDP
rose by just 0.8% year on year, with the economy firing on just one cylinder,
namely net exports.
These conditions caused the Austrian current account deficit to narrow
substantially in the first three quarters; based on transactions,2) it only ran to
EUR 760 million against EUR 3.6 billion in the like period of 2001.
For a meaningful description and analysis of data, the following methodical
note is necessary: A new statistical data collection method for travel expenses of
Austrian residents distorts the comparison between the intra-year data for the
first three quarters of 2002 and the like 2001 figures (see section 1.1.2.1
Travel). Thus, the sharp reduction of the current account deficit reported for
the first three quarters of 2002 may in fact have even been understated.
In trade with other euro area countries (see chart 2), Austrias current account
closed with a narrower year-on-year deficit in the amount of EUR 5 billion,
after EUR 5.6 billion between the first and third quarters of 2001. In its
external relations with non-euro area countries, however, Austrias current
account surplus jumped to EUR 4.2 billion against EUR 2.0 billion in 2001.
1 Based on transactions. Cutoff date for data: February 12, 2003.
2 Contrary to the monthly cash balance, whose purpose is to provide a quick overview, the transaction balance is
based on a calculation model requiring period adjustments and other adjustments. The transaction balance
confirms the improvement of results which the cash balance had already reflected for the first months of 2002.
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Thus, Austria contributed to the current account surplus of the euro area as a
whole. According to data provided by the European Central Bank (ECB) for the
first three quarters of 2002, the euro area current account turned from a deficit
of some EUR 23 billion in the first three quarters of 2001 to a surplus of some
EUR 37 billion in the period under review. One of the major factors in this
development was a significant rise in the external trade surplus. In the euro
area, imports declined by 5%, whereas exports picked up 2%.
1.1 Goods and Services
In the first three quarters of 2002, Austrias surplus on goods and services
climbed from EUR 40 million to EUR 2.0 billion year on year. However,
because of the conceptual data collection change for travel expenses (see section
1.1.2.1 Travel) the increase shown in the balance on goods and services is in fact
statistically understated by EUR 0.5 billion.
1.1.1 Goods
In the first three quarters of 2002, Austria recorded a slight external trade
surplus of EUR 320 million, compared with a deficit of EUR 3.8 billion in the
same period of 2001 (data provided by Statistics Austria).1) This improvement
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1 For conceptual reasons, the OeNBs balance of payments statistics deviate from the external trade data compiled
by Statistics Austria. While it is customary for external trade statistics to present imports at their cif (cost,
insurance, freight) value and exports at their fob (free on board) value, by balance of payments conventions
both exports and imports are valued at fob while freight and insurance costs are reflected in the services
account.
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can be traced to a decline in imports by 3.3% and an increase in exports by
3.9% (nominal figures). The reduction in merchandise imports can be attri-
buted chiefly to weak domestic demand and the lower average oil price in the
first nine months of 2002.
The deficit in Austrias external trade within the euro area (see annex, table 2)
contracted by EUR 1.6 billion to EUR 3.8 billion in the first three quarters of
2002, with exports climbing by 2.4% and imports shrinking by 2.5%. In
absolute figures, merchandise exports to other euro area countries totaled
EUR 31.0 billion, and Austrian imports from the euro area EUR 34.8 billion.
The improvements in the Austrian trade balance were strongest vis-a‘-vis
Germany, Italy and France, causing the deficit vis-a‘-vis Germany to contract
and the surplus in trade with Italy and France to widen.
In the period under review, merchandise trade with non-euro area countries
also recorded both a growth in exports and a decline in imports, but the changes
were more pronounced. Compared with 2001, merchandise exports climbed
by 5.8%, while merchandise imports went down by 4.4%. Austrias exports to
non-euro area countries came to EUR 26.2 billion, while non-euro area
imports amounted to EUR 22.1 billion. In nominal terms, the setback in
imports was most distinct for developing countries, which include the oil-
exporting countries, at —EUR 700 million or —14%. At the same time, imports
from Central and Eastern European countries slowed by EUR 110 million or
1.4%, whereas exports to this region jumped by EUR 750 million or 8%, with
exports to Romania, Croatia and the Slovak Republic accounting for the highest
growth rates.
1.1.2 Services
In the first three quarters of 2002, the balance on the services account turned
from a surplus of EUR 1.6 billion to a deficit of EUR 750 million year on year.
In this respect it should be noted that the deficit on unclassified transactions,1)
which are included in the services account, expanded from EUR 3.0 billion to
EUR 5.7 billion.
1.1.2.1 Travel
After a good winter season, the number of overnight stays by tourists from
abroad shrank visibly in the second quarter of 2002, but thereafter a successful
third quarter pushed foreigners overnight stays in the summer season up to
42 million. This figure, while representing the first rise in the summer results
since 1998, still lags some 30% behind the level of 1991. In the summer of
2002, Austria seems to have, moreover, profited from the widespread fear of
flying after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
The combined outcome of the first three quarters showed a rise in the
number of overnight stays by tourists from abroad by 2.2% (see annex, table 4).
1 The unclassified transactions item derives from an imbalance between banks reported import and export
payments for goods and the sum of merchandise import and export payments according to the foreign trade
statistics compiled by Statistics Austria, with the former exceeding the latter. In line with international
practice, the goods item of the balance of payments is calculated from the foreign trade statistics provided by
the national statistical offices. The unclassified transactions item thus corresponds to the difference between
merchandise payments and foreign trade figures.
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Visitors from Germany and the Netherlands, Austrias two chief origin markets,
accounted for two thirds of the increase of tourist overnight stays, totaling
1.55 million, between January and September 2002. Statistics Austria, more-
over, also reported a rise for other traditional origin countries, such as Switzer-
land, the United Kingdom, Italy and France. Overseas visitors, particularly U.S.
tourists, were generally coming in markedly fewer numbers.
Travel receipts blossomed. In the first three quarters of 2002, they ran to
EUR 9.7 billion, that is EUR 620 million more than in the comparable period of
2001 (see annex, table 3). Given the increase in overnight stays by 2.2% and
price boosts by roughly 2.5%, this growth in receipts of almost 7% means a
noticeable expansion of the real expenditure per overnight stay. This develop-
ment is also reflected in an above-average growth of overnight stays in higher-
quality lodgings. Revenues from international passenger transport, which are
not included in travel receipts, augmented slightly by 1.9% to EUR 1.6 billion.
Since the introduction of euro banknotes and coins, the travel spending of
Austrians has been determined on the basis of a survey among households.1)
According to this survey, travel expenditure (excluding international passenger
transport) came to EUR 8.3 billion and expenses for international passenger
transport ran to EUR 620 million. This equals an 8.7% rise in travel expendi-
ture compared to the same period of 2001. However, this comparison is
misleading because the survey, while producing comparable annual results,
shows different seasonal patterns that reflect the economic reality more
accurately. While travel expenses as reported in this survey have consistently
been clearly lower in the first and fourth quarters than under the previous
system, which was based on cash flows, the figures for the third quarter are
significantly higher under the new system. Compared with 2001 data, travel
expenditure (including international passenger transport) more or less
stagnated at +EUR 55 million or +0.6%. It follows that the deterioration by
EUR 37 million reflected in the travel balance has been distorted downward:
based on comparable figures, the travel surplus in fact expanded by EUR 465
million.
1.1.2.2 Other Services
Excluding travel, the services account for the first three quarters of 2002
showed a deficit of EUR 2.2 billion, compared with a surplus of EUR 112
million year on year — a deterioration that can be ascribed chiefly to unclassified
transactions, as mentioned above. Conversely, we report improvements
especially in the following services items: The surplus in the item transportation
(including passenger transport) widened by EUR 490 million, and the deficit of
EUR 5 million on financial services reversed to a surplus of EUR 120 million.
1 The survey, carried out by FESSEL&GfK, is a telephone poll covering 3,000 households per quarter and has
been performed at regular intervals since 1988. The original aim was to collect additional information on the
purpose of individual journeys and the type of spending. Since 2001, Statistics Austria and the OeNB have
commissioned this survey together.
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1.2 Income
At EUR 1.4 billion, the deficit in the first three quarters of 2002 on the income
subaccount remained EUR 1.1 billion below the comparable result of 2001.
This is the lowest deficit since the beginning of the Economic and Monetary
Union. Income related to the compensation of employees, as received by border
workers and seasonal workers in particular, added up to a surplus of EUR 400
million, as much as in previous years. By contrast, the deficit on investment
income was significantly lower at EUR 1.8 billion than in the first three quarters
of 2001 at EUR 3 billion. This deficit reduction is mostly traceable to income on
other investment, which more than doubled its surplus year on year.
The regional breakdown of net investment income shows that the bulk of net
outflows went to the euro area (mostly Germany, Luxembourg and Belgium),
while the highest share of net capital income came from Eastern Europe. The
EU accession countries1) (notably Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic)
account for an increasing share in net income from cross-border income.
A breakdown by key subaggregates shows Austria to have incurred net
deficits on income from both direct and portfolio investment (EUR 1.2 billion
and EUR 2.4 billion, respectively), and to have achieved a surplus on other
investment income of EUR 1.7 billion (see annex, table 5). A sectoral allocation
1 EU accession countries: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the
Slovak Republic and Slovenia.
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of net results shows the public sector to be a net payer and the OeNB, banks and
other sectors to be net recipients.
Since the stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Austria exceeds the
stock of Austrian FDI abroad and since, in addition, inward investment projects
are more profitable in a long-term comparison as they are more mature, the
balance on direct investment income is always in deficit. The profits Austrian FDI
investors estimate to have accrued in the first three quarters of 2002 total EUR
1.6 billion, while foreign-owned Austrian companies post EUR 2.8 billion in
profits, which results in a net outflow of EUR 1.2 billion. Whereas the profits
distributed by direct investment enterprises established abroad by Austrian
parent companies have contracted significantly, the dividend payments of
Austria-based direct investment enterprises to their foreign parent companies
continued to be high, resulting in reinvested earnings of EUR 990 million for
outward FDI, and EUR 1.4 billion for inward FDI.
Income on portfolio investment remains the key component of investment
income. Portfolio investment-related income accrued abroad came to as much
as EUR 4.2 billion in the first three quarters of 2002, but fell clearly short of
outgoing income payments made in the same period (EUR 6.6 billion). The
relative increase ran to 15% on the assets and 6% on the liabilities side. A
regional allocation of net inflows and outflows in this income category shows
that net outflows to the EU continue at a high level at EUR 2.4 billion. Within
the EU, half of the outflows went to euro area countries, while the United
Kingdom accounted for the biggest residual item. In terms of income on
portfolio investment, the EU accession countries remain net payers to Austria.
Income on bonds and notes accounted for 90% of the results on both sides
of the balance sheet. In the first three quarters of 2002, Austrian investors
received EUR 3.8 billion in interest income, while Austrian borrowers had to
pay EUR 6.3 billion in interest income. On the assets side, interest income went
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mainly to the segment of other sectors (62%), in particular institutional
investors, and to banks (35%). The liabilities side recorded interest payments
above all by the general government (52%) and also by banks (38%). In a
comparison of net results, the Austrian general government and banks are
net contributors, while the other sectors, mostly institutional investors, are
net recipients. On both the assets and the liabilities side, the euro area
accounted for 60% of the result, with Germany playing the key role within
the euro area. The runners-up were the United States at 11% on the assets side
and the United Kingdom at 24% on the liabilities side.
In the first three quarters of 2002, income on other investment — cross-border
lending and deposit-taking — and reserve assets posted a combined surplus of
EUR 1.7 billion, which corresponds to an increase by EUR about 920 million.
Year on year, other investment income receipts slowed down by 17%, while
payments decreased by 43%. Other investment income accounted for 41% of
overall investment income on the assets side and for 19.6% on the liabilities
side, which compares with 49.5% and 31.6%, respectively, in the same 2001
period. A breakdown into regions reveals Austria to have been a net recipient of
income arising from other investment both in the euro area (more than EUR
1 billion) and in the accession countries (EUR 313 million).
A sectoral analysis of the Austrian economy in the first three quarters of
2002 shows that the general government closed with higher net income out-
flows of EUR 140 million that were traceable to foreign borrowing (review
period 2001: EUR 50 million). The Austrian banking sector managed to widen
its income surplus by EUR 950 million to EUR 1.3 billion, reflecting a
significant decrease in its income deficit on currency and deposits and a decline
in its surplus on loans. Other sectors — institutional investors, enterprises and
households — closed the first three quarters of 2002 with higher income receipts
in the amount of EUR 116 million, an increase by EUR 80 million.
1.3 Current Transfers
The shortfall of current transfers came to EUR 1.3 billion in the first three
quarters of 2002, which corresponds to an expansion by EUR 270 million. This
rise in outflows was mainly attributable to the other sectors, which stepped up
their net payments from EUR 100 million to EUR 440 million. Transactions
with EU institutions dominated public sector current transfers at —EUR 870
million net. Austrias contribution to the EU budget amounted to EUR 1.6
billion during the reporting period, while its receipts (excluding EU contribu-
tions to infrastructure projects) came to EUR 1.0 billion, resulting in a net
payment of EUR 600 million compared with EUR 800 million in the first three
months of 2001.
2 Capital Account
The capital account closed the reporting period with outflows in the amount of
EUR 290 million.
General government capital transfers in kind resulted in net outflows of EUR
140 million, after EUR 30 million in the first three quarters of 2001. Since
2001, these outflows have comprised restitution payments by the general
government sector.
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The balance of other sectors capital transfers in kind closed with higher gross
flows, but at a similar deficit as in the like period of 2001 at EUR 180 million.
The higher outflows can chiefly be attributed to debt relief effects, the higher
inflows to immigration effects.
In terms of volume, capital transfers in cash, which are part of this
subbalance, play a minor role in the Austrian balance of payments statistics.
3 Financial Account
The balance on the Austrian financial account reversed from capital imports in
the first three quarters of 2001 in the amount of EUR 3.3 billion to capital
exports of EUR 2.8 billion in the first nine months of 2002 (see annex, table 6).
While Austrians continued to expand their investments abroad by 11% to EUR
19.2 billion in the period under review, investments made by nonresidents in
Austria fell by 20% to EUR 16.5 billion against the first three quarters of 2001.
The subbalance of foreign direct investment accounted for capital outflows of
EUR 3.6 billion in the first three quarters of 2002, reflecting both notably
higher outward FDI flows of EUR 4.8 billion (+69%) and substantially lower
inward FDI flows of EUR 1.2 billion (—77%). Portfolio investment, which had
been almost balanced in the same period of last year, closed with capital exports
in the amount of EUR 3.6 billion. In terms of volume, Austrians invested almost
twice as much in foreign securities at EUR 22.4 billion as in the first nine
months of 2001; at the same time, nonresidents also bought more domestic
securities at EUR 18.8 billion in the review period, after EUR 11.9 billion in
the same period of 2001. A breakdown into financial instruments shows that
debt securities dominated both inflows and outflows. The balance on other
investment turned from capital outflows of EUR 1.5 billion in the comparable
period of 2001 to capital inflows of EUR 3.9 billion in the review period 2002,
a development that is largely traceable to banks short-term capital flows,
including deposit and lending transactions.
When cross-border transactions are broken down by interest-bearing1) and
venture capital-oriented2) investment, it becomes evident that interest-bearing
investment accounted for the majority of cross-border transactions: In the first
nine months of 2002, Austrian residents invested EUR 10.7 billion, i.e. 56% of
total outward investment, in interest-bearing financial assets. This dominance
was even more pronounced on the liabilities side, where EUR 13.4 billion or
81% of total volumes were thus invested.
A regional allocation of cross-border capital flows shows that, in the first
three quarters of 2002, net capital inflows from euro area countries dropped from
EUR 12.7 billion to EUR 7.9 billion (see annex, table 7). Capital flows from
holdings on euro area assets augmented to EUR 7 billion in the review period,
whereas, on the liabilities side, transactions with euro area countries decreased
slightly to EUR 14.9 billion.
In capital transactions with non-euro area countries, Austria recorded net
capital outflows of EUR 10.7 billion in the first nine months of 2002, compared
1 Fixed-income debt instruments, deposits and loans, notwithstanding whether they are included in the
categories direct investment, portfolio investment, other investment, or reserve assets.
2 Investment in equity stakes and equity securities.
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with EUR 9.4 billion in the like 2001 period. The decline in gross investment of
Austrian residents abroad from EUR 14.2 billion to EUR 12.2 billion was more
than offset by an even greater slump by two thirds of foreign investment in
Austria to EUR 1.5 billion (see annex, table 7).
A sectoral breakdown of the financial account shows an almost balanced
result for MFIs (the OeNB and banks) and capital exports of EUR 2.7 billion for
nonbanks (general government and other sectors). In the first three quarters of
2002, the general government recorded capital inflows of EUR 7.6 billion, with
transactions on both the assets and the liabilities side declining against the like
2001 period. The other sectors1) reported an increase of net outflows from
EUR 5.9 billion to EUR 10.3 billion in the reporting period, which is largely
traceable to a surge of portfolio investment on the assets side by 137%.
3.1 Direct investment
Global cross-border FDI flows halved in 2001 against 2000, thus reverting to
the long-run trend. Against this background, and given the uncertainty shroud-
ing the global economy and the continued weakness of stock exchanges,
UNCTAD expected direct investment to remain slack also in 2002 (see
UNCTAD: World Investment Report 2002). In Austria, this effect has so far
emerged in a very asymmetric fashion. Whereas inward FDI growth was
substantially weaker than in previous years, outward FDI turned out to be
highly robust. Thus, the gap by which outward FDI falls short of inward FDI
might actually have narrowed in 2002.
Outward direct investment of Austrian businesses totaled EUR 4.8 billion net
in the first three quarters of 2002, which is by far the biggest result ever
registered in the first nine months, and equals the second largest full-year
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1 Including other financial institutions, insurance companies and pension funds as well as enterprises and
households.
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result. The total of EUR 4.8 billion comprises investment in equity amounting
to EUR 3.7 million, EUR 990 million of reinvested earnings and EUR 140
million in the form of intercompany loans. The given amount of equity capital
included gross new investment of some EUR 4.5 billion, compared to EUR 800
million in disinvestment.
Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) attracted more than half
(EUR 2.5 billion) of the FDI capital invested. The Czech Republic accounted
for the lions share (EUR 760 million), followed by Poland (EUR 610 million),
Croatia (EUR 410 million) and Slovenia and Hungary (between EUR 230
million and EUR 240 million each). About one quarter of outward FDIs was
invested outside of Europe, for instance in offshore financial centers in the
Caribbean and in Australia. Within Western Europe, mainly investments in
Germany and Denmark and, to a lesser degree, in Switzerland and the United
Kingdom were significant. Banks, trading and holding companies were the chief
investment sectors.
Conversely, there was a steep falloff in inward direct investment, which
registered the lowest result since 1995 at EUR 1.2 billion, on the back of a
standstill in net new investment. Gross investment in equity amounting to EUR
1.3 billion fell short of disinvestment totaling EUR 1.4 billion. On the plus side,
only reinvested earnings improved the balance by EUR 1.4 billion, while
intercompany loans caused the balance to deteriorate by EUR 120 million.
Most of the capital invested came from Germany (EUR 1.1 billion), fol-
lowed by the United States (EUR 320 million) and Switzerland (EUR 230
million). Vis-a‘-vis the Netherlands, by contrast, disinvestments of over EUR
730 million were recorded, reflecting Telecom Italias pullout from the Austrian
telecommunications market.
3.2 Portfolio investment
International financial market conditions:
In the second and third quarters of 2002, long-term interest rates plum-
meted both in the euro area and the United States. The yields of ten-year U.S.
treasury notes fell by roughly 180 basis points, and those of ten-year German
government bonds by some 100 basis points. The benchmark yield of Austrian
government bonds followed this downward trend and came to 4.5% at the end
of September, thus lagging about 100 basis points behind its peak of mid-May
2002. This great demand for government bonds was traceable to the sluggish
economy, the concurrent downward revisions of inflation expectations and the
ensuing stock market downtrend. The continuing stock price slumps entailed a
flight into quality, as the default risk of government bonds is substantially
smaller than that of other instruments.
The U.S. and euro area stock markets were characterized by plunging stock
prices in 2002. Since July 15, 2002, the euro STOXX index has gone down by
some 17%, and the S&P 500 index has retreated by about 7.5%. In contrast to
these two indices, the Austrian leading index ATX proved to be much more
stable. We cannot discern a long-term downtrend of the ATX, although it has
recently also recorded price declines. At the end of September 2002, it stood at
1070 points, just like at the beginning of 2001.
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In the period under review, interest rates on the euro money market showed
a relatively stable development. Before the summer of 2002, the three-month
Euribor rate stood at about 3.5%; after the summer, it sank to some 3.3%.
Interest rates on the U.S. money market developed largely along the same lines.
On foreign exchange markets, the second quarter of 2002 was largely
marked by a weak U.S. dollar. In the third quarter, the U.S. dollar stabilized
at a level between 0.97 cents and 0.99 cents against the euro.
In the Austrian financial account, cross-border transactions related to the
acquisition and sale of securities resulted in net capital exports of EUR 3.6
billion in the first three quarters of 2002. The corresponding gross values
indicate that both Austrian investment in foreign securities (assets side) and
foreign investment in Austrian securities (liabilities side) are higher than in the
same 2001 period. Gross portfolio investment in shares, debt securities and
money market instruments continued to dominate the financial account in the
reporting period. Both on the assets and the liabilities side, debt securities
accounted for more than 80% of the volume of portfolio investment trans-
actions.
A sectoral breakdown of portfolio investment abroad shows that other
sectors — mainly institutional investors — made 51% of investments, followed
by banks with 34%. The majority of foreign investors bought securities issued
by the Austrian government (55%) and by banks (33%).
Both on the assets and the liabilities sides, over two thirds of all transactions
were conducted with euro area counterparties (see annex, table 7), with
purchases of euro area securities by Austrian investors surpassing purchases
of Austrian securities by euro area investors by EUR 1.7 billion. At the same
time, the portfolio investment position vis-a‘-vis the rest of the world also
recorded net capital exports of EUR 1.9 billion.
3.2.1 Portfolio Investment in Foreign Securities
In the first three quarters of 2002, Austrian investors acquired foreign securities
to the tune of EUR 22.4 billion, that is almost twice as much as in the
comparable 2001 period. 68% thereof were invested in bonds and notes,
16% in money market instruments, 14% in shares and 2% in mutual fund
shares. Austrian investors main focus was on securities issued in the euro area
(72%) and in the U.S.A. (12%).
More specifically, domestic investors purchased foreign equity securities for
EUR 3.2 billion, issued above all by businesses incorporated in the U.S.A.
(42%) and the euro area (35%) — notably in Germany and France. Investments
in this type of securities were predominantly made by domestic institutional
investors, followed at some distance by households.
Investment in foreign mutual fund shares amounted to EUR 480 million in the
first three quarters of 2002, compared with EUR 620 million year on year. A
breakdown by regions shows that British and Irish mutual fund shares were
highest in demand with Austrians, whereas Swiss mutual fund shares accounted
for disinvestments. In the reporting period, domestic mutual funds, which
constituted the largest group of investors in this field, preferred balanced funds.
When investing in foreign securities, Austrian investors typically go for debt
securities, which were predominant also in the reporting period at EUR 18.7
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billion: 68% of all foreign securities purchased were bonds and notes (EUR 15.1
billion), which equals a year-on-year plus of 50% against the first three quarters
of 2001. By geographic allocation, 80% of debt securities purchased were euro
area issues, with German (33%), Italian (14%) and Greek (7%) issues being of
particular interest to Austrians. Demand for accession countries issues (8%)
also picked up in Austria. By investing category, the key investors were other
sectors (mostly institutional investors) at some 52% and Austrian banks at 48%.
Investments were almost exclusively made in euro-denominated securities and
only to a smaller extent in U.S. dollar-denominated debt securities (6%).
Austrian investors also purchased securities issued in Polish zloty (2%), Czech
koruna and Hungarian forint (1% each).
Austrians acquired foreign money market instruments, mainly commercial paper
and certificates of deposit, to the tune of EUR 3.5 billion. Investors concen-
trated largely on euro area issues (Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and Ireland)
and on paper issued in the United States and the United Kingdom. Investments
focused almost exclusively on euro-denominated securities, with debt securities
denominated in Japanese yen and U.S. dollars only accounting for 3% and 2%,
respectively. In terms of volume, the major investor in foreign money market
instruments was the Austrian government.
3.2.2 Portfolio Investment in Domestic Securities
In the first three quarters of 2002, foreign investors acquired Austrian securities
in the amount of EUR 18.8 billion, which — just as on the assets side — equals a
substantial rise year on year. Debt securities accounted for the lions share of
investment in this category.
Of the EUR 1.7 billion worth of domestic equity securities sold to foreign
investors, Austrian shares accounted for EUR 1 billion. Most of the capital was
invested in bank issues.
#!'"
 !	'##

;
		>
	

	

#

#

#

#
     
3
;
	
,-	.///	#	%0	.//,	%	%0	.//.	

#	%
	
*
"1&
>



1	




1	




1	




1	




1	




1	


Balance of Payments
in the First Three Quarters of 2002
60 Focus on Austria 1/2003
Austrian mutual fund shares acquired by foreign investors totaled EUR 730
million. Investors were chiefly interested in domestic balanced funds (67%) and
money market funds.
As in previous years, foreign investors showed a clear preference for
Austrian debt securities; in this category, the transaction value was EUR 17.3
billion in the first three quarters of 2002. Aside from euro-denominated issues
(66%), nonresidents mainly purchased U.S. dollar-denominated (17%) and
Swiss franc-denominated (13%) securities. A breakdown of debt security
investment by sectors revealed that general government issues accounted for
57% and bank issues for 35% of foreign investment. In the first three quarters
of 2002, foreigners invested EUR 10.1 billion in new issues or reopened issues
of the Republic of Austria, amounting to 80% of the overall volume of EUR 12.6
billion.
Liabilities from domestic money market instruments decreased by EUR 260
million, with short-term bonds issued by the Austrian government being sold
abroad and, at the same time, banking sector commercial paper and certificates
of deposit being redeemed.
3.3 Other Investment
In the first three quarters of 2002, the Austrian other investment net result —
loans, cash and deposits — turned from capital outflows of EUR 1.5 billion to
capital inflows of EUR 4 billion.
On the assets side, cross-border lending and deposit-taking accounted for
capital imports of EUR 7.5 billion in the first three quarters of 2002, reflecting
above all a surge in currency and deposits and a decline in capital exports
generated by unsecuritized loans (the latter totaled EUR 5.4 billion, which is
EUR 2.5 billion lower than the comparable 2001 and 2000 figures). In a
regional breakdown, the increase of investment in the euro area proved to be
stable year on year at EUR 1.8 billion. The volume of investment in the United
Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden, which had strongly increased from 1999 to
2001, decreased due to capital repayments, after having run to EUR 4 billion in
the review period 2001. Lending to the ten EU accession countries trended
upwards compared with the two previous review periods: loans rose to just over
EUR 1 billion, thus corresponding to the peak full-year result for 2000.
For the most part, Austrian banks carried the expansion of external lending;
their activities accounted for a volume EUR 4 billion. Whereas the 2001
reduction of loans against the peak in the reporting year 2000 was traceable
Government Bond Syndication and Tender Offers
in the First Three Quarters of 20021)
ISIN External transactions
EUR million
5.0% Federal government bond 2002—2012/1/144A AT0000385356 6,091
5.875% Federal government bond 1996—2006/7 AT0000383518 790
5.5% Federal government bond 2000—2007/144A AT0000384953 3,207
Total 10,088
Source: OeNB.
1) Transaction values: + = sale abroad.
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to short-term lending, the declining trend in 2002 was mostly attributable to
long-term loans. The transaction-based rise in the loan assets of businesses
(including institutional investors), by contrast, remained stable at just over
EUR 1 billion year on year.
In the first three quarters of 2002, other investment liabilities accounted for
capital exports to the tune of EUR 3.6 billion. The Austrian economy
augmented its loan liabilities abroad by EUR 1.5 billion. The inflow of unse-
curitized loan capital from EU countries outside the euro area came to 60% of
the overall transaction volume (EUR 900 million against EUR 150 million in the
euro area) and outdid the full-year figure of 2001 (EUR 540 million against
EUR 1.3 billion in the euro area). Banks and other sectors — essentially
businesses and households — extended their liabilities by some EUR 1 billion
each. The public sector redeemed some of its liabilities from loans abroad.
3.4 Financial Derivatives
The financial derivatives position basically includes options, futures contracts
and swaps, which are either based on capital products (e.g. foreign exchange
assets, securities) or on interest rate products. On the one hand, transaction
values refer to the buying and selling of securities-based financial derivatives
and, on the other, to transactions resulting from option payments (including
premiums) in the course of OTC deals and/or from variation margin payments
for futures contracts and swap payments.
In the first three quarters of 2002, the financial derivatives subaccount
closed with net capital exports of EUR 1.1 billion. The interest-based
derivatives contained therein accounted for capital imports to the tune of
EUR 700 million.
3.5 Reserve Assets
In the first three quarters of 2002, reserve assets decreased by EUR 1.7 billion
through transactions.
This development was mainly attributable to the decline in deposits and
Special Drawing Rights in the amount of EUR 790 million. Also securities
under reserve assets dropped by EUR 650 million. In the second quarter of
2002, gold sales amounted to EUR 310 million. Austrias reserve position in the
IMF increased by EUR 90 million in the review period.
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Annex
Table 1
Balance of Payments Summary
1st to 3rd
quarter 20011)
1st to 3rd
quarter 20022)
Annual change
EUR million
Current account 3,568  762 þ2,806
Goods, services and income 2,519 þ 556 þ3,075
Goods and services þ 38 þ1,991 þ1,953
Goods 1,555 þ2,743 þ4,298
Services þ1,593  752 2,345
Travel þ1,481 þ1,444  37
Other services items þ 112 2,196 2,308
Transportation þ1,307 þ1,799 þ 492
thereof international passenger transport þ 818 þ 950 þ 132
Construction services þ 194 þ 89  105
Financial services  5 þ 122 þ 127
Royalties and license fees  370  484  114
Other business services þ1,712 þ1,570  142
thereof merchanting þ 985 þ 983  2
Other services þ 317 þ 382 þ 65
Unclassified transactions 3,043 5,674 2,631
Income 2,557 1,435 þ1,122
Compensation of employees þ 398 þ 397  1
Investment income 2,955 1,832 þ1,123
Current transfers 1,049 1,317  268
General government  949  873 þ 76
Other sectors  100  444  344
Capital and financial account þ2,974 3,069 6,043
Capital account  300  294 þ 6
General government  35  137  102
Other sectors  215  178 þ 37
Acquisition/disposal of nonproduced, nonfinancial assets  50 þ 21 þ 71
Financial account þ3,273 2,775 6,048
Direct investment þ2,192 3,612 5,804
Portfolio investment þ 15 3,623 3,638
Other investment 1,540 þ3,911 þ5,451
Financial derivatives þ 575 1,112 1,687
Reserve assets3) þ2,031 þ1,662  369
Errors and omissions þ 594 þ3,830 þ3,236
Source: OeNB.
1) Revised data.
2) Provisional data.
3) Oesterreichische Nationalbank: Gold and foreign exchange, reserve position in the Fund, SDRs, etc.; increase: — / decrease: +.
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Table 2
Merchandise Exports and Imports
as Recorded in the Foreign Trade Statistics
Goods by geographic area1)
1st to 3rd quarter 2002
Exports Imports Balance
Annual change Share of
total exports
Annual change Share of
total imports
Annual change
% EUR million
EU þ2.3 60.7  2.4 65.8 2,716 þ1,726
Euro area þ2.4 54.2  2.5 61.2 3,807 þ1,630
thereof:
Germany þ1.0 32.3  3.0 40.5 4,569 þ 898
Italy þ2.7 8.5  6.4 7.1 þ 830 þ 401
France þ2.2 4.5 12.9 3.7 þ 439 þ 370
Non-euro area countries þ5.8 45.8  4.4 38.8 þ4,126 þ2,450
thereof:
Switzerland
and Liechtenstein þ1.2 5.6 þ 2.9 3.5 þ1,241  17
Eastern Europe2) þ8.0 17.6  1.4 13.7 þ2,299 þ 855
U.S.A. þ4.1 5.3  4.4 5.0 þ 177 þ 251
Japan 0.5 1.1 11.0 2.2  570 þ 148
Total þ3.9 100.0  3.3 100.0 þ 319 þ4,079
Source: Statistics Austria.
1) Geographic areas as defined by WIFO.
2) Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Ukraine, countries of the
former Yugoslavia.
Table 3
Travel and International Passenger Transport
1st to 3rd
quarter 20011)
1st to 3rd
quarter 20022)
Annual change
EUR million %
Travel
Receipts 9,089 9,715 þ 626 þ 6.9
Expenditures 7,608 8,271 þ 663 þ 8.7
Balance 1,481 1,444  37  2.5
International passenger transport
Receipts 1,542 1,570 þ 28 þ 1.8
Expenditures 724 621  103 14.2
Balance 818 950 þ 132 þ16.1
1,000 %
Foreign tourist overnight stays 71,962 73,516 þ1,554 þ 2.2
Source: OeNB, Statistics Austria.
1) Revised data.
2) Provisional data.
Balance of Payments
in the First Three Quarters of 2002
64 Focus on Austria 1/2003
Table 4
Foreign Tourist Bednights by Country of Origin
1st to 3rd quarter 2002
Overnight
stays
Annual change Share
1,000 %
Germany 45,719 þ 638 þ 1.4 62.2
Netherlands 7,364 þ 425 þ 6.1 10.0
United Kingdom 2,819 þ 149 þ 5.6 3.8
Belgium, Luxembourg 2,142 þ 103 þ 5.0 2.9
Switzerland, Liechtenstein 2,714 þ 157 þ 6.1 3.7
Denmark 916 þ 24 þ 2.7 1.2
Italy 2,386 þ 149 þ 6.6 3.2
France 1,412 þ 103 þ 7.9 1.9
Sweden 580  2  0.4 0.8
Spain 374  30  7.5 0.5
Poland 741 þ 37 þ 5.2 1.0
Hungary 718 þ 64 þ 9.9 1.0
Czech Republic 658 þ 10 þ 1.5 0.9
Croatia 213 þ 1 þ 0.4 0.3
C.I.S. 427 þ 53 þ14.3 0.6
Slovenia 160 þ 1 þ 0.3 0.2
Slovak Republic 137 þ 7 þ 5.5 0.2
U.S.A. 1,073  290 21.3 1.5
Japan 376  72 16.1 0.5
Other countries 2,587 þ 26 þ 1.0 3.5
Total 73,516 þ1,554 þ 2.2 100.0
Memorandum item: Austrian tourists 26,169  311  1.2 x
Source: Statistics Austria.
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Table 5
Investment Income
1st to 3rd
quarter 20011)
1st to 3rd
quarter 20022)
Annual change
EUR million
Net investment income3)  2,955  1,832 þ1,123
Investment income receipts 9,693 9,745 þ 52
Investment income payments 12,648 11,577 1,071
Net direct investment income3)  1,237  1,182 þ 55
Income on direct investment abroad 1,227 1,565 þ 338
Income on direct investment in Austria 2,464 2,747 þ 283
Net portfolio investment income3)  2,519  2,368 þ 151
Income on foreign equity securities 137 313 þ 176
Income on domestic equity securities 183 239 þ 56
Income on foreign bonds and notes 3,458 3,802 þ 344
Income on domestic bonds and notes 5,745 6,289 þ 544
Income on foreign money market instruments 69 84 þ 15
Income on domestic foreign market instruments 256 38  218
Net other investment income3) 801 1,718 þ 917
Other investment income4) receipts 4,802 3,982  820
Other investment income payments 4,001 2,264 1,737
Investment income on foreign interest-bearing investment5) 8,383 7,910  473
Investment income on domestic interest-bearing investment6) 10,008 8,593 1,415
Investment income on foreign venture capital-oriented investment7) 1,310 1,835 þ 525
Investment income on domestic venture capital-oriented investment7) 2,640 2,984 þ 344
Memorandum item: Financial derivatives based on interest rate contracts8) 717 698  19
Source: OeNB.
1) Revised data.
2) Provisional data.
3) Income on outward foreign investment less income on inward foreign investment.
4) Income on deposits, loans and reserve assets.
5) Income on debt securities, deposits, loans and reserve assets.
6) Income on debt securities, deposits and loans.
7) Income on direct investment and equity securities.
8) Included in the financial account, financial derivatives.
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Table 6
Financial Account
20001) 20012) 1st to 3rd
quarter 20012)
1st to 3rd
quarter 20023)
EUR million, net
Financial account 4,679 4,194 3,273  2,775
Assets 52,276 21,762 17,258 19,185
Liabilities 56,955 25,957 20,531 16,410
Direct investment 3,365 3,195 2,192  3,612
Direct investment abroad  6,230  3,408  2,844  4,794
Equity capital  5,388  2,613  2,456  3,657
Reinvested earnings  129  705  370  994
Other capital  713  90  18  142
Direct investment in Austria 9,595 6,603 5,036 1,181
Equity capital 8,494 4,115 3,979  87
Reinvested earnings 944 1,562 1,188 1,391
Other capital 156 927  131  122
Portfolio investment 3,229 5,164 15  3,623
Portfolio investment in foreign securities 29,167 13,267 11,894 22,391
Equity securities 16,959  1,277  24  3,715
Thereof: mutual fund shares  5,745  1,365  618  484
Bonds and notes 11,441 12,403  9,734 15,126
Money market instruments  767 412  2,135  3,550
Portfolio investment in domestic securities 32,395 18,431 11,908 18,768
Equity securities 3,857  4,787  4,349 1,723
Thereof: mutual fund shares 1,205 1,004 561 730
Bonds and notes 26,738 25,989 17,965 17,308
Money market instruments 1,801  2,771  1,707  263
Other investment  2,489  5,885  1,540 3,911
Assets 17,187  6,699  4,972 7,494
Trade credits  2,234 308 188  137
Loans  9,948  6,808  7,776  5,388
Currency and deposits  4,994 562 3,087 12,999
Other assets  11  762  472 20
Liabilities 14,698 814 3,432  3,582
Trade credits 502  562  532  350
Loans 4,302 719  1,626 1,535
Currency and deposits 9,686 649 5,545  4,602
Other liabilities 208 9 46  166
Financial derivatives  263  347 575  1,112
Reserve assets4) 838 2,067 2,031 1,662
Memorandum item: Interest-bearing investment 13,760 8,262 5,500 2,760
Assets 29,900 16,804 14,213 10,679
Liabilities 43,660 25,067 19,713 13,439
Sectoral breakdown:
Banks (including the OeNB) 18,191  1,943 1,725  46
Assets 17,532 11,568  5,092  2,339
Liabilities 35,723 9,624 6,817 2,293
General government 8,465 9,781 7,436 7,625
Assets  2,948  361  4,331  2,567
Liabilities 11,413 10,143 11,766 10,191
Other sectors 21,976  3,644  5,887 10,300
Assets 31,796  9,834  7,835 14,279
Liabilities 9,820 6,189 1,948 3,980
Source: OeNB.
1) Final data.
2) Revised data.
3) Provisional data.
4) Oesterreichische Nationalbank: Gold and foreign exchange, reserve position in the Fund, SDRs, etc.; increase: — / decrease: +.
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Table 7
Financial Account by Region1)
Investment in/
from the euro area
Investment in/
from non-euro area countries
20012) 1st to 3rd
quarter
20012)
1st to 3rd
quarter
20023)
20012) 1st to 3rd
quarter
20012)
1st to 3rd
quarter
20023)
EUR million, net
Financial account  317 12,710 7,883 4,511  9,437 10,658
Assets  6,942  3,011  6,988 14,820 14,247 12,197
Liabilities 6,625 15,721 14,871 19,332 4,810 1,539
Direct investment 2,448 2,482 155 747  290  3,767
Direct investment abroad  77 330  387  3,331  3,174  4,407
Direct investment in Austria 2,525 2,152 542 4,078 2,884 639
Portfolio investment 6,638 7,796  1,716  1,474  7,781  1,907
Portfolio investment
in foreign securities  5,144  3,440 16,132  8,123  8,454  6,259
Portfolio investment
in domestic securities 11,781 11,235 14,416 6,650 673 4,352
Other investment 10,096 1,510 10,358 4,211  3,050  6,447
Assets  2,157  930 9,751  4,542  4,042  2,257
Liabilities  7,939 2,441 607 8,753 991  4,189
Financial derivatives 426 660  914  773  85  198
Reserve assets4) x x x 2,067 2,031 1,662
Source: OeNB.
1) While for foreign direct investment in Austria and other inward investment it is possible to establish the identity of the foreign investors, in the case of
portfolio investment one can only determine the country via which the transaction has been effected. This means that it is not possible to provide a
current and/or completely reliable classification of creditors. Ongoing studies, however, show that the largest volume of Austrian securities sold to the
euro area are government bonds sold to foreign banks in the course of tender or syndication offers. Since, in this case, the secondary market generated
only a relatively small volume of cross-border transactions, the regional structure of the basic data derived from the reporting system on foreign
exchange statistics can be regarded as sufficiently conclusive.
2) Revised data.
3) Provisional data.
4) Oesterreichische Nationalbank: Gold and foreign exchange, reserve position in the Fund, SDRs, etc.; increase: — / decrease: +.
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— Net new investment by Austrians was chiefly in the form of euro-denomi-
nated debt securities issued by euro area residents.
— Institutional investors and banks continued to be the largest groups of
domestic investors; they bought above all foreign debt securities.
— Foreign investors continued to purchase domestic securities issued by
general government entities.
1 International Capital Market Developments
In the third quarter of 2002, long-term interest rates declined significantly both
in the euro area and in the United States. Yields of ten-year U.S. treasuries
decreased from 4.93 to 3.87% (average over period p.a.) and those of ten-year
German government bonds from 5.02 to 4.38%. Following this downward
trend, the benchmark yield of Austrian government bonds reached 4.5% in
September 2002 (June 2002: 5.19%). Thus, the Austrian yield gap vis-a‘-vis
Germany continued to run to about 20 basis points during July, August and
September 2002.
The reasons for the strong demand for government bonds include the weak
economic performance, the ensuing downward revision of inflation expect-
ations as well as the resulting downward trend on stock markets. The continued
sharp decline of stock prices led to a flight to quality, reflecting the considerably
lower default risk of government bonds.
1 Regular reporting started with the article on Austrias Portfolio Investment Position — The Globalization of
Securities Investment and its Impact on Austria published in issue 4/2002 of Focus on Austria.
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The exchange rate of the U.S. dollar against the euro stabilized in the 0.978
to 0.986 cent range in the course of the third quarter.
2 Portfolio Investment Position Data for Austria1)
2.1 Domestic Holdings of Foreign Debt Securities (Portfolio Assets)
At the end of June 2002, Austrian holdings of foreign debt securities came to
EUR 106 billion and consisted mainly of bonds and notes (EUR 102 billion).
From July to September 2002, domestic investors purchased foreign debt
securities for another EUR 2.6 billion. Benefiting from positive exchange rate
and securities price effects in the third quarter of 2002, foreign portfolio assets
actually expanded by EUR 4.3 billion to EUR 110 billion until end-September
2002.
A sectoral breakdown of foreign portfolio assets at the end of September
2002 reveals that as in previous years, Austrian institutional investors2) were the
largest group of investors (49%), followed by the banking sector (OeNB and
banks, holding a share of 43%). These two groups of investors were also the
leading players on the capital market from July to September 2002, purchasing
foreign debt securities worth EUR 3 billion. At the same time, general govern-
ment entities and households were selling foreign securities.
At the end of June 2002, 65% of the stock of foreign portfolio assets were
debt securities issued by euro area residents. Securities issued in Germany
accounted for the lions share thereof, followed, by a large margin, by bonds
and notes from the Netherlands, Italy and France. As to debt securities issued by
non-euro area residents, Austrians primarily opted for securities issued in the
U.S.A., the United Kingdom and Denmark. Net new investment of Austrians in
the third quarter of 2002 was chiefly in the form of securities issued by euro
area residents. Taking into account valuation effects, domestic holdings of bonds
and notes issued by euro area residents came to EUR 69 billion by end-
September 2002, compared with EUR 36 billion worth bonds and notes issued
by other nonresidents.
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1 More detailed data on Austrias portfolio investment position are available on the OeNBs website
(www2.oenb.at/stat-monatsheft/englisch/chapter07_p.htm).
2 This sector comprises insurance companies, pension funds and other financial institutions, such as mutual
funds.
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Foreign short-term debt securities display a different pattern. At the end of
June 2002, money market instruments issued by euro area residents accounted
for 67% of the stock of money market instruments in Austrian investors
portfolios. With redemptions exceeding new investment in the following three
months, this share shrank to 65% or EUR 3 billion by the end of September
2002. At the same time, investors were net buyers of money market instru-
ments issued by non-euro area residents. Thus, Austrian investors held money
market paper issued by nonresidents worth EUR 1.6 billion at end-September
2002.
An analysis by currency of domestic holdings of foreign debt securities
reveals that by end-June 2002, 75.6% of Austrian holdings of debt securities
issued by nonresidents were denominated in euro. New investments in the third
quarter of 2002 pushed this share to 76.3%. At the same time, domestic
investors increased their holdings of foreign money market instruments
denominated in euro from EUR 3.8 billion (84%) at end-June 2002 to EUR
4 billion (86%) at the end of September 2002.
Concerning the regional and currency allocation of foreign portfolio assets,
a cross classification analysis provides the following picture for the third quarter
of 2002:
— Austrian investors purchased euro-denominated debt securities issued by
euro area residents and benefited from positive securities price effects.
— They sold bonds and notes issued by euro area residents and denominated in
a foreign currency (i.e. not euro-denominated), causing their holdings to
contract despite securities price and exchange rate gains.
— They purchased euro-denominated securities issued by foreign (i.e. non-
euro area) residents and benefited from securities price gains.
— They sold bonds and notes issued by non-euro area residents and denomi-
nated in a foreign currency but increased their holdings nonetheless because
of positive price and exchange rate effects.
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Thus, Austrian investors portfolios comprised the following holdings at
end-September 2002: 61% of Austrian holdings of foreign debt securities were
issues of euro area residents and denominated in euro, 15% were euro-denomi-
nated securities issued by non-euro area residents, 4% were issued by euro area
residents and denominated in a foreign currency, and 19% were issued by non-
euro area residents and foreign currency-denominated.
2.2 Foreign Holdings of Austrian Debt Securities (Portfolio Liabilities)
At end-June 2002, foreign investors held Austrian debt securities worth EUR
191 billion, 96% (EUR 184 billion) of which were bonds and notes. In the
course of the third quarter of 2002, foreigners purchased debt securities for
another EUR 1 billion. Like portfolio assets, however, portfolio liabilities were
also affected by positive securities price and exchange rate effects in the third
quarter of 2002. Thus, foreign holdings of Austrian debt securities actually
came to EUR 196 billion at the end of September 2002.
As in previous years, public sector issues were highest in demand by foreign
investors. At end June-2002, nonresidents held public sector issues amounting
to EUR 93 billion. Further net purchases in the third quarter of 2002 and
mainly positive price effects pushed foreign portfolio liabilities up to EUR 98
billion, which corresponds to 50% of nonresident creditors holdings of Aus-
trian debt securities.
Domestic securities issued by banks display a different pattern. From July to
September 2002, foreign investors were selling securities issued by Austrian
banks. As a result, foreign investors holdings of such assets further shrank to
EUR 78 billion in spite of positive price and exchange rate effects. In this
category, developments were mixed in 2002. At end-2001, foreign investors
had held securities issued by Austrian banks worth EUR 75 billion. As it was the
case with public sector issues, net purchases offset adverse securities price
effects in the first quarter of 2002. By the end of June 2002, however, investors
holdings had contracted, as negative exchange rate effects were exceeding net
securities purchases. In the third quarter of 2002, the decline in investors
holdings continued for the reasons outlined above.
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An analysis by currency of foreign holdings of Austrian debt securities
reveals that by the end of June 2002, 69% of domestic bonds and notes held
by nonresidents were denominated in euro. Thanks to new investments and
positive securities price effects in the following three months, foreign holdings
of euro-denominated Austrian bonds and notes amounted to EUR 130 billion
and continued to account for a share of 69% at the end of September 2002.
Debt securities denominated in other currencies also recorded new investment
by nonresidents. As a result of new investments and owing to additional positive
price and exchange rate effects, Austrias external liabilities in the form of
bonds and notes denominated in foreign currencies came to EUR 59 billion.
Between July and September 2002, foreign investors purchased Austrian
money market instruments denominated in euro while selling or redeeming
domestic money market instruments denominated in other currencies. At end-
September 2002, foreign holdings of domestic money market instruments
denominated in euro amounted to EUR 1.9 billion and foreign holdings of
short-term fixed-interest securities denominated in foreign currencies came to
EUR 5.2 billion.
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F i n a n c e f o r G r o w t h
1 The Century of Financial Markets?
Historians scrambled to label the 20th century even before it had drawn to a
close and even though one might argue that the rather chance unit of 100 years
does not really befit such an exercise. Eric Hobsbawm (1995) coined one of the
most famous and felicitous epithets with the short twentieth century spanning
the time from the outbreak of World War I to the collapse of the Soviet Union.2)
While this judgment, though persuasively expounded, reflects an interesting
perspective of the past century, it is certainly neither the only possible nor the
single most important nor the only fitting one.
Inspired by Hobsbawms approach, one may engage in an experiment,
asking what has shaped the economy and economic policymaking in the past
century. Just like historians, economists very likely will come up with an array
of answers to this question. Not least because a host of special factors — two
world wars, repeated arms races, hyperinflation, the Great Depression, the
post-war upswing, two oil price shocks and the New Economy — combine to
produce too heterogeneous a picture to capture the entire century in one
catchall phrase.
Nevertheless, observers may find at least one common theme running
through the 20th century: the development of financial markets. Cases in point
are the dynamic growth and multifaceted specialization on financial markets in
the second half of the century, developments at the beginning of the century
(Obstfeld and Taylor, 1997) and the slide into the Great Depression, its severity
and duration (Kindleberger, 1973). At the same time, the evolution of the
international monetary system from the gold standard via Bretton Woods to
the European monetary union likewise left its mark on the 20th century and its
financial history (Eichengreen, 1998).
A quick look at some empirical developments may illustrate the dynamic
growth and differentiation of the financial markets over the last decades (see
Annex):
— international foreign exchange market turnover has risen to daily figures
well beyond USD 1,000 billion, a volume often cited to show the rising gap
between (international) financial market activity and real transactions;
— the rapid growth of derivatives markets — to a daily turnover of about USD
1,400 billion in April 2001 — and a shift from foreign exchange to interest
contracts constitute a clear element of higher market differentiation and risk
exposure;
— the internationalization of the banking system illustrates another stylized
fact of financial market development, with foreign assets and assets denomi-
nated in foreign currency of the banking sector reaching USD 12,270 billion
in 2000 compared to just USD 2,582 in 1983;
1 The author is very grateful to the participants of an OeNB-workshop on the subject, in particular Helene
Schuberth, Martin Schu‹rz and Engelbert Stockhammer, for many helpful comments and suggestions on earlier
versions of this paper.
2 In contrast, the 19th century appears to have been long from his point of view, having lasted roughly from
1780 to 1914.
Peter Mooslechner1)
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— international bond and stock market transactions data of industrial countries
as measured by balance of payment statistics show a similar marked rise, also
in relation to nominal GDP growth;
— strong growth of stock market capitalization — from USD 4,520 billion in
1990 to USD 18,846 billion in 2001 — and even more pronounced growth in
stock market turnover to USD 30,643 billion in 2001 compared to only
USD 2,950 billion in 1990 — illustrate the importance of financial market
growth also from the domestic perspective;1)
— the same is true for the long-term development of households financial
assets, which have risen substantially not only in absolute figures but also in
relation to nominal GDP over the last four decades — very much related to
the particular framework conditions after World War II, perhaps being a
historic exception.
Although it is very difficult or almost impossible to come up with consistent
time series on financial market developments for the entire century, there is an
interesting discussion looking at changes in global capital market inter-
dependencies from a historical perspective. For example, Obstfeld and Taylor
(2002) favor the so-called U-shape hypothesis, arguing that vigorous inter-
national capital flows were seen already in the late 19th century and at the
beginning of the 20th century.2) After the setbacks brought on by the two world
wars, the Great Depression and the restriction on capital flows related to the
Bretton Woods system, the recent rise in international capital market flows can
be interpreted as a return to pre-1900 levels of financial market development in
their view.
Kindleberger (1984) contributes an impressive historical account of finan-
cial market development and financial market interdependencies, even though
he states that it is not clear that there is a need to justify a financial history of
western Europe. He is actually the first to provide a comprehensive history of
this kind, and to date similar contributions have been sparse and much more
limited in focus. However, it is not by chance that Kindleberger pens the book
in that historic period and at the very outset raises the question Why finance?
He cites that one may ask whether monetary and financial events and institu-
tions matter as his key motivation for writing this book, thereby implicitly
dedicating the whole volume to finance and growth — filling a void in the
economic literature of his time.
Twenty years on, in 2003, pinning down the theme finance for growth to
set the stage for the contributions published in this issue is a tall order, partic-
ularly in the face of many comprehensive papers and literature surveys shedding
light on the theory and empirics of finance and growth (e.g. Pagano, 1993;
Levine, 1997; Leahy et al., 2001; Thiel, 2001; Wachtel, 2001; Dolar and Meh,
2002; Giannetti et al., 2002). From the wide range of aspects related to finance
1 Stock market capitalization and turnover of the five largest stock exchanges: NYSE, Nasdaq, Deutsche Bo‹rse,
London and Paris.
2 Although Obstfeld and Taylor and others provide some convincing evidence in this respect, the quality of
financial development and integration was of a different nature at that time. For example, and compared to the
situation in the second half of the 20th century, participation in financial markets and, specifically, in
international financial transactions seem to have been limited to a much smaller number of institutions and
even fewer (very rich) individuals — as it can be illustrated by considerable lower financial assets to GDP ratios.
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and growth the paper highlights three selected issues that are fundamental to
find adequate policy prescriptions for economic policy decision-making and
which are key to the current discussion. Section 2 centers on the question
Does finance matter? from a rather theoretical-historical perspective, and
section 3 revolves around the essential functions of financial markets and the
important characteristics of financial market transactions. Finally, section 4
focuses on the perennial debate of different financial systems. The paper ends
with a number of tentative conclusions on the state of our knowledge and on
possible economic policy and institutional consequences.
2 Does Finance Matter? — Theory versus History, Reality
and Policy
When analyzing financial markets not just at the microlevel but explicitly in a
macroeconomic context, a number of interesting gaps related to the role
financial markets and financial institutions play in the economy emerge:
(i) Over the past decades economic reality has to a large extent been shaped by
financial market shocks and crises. The European monetary union, the
implicit redefinition of the IMFs role and the greater importance attached
to financial stability in the hierarchy of economic goals have been direct
consequences of this situation.
(ii) With economic issues thus reprioritized, economic policymakers all over
the world regard financial market developments as a permanent economic
policy challenge. Recurring topics for discussion include an adequate reg-
ulatory framework for the supervision of financial markets and institutions,
effective early warning systems for monetary and financial crises and the
implications of asset market instabilities for monetary policy.
(iii) The economic history literature with its long-term perspective attests to the
existence of a relevant relationship — both in a positive and negative sense —
between financial market and macroeconomic developments. Perhaps this link
does not exist at all times, but it is definitely there during particular historical
phases. At any rate, this relationship clearly manifests itself in day-to-day eco-
nomic policymaking, and chances are the general public is also aware of it, at
least in times of heavy stock market losses.
(iv)In contrast to the previous three points and the inferred requirements for
economic policy action, in economic theory, it is by no means clear whether
financial markets and the real economy are indeed related and, if so, in what
form and how it ties in with our understanding of macroeconomic theory. A
brief rundown of economic theories helps illustrate this peculiar dichotomy
and associated schizophrenia.
Six (excessively simplistic) shortcuts how the relationship between financial markets and
the real economy was treated in economic theory:
Adam Smith
When Adam Smith established economics as an autonomous science, he intro-
duced in his broad economic analysis three concepts which have been crucial to
economic understanding ever since: (i) methodological individualism, (ii) self-
interest as one of the principle forces guiding action and (iii) the market price
mechanism (the invisible hand) as the all-important coordination mechanism.
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Apart from a monetary analysis focusing on precious metals and a brief dis-
cussion of bank lending, Adam Smith did not cover financial markets. Efficiency
and macroeconomic equilibrium are determined by the real economy, and the
three basic concepts he introduced are focused on the behavior of market
participants and market structure on goods markets; financial transactions do
not systematically impact the economic situation.
Rudimentary Finance
Mainstream economic doctrines ranging from classical theories via Keynesian
and neoclassical views to real business cycles are generally characterized by
merely rudimentary efforts to explicitly integrate financial markets into
analysis. Banks, which dominate the financial systems of advanced market
economies, are only very seldom modeled as a separate component in macro-
economic models.
A case in point is the IS-LM model, which for decades mirrored the text-
book consensus on macroeconomic thinking. While this model lacks many
essential Keynesian principles, it differs from classical orthodoxy in that
monetary factors in fact are seen to have an influence on the determination
of the interest rate. Yet, even though a rudimentary securities market is thus
implied in the model, it ignores any independent effect of nonmonetary finan-
cial markets on the real sector, e.g. associated with investment financing.
Put very simply, in most of these models implicit financial markets merely
accommodate real sector decisions, even in such cases where the model allows
for a relationship between monetary conditions and the real economy. Here, it is
important to note that modeling the interaction between monetary policy and
the real economy does not yet imply that financial markets are accorded a role in
their own right.
Financial Market Economics and the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH)
While mainstream macroeconomics would decouple financial markets and the
real economy, under more limited a focus, financial markets were allocated a
significant role in guiding real sector decisions, such as investment decisions.
Put differently, financial markets and financial institutions are seen to influence
economic decisions from this point of view. Essentially, this is based on the
notion that financial market decisions are more efficient compared to decision-
making on rigid product markets and that financial market structures are less
distorted. In this context, financial markets have a central role to play in
controlling and steering product markets, thus helping boost the efficiency of
the economy as a whole.
At the same time, financial market economics was long dominated by the
efficient market hypothesis (EMH), an idea partly developed by Fama (1970).1)
Under the EMH, an efficient financial market is characterized by asset prices
which fully reflect all available information. Empirical evidence was interpreted
to show that the existing financial markets, isolated exceptions aside, are indeed
efficient consistent with the above definition. The assumptions underlying this
model basically define efficiency along the lines of three criteria: (i) financial
1 For a survey and re-statement at the beginning of the 1990s see Fama (1991).
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market players act rationally as a rule; (ii) insofar as rationality is flawed, their
behavior is random; (iii) should there indeed be irrational agents, sufficient
numbers of rational arbitrageurs cancel out the impact such irrational behavior
would have on the market outcome.
The Modigliani-Miller theorem (MMT), which built on the EMH and its
far-reaching assumptions, was for a long time the authoritative theorem on the
relationship between the financial sector and the real economy in financial
market economics. Similarly to what is typical of mainstream macroeconomics,
the MMT decouples real sector decisions from financial constellations under a
number of extremely rigid assumptions about financial market players and their
behavior. In the same vein, financial market economics also ignored the influ-
ence of financial market decisions on real sector decisions, including e.g. the
link between stock market developments, investment and spending decisions.
Wicksell and Schumpeter
The picture would be incomplete, however, without naming some of the econ-
omists who held diverging views and who placed a particular emphasis on the
relationship between finance and growth. Yet, even though they captured reality
more precisely, such theories have somehow never really caught on as part of an
economics canon and never figured broadly in mainstream textbooks. Wicksell
and Schumpeter are only two examples in this context.
Wicksell (1913, 1922, 1934), who never followed mainstream economic
beliefs, postulates the existence of two distinct rates of interest. The natural rate
of interest as the expected return on new capital is determined by the real
sector, while the loan rate of interest is affected by the banking market. Diver-
gence between these two interest rates sets in motion a cumulative process of
expansion or contraction of income and prices (via investment decisions). In the
light of the active role of the loan interest rate, the financial markets have a
pivotal function in Wicksells model. Along similar lines, Schumpeter (1934)
accords the banking system a more important role, since it is the banking system
which facilitates an economic upswing through its (inflationary) financing of
innovative entrepreneurs and thus paves the way for a higher level of equili-
brium output.1)
Minsky
Incorporating financial markets, Minskys theory of investment makes an effort
to give an authentic interpretation of Keynes. His theory, which explicitly
accounts for budgetary constraints and financing conditions, builds on the
financial framework underlying economic activity. Minsky (1975) distinguishes
a mix of fragile financing constellations and at the same time considers cash
flows and obligations incurred in the process of building up capital stock. This
puts the spotlight on the issue of how to finance investments and on the
prevailing financial market situation. Here, Minsky not only extends Keynes
(especially the Keynes of the Treatise), but also Irving Fishers (1933) debt
1 This Schumpeter-Connection is mentioned explicitly in the modern literature on the subject (King and
Levine, 1993b).
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deflation theory, which, under the influence of the Great Depression, tackles
very similar mechanisms.
New Keynesian Economics
Following Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986), a new strand of New Keynesian
Economics has evolved since the 1980s. This new strand claims that the core
of the Keynesian view need not rely on rigidities and imperfect competition
alone but must also reflect the macroeconomic consequences of capital market
failures due to asymmetric information. This literature claims that capital
market failures have a role in determining the business cycle and the non-
neutrality of money even if markets are assumed competitive. Financial factors
are considered relevant for self-sustained oscillations of exogenous shocks.
This brief overview of economic theories reveals above all that the question
of the role financial markets play in macroeconomic thinking first and foremost
hinges on the underlying theoretical model one has in mind. Interestingly, the
majority of macroeconomic constructs more or less ignore the impact of the
financial sector on the real economy. Vice versa, a considerable portion of
financial market economics does not take into account real sector issues. What
is strange is that the steering function financial markets are widely assumed to
have with regard to real sector decisions is not considered in either perspective.
Where specificities of financial market imperfections (microfoundations) are
introduced into macroeconomic models such as the New Keynesian models
described above, it is not clear whether the deeper implications of the long list
of financial market imperfections are addressed adequately by these models — if
we think of the impact of deviations from rational expectation equilibria or of
bounded rationality. E.g. liquidity preference as a cause of financial market
failure is not captured by New Keynesian models. The different causes of
financial market failure have different macroeconomic effects: Whereas the
liquidity preference implies a downward rigidity of the interest rate in case
of excess capital supply, capital rationing which is important in New Keynesian
models, implies an upward rigidity of the interest rate in the event of excess
capital demand (Delli Gatti and Tamborini, 2000).
Besides, this simplified historical-theoretical rundown accentuates why it is
so difficult in economic analysis to factor current financial market developments
into the macroeconomic context. Not only can financial market developments
hardly be explained systematically by means of traditional approaches, but their
general implications for growth and employment are also hard to pin down.
However, the growing importance of behavioral finance points to a significant
change in this respect. Behavioral finance does not call the fundamentals of
financial market economics into question, but merely broadens the perspective
by adding real-life market behavior.1) Evidently, interaction between rational
and less rational market participants results in interesting outcomes. In partic-
ular, the cornerstones of financial market efficiency are challenged; under
1 For a recent survey of the issues see Shiller (2002), Zwiebel (2002) provides an interesting review of Shleifers
(2000) book. Beside financial economics Behavioral Economics has also started to challenge many of the
traditional behavioral assumptions in economic theory (Fehr and Falk, 2002; Rabin, 2002; Tirole, 2002).
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realistic market conditions, efficiency is but a special case with a low probability
(Shleifer, 2000).
3 The Characteristics of Financial Transactions
and the Multiple Functions of Financial Markets
Whenever one tackles financial market issues and especially the impact of
financial market developments on the real sector, two basic questions inevitably
come to mind which are key to understanding this interrelationship:
(i) Do financial transactions differ so much that they need to be treated
separately, or is the traditional (product) market model also applicable to
financial market analysis?
(ii) What functions do financial markets have in a macroeconomic setting, and in
how far are these functions important to economic growth?
The answers to these rather basic questions are important as to in how far
and in what form financial markets are to be treated as related to the real sector.
And indeed, it makes little sense to pursue the question of the interrelationship
of finance and growth any further, as long as the main characteristics of financial
transactions are not explicitly accounted for in the analysis. In particular,
implicitly equating product and financial markets along the lines of traditional
neoclassical microeconomic theory masks the specific characteristics of financial
transactions and their potential implications for the real sector.
The bulk of transactions on product markets may be classified as spot
transactions. Here, sellers and buyers interact on the market for a mere
moment, reach agreement on the type of product and its price and do not have
to see each other before or after the transaction.
Financial transactions are fundamentally different. Acquiring a financial asset
or incurring a financial obligation (in the form of debt) invariably goes hand in
hand with the establishment of a relationship between buyer and seller for a
given period of time — any financial asset or liability exists not only here and
now, but also has a history and future. To give an example, when an investor
buys a debt security, this additional asset in his balance sheet is (a) directly linked
with the debt the issuer incurs by issuing this security and (b) interconnects
buyer and issuer until they decide to alter their respective balance sheet posi-
tions. The buyer of the security expects the seller to deliver on the agreed cash
flows, i.e. interest payments and redemptions. Besides, the buyer usually takes a
keen interest in the economic situation of the issuer. If the issuer runs into
difficulties, the buyer may face a substantial financial loss, even though the
original acquisition took place years or decades before. This contrasts com-
pletely with, say, a book purchase, where the buyer is indifferent to any prob-
lems the seller or issuer of the book may have five minutes after the transaction.
Financial transactions differ fundamentally from transactions on product
markets, with the inherently forward-looking nature of financial transactions
probably the most striking difference. Information on the past and present state
of markets and products is much less important for financial market than for
product market transactions. Instead, financial transactions are very much gov-
erned by expectations, which is attributable to the above-mentioned creditor-
debtor relationship. Price formation on financial markets is therefore chiefly led
by expectations, from which follows: (i) very rigid assumptions on how expect-
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ations come about aside, efficient fundamental equilibria are likely to be the
exception rather than the rule; (ii) besides, market participants expectations
may be presumed to be rather volatile and thus related to greater financial
market instability. These perceptions are not only borne out by present-day
financial market developments, but also figure prominently in modern theory
on financial markets.
Of course, this stylized picture of differences between (dominant) charac-
teristics of transactions on financial markets and goods markets can be taken as a
first step only. For example, warranties on durable consumer goods and, in
general, real investment decisions — in particular investment in new products
and new technologies — show considerable similarities with characteristics of
financial transactions. On the other hand, there are a number of financial
transactions — e.g. payment services and short-term transactions on stock and
on foreign exchange markets — which come very close to the characteristics of
spot transactions. Therefore, a much more detailed analysis of transaction
characteristics would be necessary, distinguishing above all between the
short-term and the long-term orientation of transactions as well as their imme-
diate consumption or investment characteristics both on goods and financial
markets.
In addition to transaction characteristics, financial market participants
motives may be very diverse and may vary considerably over time. Taking on
additional debt may, for instance, be motivated by the wish to realize a highly
profitable investment project or to cushion losses resulting from past misdir-
ected investment. To be able to make an informed decision on whether to
conduct a given transaction or not, additional information is necessary and
information asymmetries frequently pose a problem. In essence, the simple
fact that a borrower is not necessarily allowed to borrow more money if he
pays a higher interest rate attests to these difficulties; thus, it would be a fallacy
to assume that credit was theoretically infinite. Likewise, a multitude of
motives, such as precaution, liquidity preference, profitability, speculation,
retirement provision or inheritance may guide investors in their decision
whether or not to conduct a transaction, which also explains the vast variability
in decision-making. Also, at different points in time, one and the same investors
decisions are determined by different factors.
In general, the market mechanism on financial markets is highly complex.
Various perspectives on the concrete functions of the financial system and how
they are presented in the discussion of bank-based versus market-based systems
bear testimony to this fact. The categories of financial market functions pro-
vided by Leahy et al. (2001) basically capture the wide range of views on this
topic:
(i) Mobilizing savings
(ii) Diversifying risk
(iii) Allocating savings to new (investment) projects
(iv) Monitoring the allocation decision of managers.
Tobin (1984) explicitly relates this largely undisputed structure of financial
market functions to the macroeconomic perspective and endeavors to classify
these concepts according to their contribution to overall economic efficiency.
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Traditional equilibrium-oriented economic theory generally accepts finan-
cial markets as a blueprint for ideal markets and efficient price formation. In
real life, however, financial markets are increasingly seen as a source of volatility
and instability (Shiller, 2000). In this respect, Tobin distinguishes between three
basic concepts: (i) Information-arbitrage efficiency means that financial market
players use all available information, which leads to efficient price formation;
(ii) fundamental-valuation efficiency postulates that market efficiency is guaranteed
in that the valuation of any asset reflects accurately the discounted stream of
future payments to which the asset gives title; and, finally, (iii) full-insurance
efficiency in an Arrow-Debreu economy posits that any agent is at all times
capable of hedging against any feasible future contingency.
Tobin points out that these concepts, while lending themselves to describing
specific functions and efficiency aspects of financial systems, fail to exhaustively
define macroeconomic efficiency. This is so because they ignore the very core
function (i.e. financing function) of financial markets, which consists in the
transfer of savings to investors. For this reason, Tobin suggests to add another
concept, namely (iv) functional efficiency, centering on the efficient transfer of
funds with a view to financing investment. In this perspective, financial markets
are directly related to the real sector; thus, any factors determining the transfer
of funds from investors to debtors are relevant to overall economic perform-
ance. Disruptions and inefficiencies in this transfer process may reduce the level
of investment, thus translating into a lower growth path for the economy.
The great complexity of this issue is illustrated by the fact that these
efficiency concepts cannot be seen as mutually exclusive; to the contrary, it
makes sense to apply them simultaneously and with considerable overlaps.
Emphasizing, for instance, functional efficiency by no means suggests that,
say, information-arbitrage efficiency may be neglected, because the latter may
also contribute to functional market efficiency. It is, however, very unlikely that
there are no conflicts between the individual efficiency concepts and that all
four dimensions could be met simultaneously and completely by efficient finan-
cial markets. Again, it all depends very much on which approach towards
financial market functions is selected and on what framework conditions are
deemed to be conducive to efficiency. Interestingly, each of these concepts
presumes completely different repercussions of finance on growth.
4 Financial Systems — Europe versus U.S.A.
One of the most important debates — both from an economic and a political
perspective — sparked at the end of the past century revolves around financial
systems, basically the juxtaposition of the American and the European
model.1) It comes on the heels of vigorous deregulation and financial market
liberalization (Edey and Hviding, 1995; Stiglitz, 2000) and has spawned a
number of important issues in Europe, such as the need of the European
banking system for structural adjustments, the strengthening of Europes capital
markets and the discussion of Basel II and its implications.
1 In a much broader context, the discussion on the differences between and the importance of financial structures
goes back to the path-breaking analyses by Goldsmith (1969), Gurley and Shaw (1955) and McKinnon
(1973).
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While the bursting of the New Economy bubble and the crisis in stock
markets somewhat dampened the one-sided tendency to advance the U.S.
model, according to which financial market structures are to be geared primar-
ily to the capital market, the issues driving this debate continue to influence
financial system design — on both sides of the Atlantic.
Two contrasting models of corporate governance, i.e. the outsider and
insider system, are at the center of this discussion. In the outsider system,
the supervisory board representing the company owners exercises little imme-
diate control over the companys management (arms length relationship).
Instead, corporate control is exercised primarily via the capital market. If the
company is poorly managed and the shareholder value diminishes, investors
react by selling company shares, exposing the company to hostile takeovers. In
the insider system, the owners take an active role in corporate governance, with
the main groups of owners and stakeholders represented in the supervisory
board.
As is evident from this stylized differentiation of corporate governance
regimes, the smooth functioning of the models depends on the structure and
developmental stage of the financial markets.
Banks play a particular role in this respect, which is reflected in the dis-
tinction between market-based and bank-based financing structures. In the
United States and in the United Kingdom, companies rely heavily on the capital
market, whose mechanisms also determine corporate governance. By contrast,
in central Europe banks play a pivotal role given the greater significance
attached to debt financing. As to the efficiency of the models, in the literature
we find about as many arguments for as against either of the two models.
Modern theory on corporate finance emphasizes the relationship between
investment decisions, finance and corporate governance. According to Hellwig
(1991), the fact that this decision-making structure was previously ignored is to
a large part traceable to the dominant role the Walrasian paradigm of perfect
markets played in financial market analysis. This paradigm implies a specific
institutional framework which does not allow for the analysis of different
financial institutions and financing constellations. The popular Modigliani-
Miller theorem demonstrating the irrelevance of financing decisions was at
the root of the disregard for financing aspects.
The primacy of this position was not seriously called into question before
the latter half of the 1980s, when it was criticized both from a theoretical (e.g.
Stiglitz, 1985) and, above all, an empirical perspective (Mayer, 1988). To this
effect, it had been necessary to link the three elements finance, information and
corporate governance to gain a holistic view of the functions of any given
macroeconomic financing system.
In the Anglo-American market-based system, households excess funds are
channeled to investors mainly via the securities markets. As a consequence, we
face a comparatively fragmented financing structure, where banks are heavily
specialized and nonbank financial intermediation is very important. In the bank-
based system, the bulk of financial intermediation is provided by universal
banks, which engage both in lending and securities trade and maintain close
relationships with the investors. These universal banks provide long-term
financing and offer a broad range of financial services to their customers.
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Market-based systems insist on public disclosure, thus facilitating access to
corporate information. Many companies tap the capital market and are listed on
stock exchanges. In line with strict rules, all market participants have equal
access to relevant information. This improves not only the liquidity, but also the
allocative and information efficiency of these markets. In contrast, little cor-
porate information is publicly disclosed in the bank-based system. The majority
of companies do not use institutionalized markets, with corporate information
shared chiefly among agents with long-term (financing) relationships. The lend-
ing banks, which play a crucial role in this context, frequently hold stakes in
large companies.
By contrast, equity is typically owned by widely dispersed groups in the
market-based system. In most companies individual owners wield little influ-
ence, and even larger owners seldom exercise direct control over corporate
management. Investors have an overriding objective, which is to maximize the
return on their portfolio; this objective guides them in their decision to buy or
sell their securities. In this way, the transfer of ownership serves as a tool for
disciplining management. In the bank-based system, ownership is highly con-
centrated. The stock exchange and stock prices are less important and hostile
takeovers are rare. Governance rights are exercised directly via the supervisory
board, in which all the major owners are represented. Banks, which hold a
considerable share of voting rights in large companies, figure prominently as
well. Major owners equity interests, in particular, seldom change hands.
Long-term financing relationships, the role of debt financing as an instru-
ment of governance and the advantages of delegated monitoring figure among
the merits of the bank-based financial system. Amid incomplete contracts,
mechanisms fortified by long-term relationships reduce moral hazard problems
between providers of finance, managers and employees. Against the backdrop of
implicitly long-term contracts among the parties involved, it is possible to
follow through on long-term corporate strategies, such as research and develop-
ment, large-scale investment projects and staff education and development.
The positive effect on debt financing resulting from strengthening corporate
governance appears to be largely undisputed in the literature. Company owners
and providers of finance are expected to disagree on corporate governance
(Aghion and Bolton, 1992), which is why restricting governance to ownership
control will probably not automatically lead to optimal outcomes from a macro-
economic perspective. Owners and providers of finance by definition seek
different types of corporate information, and only all the information put
together provides the large picture necessary for effective corporate control.
With Diamond (1984) as a clear point of departure, the role of banks as
delegated monitors of the corporate sector has come to the forefront in the
corporate governance literature. Producing additional information is regarded
as the key to overcoming information asymmetries prevailing between the
providers of finance and corporate management. In this respect, financial inter-
mediaries seem to have an edge over securities markets owing to economies of
scale and institutionalized constancy. What is more, delegated monitoring cov-
ers the entire group of companies using intermediated financing. The most
serious constraint on the monitoring and control function of financial interme-
diaries is, however, that the available information and any ensuing consequences
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do not immediately become transparent to the original investors. In the case of
delegated monitoring, governance rights are exercised on the basis of a fictitious
mandate and in the interest of all investors.
Empirical studies provided the necessary impetus to raise the profile of these
aspects in the economic literature. Cable (1985) was among the first to dem-
onstrate that countries where banks are well-established providers of finance
and where close interlinkages exist between banks and industrial companies
show better growth performance. Furthermore, the fact that even in the coun-
tries with the most advanced securities markets, such markets contribute only
marginally to corporate investment financing (Mayer, 1988; Franks and Mayer,
1994) underlined this empirically. In the end, the interrelationship between the
structure of the financing system and the performance of the economy as a
whole was explored further, which resulted in a long-run growth and develop-
ment perspective (King and Levine, 1993a, 1993b, 1993c).
Bank behavior is said to be the main drawback of bank-centered financing
structures (Edwards and Fischer, 1994). Here, especially lack of transparency,
insider problems, vested interests and conflicts of interest of financial inter-
mediaries representing all investors as well as inefficient monitoring and
corporate control draw criticism despite of the theoretical advantages of the
bank-based model.
Interestingly, despite the pronounced differences between the bank-based
and the market-based model, the current trend in the economic literature is to
attest neither of the two models any particular advantage as to economic growth
performance (e.g. Beck and Levine, 2001). Researchers have increasingly been
focusing on the general developmental stage of the financial markets and finan-
cial institutions of a country, relatively independent of which model the financial
system is based on. Well-developed financial markets appear to have a positive
impact on overall economic performance, while effects of certain financial
market specializations are increasingly deemed to be less important.
However, this is not to say that structural factors are completely inconse-
quential to the efficiency of financial systems. More emphasis is, for instance,
being placed on institutional differences, such as fundamental differences in
legal systems. Also, the financial market structure may influence the ease with
which distributive effects of finance as to given types of companies (e.g. accord-
ing to their size) or to the type of activity to be funded (e.g. innovations and
research) can be financed.
5 Financial Markets and the Economy:
Some Tentative Conclusions
Financial market developments, in particular financial market growth and a
marked differentiation of financial products, have shaped the economic situation
of the 20th century to a considerable extent. Although the framework
conditions for this development after World War II may have been very specific,
in general, historical experience makes it rather unlikely that there is no
interrelationship between financial market developments and the real economy,
or only a negligible one.
Surprisingly enough, mainstream economic theory as well as financial
economics have considerable problems in sufficiently integrating financial
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markets into macroeconomic analysis. At the same time, economic policy-
makers had and have to regard financial market developments as a growing
and permanent economic policy challenge. More recent theoretical develop-
ments, although far from belonging to mainstream economic thinking (e.g.
Behavioral Finance), try to react to this challenge and to give financial markets
an independent new role. The role financial markets are allowed to play in the
context of macroeconomic thinking, and consequently in policy suggestions
based thereon, implicitly hinges first and foremost on the underlying theoretical
model.
Contrary to the extensively discussed differences between bank-based and
market-based financial systems, nowadays the overall degree of development of
a financial system is seen to be the important factor. Well-developed financial
markets are very likely to have a positive influence on economic performance,
to a large extent independently of a specific structure of a financial system. In
addition, institutional differences — e.g. in the legal system — are considered to
explain the main differences in how financial systems work and how efficient
they are. Structural features of financial systems do play a role for the efficiency
of financial systems also, but these are mainly related to specific distributive
effects of financing depending on the type of firm (e.g. a small versus a large
firm) or the type of financing (e.g. financing of innovations versus financing of
traditional sectors).
The specific characteristics of financial transactions as compared to (most)
transactions on goods markets call for a particular theoretical treatment of these
markets and transactions in economic analysis, unlike traditional microeco-
nomic theory, which is clearly intended to focus on short-term goods market
equilibria. As a consequence of the particular characteristics of financial markets
and financial market behavior, price formation on financial markets is domi-
nantly expectation-determined, leading to a rather volatile market situation and
greater financial market instability.
The functional efficiency of a financial system, centering on the efficient
transfer of funds with a view to financing investment, directly relates financial
markets to the real economy. Almost by definition, functional efficiency takes
the priority a financial system needs to fulfill from a macroeconomic point of
view. Factors determining the transfer of financial funds to investors are essen-
tial for the potential level of investment and the growth path of the economy to
be realized. Other concepts of financial market efficiency — e.g. information
arbitrage, fundamental valuation or full-insurance efficiency — perform impor-
tant functions as well and therefore must not be neglected. However, it appears
very unlikely that in reality all these concepts of efficiency may be achieved in an
overall equilibrium simultaneously, therefore a certain challenge arises in select-
ing the efficiency concept to be given priority depending on the economic
situation and the economic policy needs to be addressed.
Combining the different historical, economic policy and financial market
perspectives, there seems to be a clear need for a paradigm shift in economics,
in the direction of a macroeconomic theory integrating financial markets and
their impact on real developments into the core of the analysis.
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1 Introduction
Financial liberalization has become an important policy issue in the past decades
and has led to a more prominent role of financial markets, and the stock market
in particular, within the economy. The paper discusses macroeconomic effects
of the stock market with a focus on its impact on business investment. In doing
so the paper confronts the popular belief that stock markets matter because they
provide finance for investment. Such a belief is not only appealing intuitively,
but also backed theoretically. Standard economic theory has shown that, assum-
ing perfect information, the source of finance does not matter (the Modigliani-
Miller theorem) and that higher share prices will lead to higher investment since
they reduce the cost of capital (the Q theory of investment).
Contrary to these theoretical expectations, empirical research on invest-
ment expenditure indicates a minor role, if any, for stock markets to directly
influence investment through providing finance. However, the conclusion from
this is not necessarily that stock markets do not matter, rather they may affect
investment through other channels. Thus next to the direct finance effect the
paper discusses the following indirect effects: effects on the allocation of invest-
ment; effects on the financial system through balance sheet effects; wealth
effects in consumption; effects on corporate governance (shareholder value
revolution). While the first three of these indirect effects are discussed by
means of an admittedly selective literature survey, the issue of corporate gov-
ernance is treated in more depth and a novel post-Keynesian model of the
shareholder value oriented firm is proposed.
The paper discusses the indirect effect of stock markets on investment via
the establishment of shareholder value as a management objective. The argu-
ment presented presumes potentially conflicting interests between management
and shareholders and discusses the effects of a change in the power of share-
holders by means of a Post-Keynesian model of the firm. An increase in the
power of shareholders can lead to an increase in desired profitability and a
decrease in desired growth and investment at the firm level.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the role stock markets
play in financing investment. Section 3 summarizes studies on investment
behavior and role of share prices therein. Section 4 addresses the question of
how stock markets affect the allocation of investment. Section 5 discusses the
role of share prices in the making of financial crises. Section 6 summarizes
studies on the effects of wealth on consumption. Corporate governance issues
are introduced in section 7, and a post-Keynesian interpretation of the share-
holder revolution is presented in section 8. Finally, section 9 summarizes the
key findings.
1 Engelbert Stockhammer — Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration, Department of
Economics, VWL1, Vienna, engelbert.stockhammer@wu-wien.ac.at.
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the OeNBs Finance for Growth workshop. The author is
indebted to the participants of this workshop for the discussion and to Maria Valderrama for her critical
comments, but carries sole responsibility for all remaining errors.
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2 Stock Markets and the Finance of Investment
The standard expectation about the role of financial markets is that financial
markets channel funds from households that save to firms, which invest. In a
modern economy this role is played by financial intermediaries such as banks
and by financial markets, of which the stock market is the most prominent,
though by no means the only one. Therefore a naive expectation is that the
development of stock markets over the past 20 years has led to an investment
boom and that rising stock prices have translated into cheaper finance and thus
higher investment. It turns out that on the aggregate level, neither of the two
expectations is correct. Below, two bodies of literature will be summarized that
reach a similar conclusion using very different means: stock markets and share
prices matter little for investment.
In 1988 Colin Mayer published a paper in the European Economic Review,
where he used a flow-of-funds analysis to look at the sources of finance for
investment in major industrialized economies. The flow-of-funds data allow to
analyze the source of finance of business fixed capital investment for the non-
financial business sector as a whole. Mayer looked at the period 1970 to 1985
and found that the main source of finance was retained earnings in all countries,
with a share of 62% to 107% of total investment. Loans (and similar bank
originated funds) amounted to 5% to 42%, whereas equity contributed —4% to
5% of investment expenditures. The negative contribution of equity is possible
because these figures are net contributions. The contribution will turn negative
if the acquisition of shares requires more funds than those received through
issuing new shares.
These findings were a surprise when first published and still pose a puzzle to
economists today. Mayers findings have since been replicated and updated with
substantially the same findings (e.g. Corbett and Jenkinson, 1997). The most
recent thorough analysis is offered by Schaberg (1999), whose results are
reproduced below and will be used to discuss the results.
Table 1 summarizes the net contribution of various sources to the non-
financial business sector for the U.S.A., the UK, France, Germany and Japan
from 1970 to 1994. Internal finance, i.e. retained earnings, are clearly the most
important source of investment in all countries. In the U.S.A. and the UK 90%
or more were financed internally; in the other countries, the value is around
70%. Bank finance is the second important source, with contributions ranging
from 11% to 16% for the U.S.A., the UK, France and Germany and coming to
28% for Japan. Bonds are an important source of finance in the U.S.A. (15.2%),
Table 1
Net Sources of Finance 1970 to 1994
U.S.A. United Kingdom Germany France Japan
%
Internal finance 92.4 90.0 73.9 72.1 65.3
Bank finance 11.2 13.7 13.2 16.0 28.5
Bonds 15.4 5.2 5.2 4.8 8.1
Equity — 6.4 — 4.1 — 4.1 4.5 3.5
Trade credit — 5.0 — 0.5 — 0.5 — 0.6 — 4.8
Source: Schaberg 1999, Table 2.2. Rows Capital transfer, Other and Discrepancy have been omitted for simplicity. Therefore rows will not add up
to 100.
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where its contribution exceeds that of banks, but account for around 5% in the
UK, France and Germany. Equity had a negative contribution in the U.S.A., the
UK and France, but a positive one in Germany and Japan.
The U.S.A. and the UK are considered cases of a market-based financial
system;1) thus it is interesting to note that these countries have the highest ratios
of internal finance. While bond finance is particularly important in the U.S.A.,
it contributes only moderately in other countries. Already Mayer noted the
paradox that the most competitive financial markets in the world appear to be
the most deficient at funding their industries (Mayer 1988, p. 1182). Overall it
seems that the market-based financial systems effectively require a higher degree
of self-financing of investment.
Table 2 summarizes the development of the net contribution of equity over
time. Patterns differ significantly across countries, and it is probably most
interesting to look at the U.S.A., since the U.S.A. is often used as the role
model for the design of the financial system. There the contribution of equity
was positive and significant in the early 1970s, fell in late 1970s and turned
negative in the early 1980s. In the second half of the 1980s, the time of the
merger and acquisition boom, the negative contribution reached an astonishing
—26%. In the early 1990s the contribution became moderately negative again.
The UK also had the highest negative contribution in the second half of the
1980s, but negative contributions throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Only in the
1990s did the contribution turn positive. Both Germany and France experi-
enced negative contributions in the 1990s, but positive ones before. In Germany
the contributions are small in any case, but in France they were above 5%
throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Only Japan had positive, if moderate, net
contributions of equity over the entire period.
What do we conclude from this analysis of flows of funds data? Mayer
(1988) suggested that the market-based systems had an inferior performance
in financing and supporting investment. Thus the inferior financial system
translates into inferior investment expenditures. Mankiw (1988) on the other
hand suggested that causality runs the other way and it was the low investment
expenditures in the Anglo-Saxon countries that caused the high retention rates,
since firms could easily self-finance their investment. In his explanation the
financial sector is a side show that would eventually adapt to the needs of
1 The distinction between market-based and bank-based financial systems goes back to Gerschenkron (1962),
who compared the industrialization of various countries. Grabel (1997) offers an up-to-date discussion.
Schaberg (1999) refers to exit-based versus voice-based financial systems.
Table 2
Equity as Percentage of Net Finance
1970 to 1974 1975 to 1979 1980 to 1984 1985 to 1989 1990 to 1994
U.S.A. 7.4 1.5 —4.7 —26.0 —4.5
United Kingdom —7.2 —2.3 —5.2 —12.2 9.6
Germany 0.7 0.5 —0.4 2.4 —3.4
France 6.9 8.9 5.4 5.8 —2.2
Japan 3.4 3.9 4.2 3.7 2.9
Source: Schaberg, 1999.
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industry. In the meantime a substantial literature has emerged that emphasizes
the importance of the development of the financial sector for economic growth
(see Levine, 1997, for a survey). Schaberg (1999) sides with Mayer in finding
that market-based financial systems exhibit lower and more volatile growth than
bank-based systems. Recent research, however, failed to find support for this
conclusion (see section 4).
For the purpose of the present paper, however, the crucial finding is that
stock markets contribute little to the financing of investment. Moreover, in
market-based financial systems the net contribution of stock markets is even
negative. Thus stock market development by itself is unlikely to have positive
effects on investment expenditures.
3 Investment Behavior and Share Prices
A very different strand of literature, empirical research on business investment,
reaches a similar conclusion. If issuance of shares were used to finance invest-
ment, an increase in share prices should lead to an increase in investment
expenditure because the cost of capital decreases. Indeed, this argument has
a long tradition in economics; it can be found e.g. in Keynes, and was formally
presented in Tobins Q theory of investment (Tobin, 1969).
Tobin regarded investment as a portfolio decision related to financial mar-
kets. If the demand price of a firm is the market value (roughly speaking, the
value of its shares) and its supply price the cost of additional capital goods, then
investment should be a function of the ratio of the two, which is called Tobins
Q. Expectations about future sales and profits should be captured in share
prices. In this theory no other variables are needed to explain investment
because all expectations e.g. concluding future sales ought to be captured in
share prices.
Tobins financial theory is appealing because it elegantly combines real and
financial aspects and has sparked much empirical research. Using only share
prices to explain investment as suggested by the theory would of course be
dubious in empirical research because other variables will be correlated with
share prices. Therefore it would be impossible to isolate the effect of these
variables. Indeed share prices are well known to be a leading business cycle
indicator and other investment theories also predict that investment will
respond positively to growth. Thus it has become practice to add share prices
to the standard explanatory variables such as demand growth, the cost of
capital, retained earnings and the like.
Empirical studies have almost unanimously failed to find support for the
effect of share prices on investment expenditures in multivariate regressions.
For example, Tease concludes: When other determinants of investment are
controlled for, share prices do not seem to explain much of the variation in
investment in any of the G7 countries (Tease, 1993, p. 58). Blanchard, Rhee
and Summers (1993) and Morck, Shleifer and Vishney (1990) also examine the
effect of share prices on investment and report similar results.
While (nonresidential) investment expenditures overall remain hard to
explain, the relative importance of the key factors is confirmed by various
studies. Chirinko in his authoritative survey concludes output (or sales) is
clearly the dominant determinant of investment spending with user cost having
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a modest effect (Chirinko, 1993, p. 1881). And the usefulness of q theory is
called into question by its generally disappointing empirical performance
(Chirinko, 1993, p. 1889). Ford and Poret (1991) arrive at the same results.
Thus the empirical picture is rather clear, if surprising. Equity is not used as
a major source to finance investment and share prices have no economically
relevant effect on investment expenditure. The conclusion is that if the stock
market has an effect on investment, this effect does not operate through the
standard channel of providing finance. Some qualifications of course are neces-
sary. First the research quoted refers mostly to aggregate data. The flow of funds
analysis is on aggregates, and much of the investment literature quoted is also on
aggregate investment expenditures, though e.g. Blanchard, Rhee and Summers
(1993) also refer to firm level evidence. None of the evidence cited is incon-
sistent with the notion that the stock market may be a source of finance for
some firms. In particular there may be small sectors, such as those related to
venture capital, where the stock market matters.
Second, the empirical studies cited refer to the postwar era, thus to a
particular historical period. Stock markets may have played a different role in
the past. Rajan and Zingales (2001), for example, suggest dramatic changes in
the size and probably also function of the financial system in the past century.
Stock markets may thus also play a different role in the future. But as discussed
above, the experience of the countries which have the most developed and
liberal financial systems, i.e. the U.S.A. and the UK, does not suggest that
current developments of financial liberalization move the function of stock
markets towards the financing of investment.
The fact that stock markets contribute so little to firms finance has spurred
the development of theories that are able to explain this phenomenon. Among
these, the pecking order theory of investment, the tradeoff theory and Kaleckis
principle of increasing risk are the most established ones. The pecking order
theory, originally developed by Myers and Majluf (1984; see also Myers,
2001) assumes that information asymmetries are stronger between management
and investors on financial markets than between management and banks. Since
debt is a claim prior to equity, which is a residual claim, banks are less exposed
to errors in valuing a firm than financial markets. From that a pecking order of
finance can be derived. Firms will use internal finance first, debt finance last and
equity only when the debt finance becomes too costly.
The tradeoff theory argues that due to the different tax treatment of debt1) and
equity firms have a strong incentive to acquire the former. A high debt ratio,
however, increases the risk of bankruptcy in case of shocks. Thus the firm will
increase the debt ratio to the point where the marginal effect of the tax shield
equals the (expected) marginal cost of financial distress (Myers, 2001). Sim-
ilarly in spirit, but without assuming maximizing behavior, Michal Kalecki
(1943) argued at an early point in time first, that firms access to the capital
market will depend on their size and profitability and, second, that an increasing
debt ratio will put firms survival at risk in case of difficulties. They called the
latter the principle of increasing risk, i.e. the risk of bankruptcy increasing with the
1 Interest payments on debt are tax deductible, whereas dividend payments are not.
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debt ratio. What these theories share is the assumption that capital markets are
imperfect, thus rejecting the very basis of the Modigliani-Miller theorem.
4 Allocation of Investment
If stock markets have little effect on aggregate investment, they may still be
important in allocating investment. There are three major channels through
which stock markets may affect the allocation of investment even in the absence
of a strong direct effect. First, firms may use price signals of stock markets as a
guide in their investment plans. Second, banks may be influenced in their credit
decisions by the stock market performance of firms or sectors. Third, even if
the contribution of stock market is small, this small amount may fund selective
industries that banks neglect. In popular discourse this latter channel has
entered under the heading of venture capital. It has often been argued that
market-based financial systems are superior to bank-based systems because they
are better in supporting innovation. The question is whether such indirect
effects of stock markets, if they exist at all, are strong enough to have effects
on aggregate growth.
While substantial amounts of research have been performed, these questions
are far from being settled. This is at least in part due to substantial measurement
problems of the crucial variables involved. Rather than giving an overview of the
literature, three examples arriving at different conclusions will be given. Carlin
and Mayer (1999) investigate the effects of financial systems (and other varia-
bles) on growth, investment and research activities of industrial sectors in
OECD countries. They find that stock markets do foster R&D expenditures
in rich countries. Arestis, Demetriades and Luintel (2001) use time series
analysis for some OECD countries to investigate the relation between stock
market development and growth and find that stock markets have little positive
effects on growth, whereas banks matter. Beck, Demirgu‹c-Kunt, Levine, and
Maksimovic (2001), citing evidence from firm, industry and country level for
developing as well as developed countries, conclude that distinguishing coun-
tries by financial structure does not help in explaining cross-country differences
in long-run GDP growth, industrial performance, new firm formation, firm
use of external funds, or firm growth (Beck, Demirgu‹c-Kunt, Levine, and
Maksimovic 2001, p. 193). Thus, while there is weak evidence for allocative
effects of stock markets, it is probably fair to say there is no evidence for these
effects to be strong enough to affect aggregate growth.
5 Balance Sheet Effects and Banking Crises
One important effect of a change in the valuation of shares is on balance sheets.
This is true for households as well as firms and financial institutions, but it is
most important for financial institutions since by definition their most impor-
tant assets are financial assets. Since credit is the crucial form of outside finance
available to many firms in an incomplete market setting, a banking crisis and the
accompanying credit crunch may have devastating effects on the economy (and
investment). This has been argued e.g. by Bernanke (1983) for the Great
Depression of the 1930s for the U.S.A.
Empirical research on the role of stock markets in the making of banking
crises is rare. In particular it has been difficult to identify the relative contri-
Stock Markets, Shareholder Value
and Investment
100 Focus on Austria 1/2003
bution of share prices, since banking crises usually happen when a host of factors
like a recession, a collapse of the exchange rate or capital flight coincide. Many
studies (e.g. Demirgu‹c-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998) do not even include share
price. One of the studies that does include them finds that a fall in stock
prices is also associated with an increased likelihood of banking sector distress
(Hutchison and McDill, 1999, p. 17). This is hardly surprising, but the exact
effect of share prices on the stability of the banking sector remains elusive.
6 Wealth Effects in Consumption
Until very recently the effect of stock markets on consumption has been
considered an issue of minor significance. While there was a major debate
between Keynesians and Monetarists on whether consumption expenditures
depend on current or permanent income, and if the latter, how to measure
it; and on the related issue of whether interest rates affect consumption, both
sides would probably have agreed that wealth effects were not more than of
secondary relevance. With the stock market boom of the 1990s and even more
with the bursting of the bubble in the late 1990s, research on the wealth effect
has surged.
No consensus about the order of magnitude or even the existence of the
effect of stock market wealth has yet emerged, even though The Economist
quotes such a consensus estimate of around 5% for the U.S.A. and somewhat
lower for other countries. This is backed by various working papers of OECD
economics department (e.g. Boone, Giorno and Richardson, 1998; Boone,
Girouard, and Wanner, 2001). Others are more skeptical about the reliability
of such an effect. Poterba in his survey cites the stock market crashes of 1929
and 1987 as evidence that consumption responds little to changes in equity
prices and also is cautious in the interpretation of household level data.
One of the biggest problems in the estimation of wealth effects is the
disentangling of the effects of various components of wealth. Case, Shiller
and Quigley (2001) separate housing wealth from financial wealth and analyze
their respective effects on consumption for 14 countries as well as within the
U.S.A. They find strong evidence for an effect of housing wealth, but only a
weak one for stock market wealth. This is interesting not only with respect to
the current situation of the U.S.A., which experienced a collapse in stock prices
and where there is fear of a growing bubble in property prices. Housing wealth
is also held much more widely. One reason for the importance of housing
wealth may be that housing wealth loosens credit constraints more effectively
than financial wealth since it is usually readily accepted as collateral.
To summarize, studies have yielded different results about the robustness of
an effect of stock market wealth on consumption. In any case, there is more
evidence for an effect of share prices on consumption than on investment. If the
former exists, then there also would be an indirect effect on the latter. A rise in
stock prices would increase consumption and via the accelerator would also
augment investment. It is remarkable that such an indirect effect seems more
consistent with the evidence than the direct one.
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7 Corporate Governance, Shareholder Value
and Investment
Stock markets may also affect investment behavior by affecting corporate gov-
ernance and thus management priorities. In particular since the 1970s impor-
tant changes have occurred in corporate governance that are closely linked to
financial deregulation and that have become known as the shareholder revolu-
tion. It is worth quoting from an OECD study at length:
One of the most significant structural changes in the economies of OECD
countries in the 1980s and 1990s has been the emergence of increasingly
efficient markets in corporate control and an attendant rise in shareholders
capability to influence management of publicly held companies. In particular,
owing to the expanded possibilities for investors to use the capital market to
measure and compare corporate performance of corporations and to discipline
corporate management, the commitment of management to producing share-
holder value has become perceptibly stronger; this represents a significant
change in the behaviour of large corporations (OECD, 1998, p. 15).
The effects of this development are viewed differently by different authors —
unsurprisingly, since it represents a shift in the power structure within the firm.
Baker and Smith emphatically welcome that after the deregulation and changes
of the 1970s and 1980s the pendulum could swing back toward financial
capitalism, which would limit managerial discretion in favor of more rigorous
exploitation of corporate resources (Baker and Smith, 1998, p. 22).1) Lazonick
and OSullivan on the other hand write: In the name of creating shareholder
value, the past two decades have witnessed a marked shift in the strategic
orientation of top corporate managers in the allocation of corporate resources
and returns away from retain and reinvest and towards downsize and
distribute (Lazonick and OSullivan, 2000, p. 18).
The seminal theoretical paper that provided a rationale for empowering
shareholders is Jensen and Meckling (1976). They derive the objective function
of the firm from a principle-agent problem between owners and management.
In doing so they were pioneers of using these models for a positive modeling of
the firm. Managers will not maximize profits and thus the value of the firm, but
will pursue their own interest. Thus independent managers with only partial
claims on the firm lead to waste. To avoid this waste and consequently increase
profits and the value of the firm, Jensen and Meckling propose that managers be
paid in stocks or stock options, which has become frequent practice since the
1980s.
In the course of the 1970s two institutional changes occurred that helped to
align managements interests with shareholders interests: the development of
new financial instruments that allowed hostile takeovers and changes in the pay
structure of managers. Among the former were tender offers and junk bonds
(Baker and Smith, 1998); among the latter were performance-related pay
schemes and stock options (Lazonick and OSullivan, 2000). The former play
the role of the stick, the latter is the carrot. Both have proven fairly effective in
making management adopting shareholders priorities and profoundly altered
patterns of managerial power and behavior (Baker and Smith, 1998, p. 3).
1 Marxists would probably agree but be more specific in saying ... rigorous exploitation of workers.
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Engaging in purely wasteful activities, as emphasized by Jensen and Meck-
ling, need not be the only consequence. Another stream of thought argues that
independent managers will overinvest. Managers motivation may be, at least in
part, a drive for power, i.e. being in command of people and resources. This is
achieved by large and growing firms. Business historians, in particular Chandler
(1977), and post-Keynesians1) have argued that what independent management
will lead to is increased growth rather than waste. Macroeconomically, it may
thus be a good thing if the economy is in a situation of underemployment, which
according to post-Keynesians is the normal situation for capitalist economies.
8 A Post-Keynesian Model
of the Shareholder Revolution2)
In the following, a simple model inspired by the post-Keynesian theory of the
firm is proposed to analyze such a shift in the power relations. The starting point
for the post-Keynesian theory of the firm is, interestingly, similar to modern
theories of the firm: the separation of ownership and control.
Managers will have interests other than the maximization of profits: they
may aspire to power and prestige that might be expressed in high market share
and fast growth, luxurious offices and many subordinates. Owners, on the other
hand, are interested merely in profits. This strictly speaking also need not be
true; they may also pursue other interests. In particular they will be interested
in asset prices, i.e. in the value of the firm on the market. We simplify things by
assuming that there is a direct relation between profits and asset prices. This, of
course, will not hold strictly in reality, but standard theory suggests that the
price of an asset is given by its discounted (expected) revenue stream, which in
the case of industrial firms is reasonably well proxied by the firms profit. The
issue of speculation is thereby sidestepped. Needless to say, this is not done for
the sake of realism, but for the simplicity of exposition. The specific goal of the
firm, or more precisely the relative weight of conflicting goals, will depend on
the relative power of managers and owners. These in turn will depend on the
specific institutional setting of the firm and the economy.
To formalize the argument, assume that the only two variables, growth and
profits, enter managements and the owners utility functions. Further assume
that management only cares about growth and owners only care about profits.
Thus we get the following utility functions UM and UO, for managers and
owners respectively.
UM ¼ UðgÞ
UO ¼ UðrÞ ð1Þ
where g is the investment or growth of the firm and r the profit rate.
1 Developed by Galbraith (1967) and Eichner (1976), and summarized neatly by Lavoie (1992), post-
Keynesians have a well elaborated theory of the firm in the age of managerial capitalism.
2 This and the following section is based in part on Stockhammer (2004).
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The firms objective function will be a weighted combination of the two
UF ¼ U1M UO  ð2Þ
where 0    1 is the relative power of shareholders.
The difference in interests would be no issue if the two goals were com-
plementary. But this will in general not be the case. With a standard cost
function profitability is concave in investment. Thus, there will be profit max-
imizing level of investment above which a tradeoff exists. Since managers aim at
high growth, the firm will only operate in this region where there is a tradeoff.1)
Accepting the tradeoff, we get profits as a function of investment:
profit growth tradeoff: rRG ¼ rðgÞ with r0 < 0 ð3Þ
Thus the firm will maximize its objective function subject to the growth-
profit tradeoff.
It is instructive to take a look at two extreme cases. First, assume that
managers have all the power; the firms objective function then contains only
growth. Managers will then be maximizing growth. Usually managers will
subject either to a survival condition, i.e. that the firm does not accrue losses,
or to a finance constraint. Inside finance and outside finance are different.2) For
simplicity assume that banks give loans as a multiple of the profit earned last
year. From this it follows that we can write the amount of investment feasible
for a firm as a function of profits.
finance constraint: gFC  gðrÞ with g0 > 0 ð4Þ
Finance is limited by profits minus dividends paid, i.e. retained earnings,
and outside finance, which is a positive function of profits. Note that this
constraint need not be binding. It tells how much the firm can possibly invest,
not necessarily how much it will invest.
Chart 1 gives a graphical analysis of the managerial firm. The horizontal line
UM is the indifference curve of managers, who only aim at growth; the vertical
line UO is the indifference curve of owner. rRG, the concave line, is the growth-
profit tradeoff and gFC is the finance constraint. Managers want to achieve the
highest growth rate possible, which in this case is given to be the finance
constraint. Therefore, in the managerial firm, the chosen g,r combination is
gMF and rMF .
Second, consider the situation where owners have all the power. Then the
firm is simply profit maximizing and will choose the profit-maximizing growth
level. An intermediate case of a shareholder-dominated firm (SDF) is depicted
1 The notion that growth has occurred at the expense of profits is a rather standard one in recent literature on
corporate governance. E.g. an OECD publication reads: Among the manifestations of this lack of control over
management were the pursuit of market share and growth at the expense of profitability (...) (OECD, 1998,
p. 17; emphasis added). To be fair, this is not the only manifestation given, but the existence of such a tradeoff
is obviously implied.
2 This is one of the basic assertions of post-Keynesian economics that has been slowly and painfully rediscovered
by neoclassical economists over the past decades after Miller and Modigliani (1958). Following the principle of
increasing risk, firms are reluctant to accept high leverage rates since a failure will put the existence of the firm
at risk. Banks on the other hand will take current profit and wealth as a proxy for a firms reliability, and give
credit only to firms that are already profitable.
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in chart 2. The notation is the same as above. Now through stock options and
the threat of hostile takeovers, managers have adapted partially to the interests
of shareholders, which is symbolized by the indifference curve U 0. It is an
intermediate case between indifference curves of managers and owners. In this
case the chosen g,r combination will be gSDF and rSDF , with lower growth and
higher profitability than in the previous case.
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It is difficult to test this theory, since there is no straightforward measure for
shareholder power. Stockhammer (2004) proposes the rentiers share of non-
financial businesses (henceforth: RSNF), i.e. the interest and dividend income
of nonfinancial businesses as a portion of their value added,1) as a proxy. The
rationale for this is the following. If our story were true, one would expect that
managers and consequently nonfinancial businesses identify increasingly as rent-
iers and hence will also behave as such.2) One would expect lower desired
growth and more financial investment. In other words, the aim of the firm shifts
from production-oriented goals that are typical for industrial managers towards
the return orientation that is typical for investment funds. RSNF is thus a proxy
for the investment fund-ness of nonfinancial businesses.
This measure obviously has shortcomings. First, it is an indirect measure, a
proxy, because we cannot measure the changes in management priorities
directly. Instead we look at a measure that, in our hypothesis, is itself a result
of the change in attitudes. Second, RSNF measures income from financial
investment rather than financial investment itself. The former may rise because
interest rates or dividend payout ratios have risen or because more financial
investment has been undertaken. Thus we cannot distinguish between additional
income due to changes in management priorities or due to changes in rates of
return. In the econometric analysis this problem is addressed by including
interest rates in the regression, thus controlling for one important measure
of financial rates of return. However, the measure also has an attractive advant-
age because it is an income measure. If firms were subject to a finance con-
straint, one would expect income of any kind to be positively related; however,
the theory proposed expects a negative effect.
To isolate the effect of financialization on investment we control for standard
variables that affect investment decisions. Thus we include an accelerator term,
a profit term and a term for the relative cost of capital as the standard variables
in the literature (see Meyer and Kuh, 1957; Jorgenson, 1971; and Chirinko,
1993, as surveys). The investment equation thus is:
ACCU ¼ fðGROWTH;PS;CC;RSNF Þ ð5Þ
with the expected signs being:fGROWTH > 0; fPS > 0; fCC < 0; fRSNF < 0
where ACCU, GROWTH, PS, RCC, and RSNF denote accumulation, GDP
growth, profit share, relative cost of capital, and rentiers share of nonfinancial
businesses respectively.3) Data definitions and sources are summarized in the
Appendix.
1 The numerator of this expression captures the rentiers income. Note that the rentiers share of the non-
financial business sectors measures the receipts from financial investment rather than financial investment
itself. It is derived from the National Accounts and thus a flow magnitude that does not include revaluation of
assets.
2 Note that our story avoids assigning the active role exclusively to rentiers and financial markets. Given the
ambiguous class positions of management they may, after initial changes actively promote and further the
shareholder value orientation, as noticed by Lazonick and OSullivan (2000) and Ju‹rgens, Naumann, and
Rupp (2000).
3 This specification is inspired by the reformulation of post-Keynesian investment function by Marglin and
Bhaduri (1990), but contains the neoclassical approach (pioneered by Jorgenson, 1963) as a special case.
Keynesians argue for the importance demand effects and the role of profits — as source of internal finance and
as proxy for profit expectations — whereas neoclassical economists emphasize the role of the relative cost of
capital and accept the role of output.
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Table 3 reports the results of this regression. Since the regression is in levels
and autoregressive terms are included, the R2 are very high with the lowest
value (for the U.S.A.) 0.84. GROWTH is statistically significant at the 5% level
only once, in the UK. PS ist statistically significant at the 5% level twice
(Germany and France), and CC is statistically significant only in the UK (with
Germany close to the 10% level). RSNF is statistically significant at the 5% level
or better in France and the U.S.A. Thus the coefficient estimates exhibit only
moderate levels of statistical significance, which in part is due to multi-
collinearity and the inclusion of two lags of the dependent variable. This was
done after indication of second order autocorrelation. The Breusch-Godfrey
test does not indicate the presence of autocorrelation (the test was performed
up to four lags). There is no indication of a structural break.
The results differ substantially across countries. This is not surprising since
the degree to which shareholder value orientation has been implemented differs
widely, with the U.S.A. and the UK leading the way, France following and
Germany lying behind. To ensure the robustness of results, several different
specifications have been estimated that yielded substantially similar results.
These variations included a different measure for growth and different time
series specifications.
The above discussion has been concerned with statistical significance.
Whether the coefficient estimates, be they statistically significant or not, exhibit
a value that is economically relevant, what McCloskey and Ziliak (1996) call its
economic significance, is a different question. Some simple calculations con-
firm this. The mean estimate for the coefficient is —0.22 for all four countries.
The mean change in RSNF from the 1960s to the 1990s is roughly 0.025. This
gives a long term effect of the change in RSNF on accumulation of —0.015,
Table 3
Regression Specification with Output Growth
Germany France United Kingdom U.S.A.
1963 to 1990 1978 to 1997 1970 to 1996 1963 to 1997
const —0.03* —0.02 0.00 0.01
—1.85 —1.67 —0.03 0.40
GROWTH—1 —0.01 0.02 0.08** 0.08
—0.11 0.31 2.52 1.24
PS—1 0.0012** 0.0011** 7E—05 0.000
2.42 2.38 0.10 0.24
RSNF—1 —0.22 —0.32*** —0.04 —0.22***
—0.83 —2.66 —0.34 —2.45
CC—1 —0.0004 0.0004 —0.0003** —0.001
—1.12 0.61 —1.71 —1.47
ACCU—1 1.13*** 0.49 1.18*** 0.75
4.26 1.13 6.63 3.09
ACCU—2 —0.36 0.18 —0.28 —0.22
—1.60 0.52 —1.45 —0.99
R2 0.96 0.93 0.89 0.84
adj R2 0.94 0.90 0.85 0.80
BG Obs. R2 2.16 4.11 1.1 4.45
Chow Breakpoint Test 1980
F-Stat 1.01 1.43 1.25
Prob. 0.46 0.28 0.32
Calculations performed with Eviews. Italic numbers are t-values.
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. BG is the Breusch-Godfrey autocorrelation test. Its null hypothesis is no autocorrelation.
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which is a substantial amount of the actual slowdown of accumulation over this
period. However, the results vary greatly between countries. Needless to say,
this back of the envelope calculation is not meant as a statement about actual
effects, but merely as a check whether the effects that are implied by the
parameter estimates are of an order of magnitude that is economically relevant.
The answer to this question is unambiguously yes.
9 Conclusion
The paper has asked a seemingly simple question: how do stock markets affect
investment? The straightforward answer would be that stock markets provide a
source of finance for investment and thus that higher share prices lead to higher
investment. Empirical evidence is rather clear that neither is the case. The
analysis of the flows of funds to nonfinancial business show that equity does
not provide net finance and research on investment behavior is almost unan-
imous in that share prices have no effect on investment expenditures.
Other than the obvious direct effect, changes in share prices may also affect
investment indirectly. They may affect the allocation of investment, they may
affect the stability of the financial system and they may through a wealth effect
impact on consumption expenditures, which in turn will affect investment
expenditures via the accelerator. Ironically, empirical research gives more sup-
port to the wealth effect and accelerator channel than to a direct finance
channel.
Of these indirect channels changes in corporate governance have received
the most attention. It has been argued that the shift in power from managers to
shareholders that has become known as the shareholder revolution may have had
strong effects on management priorities. Based on the post-Keynesian theory of
the firm, it has been shown that under these conditions, the desired profit rate
may have gone up, with the associated growth rates going down. Econometric
evidence was presented to support such a view.
Thus the overall picture drawn here suggests that the stock market develop-
ment of the past decades may have had little, if any positive effect, on invest-
ment expenditures. While the direct effects are nil, the indirect effects may be
positive through the consumption boom, but this latter is not sustainable. A
policy of empowering stakeholders rather than shareholders, which would
constitute a break with the policies of the past two decades, is unlikely to have
a negative effect on investment.
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Appendix
Data Definitions and Sources
Variable Definition Source
ACCU growth rate of gross business sector capital stock OECD Economic
Outlook database
Growth growth real business sector GDP OECD Economic
Outlook database
PS profit share in the business sector OECD Economic
Outlook database
CC relative cost of capital: deflator of capital goods plus short run interest
rate / real wage costs
OECD Economic
Outlook database
RSNF interest and dividend income of non-financial businesses/value added
of non-financial businesses
OECD National
Accounts, Vol. II database
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1 Introduction
Empirical evidence is increasingly supporting the view that stock markets do
matter as an overall growth factor. Only recently has an OECD study provided
new empirical evidence suggesting that since the 1970s stock market develop-
ment may have promoted economic growth in high-income countries (see
Leahy et al., 2001). These findings have been questioned by Hahn (2002a,
2002d) on the grounds that these studies use financial development indicators
which are highly biased by price effects. Hahn (2002a, 2002d) shows that, when
price effects are appropriately controlled for, the positive linkage between stock
market development and economic growth in high-income countries is no
longer statistically significant.
Another topic closely related to the finance matters discussion but only
recently brought to the forefront is the link between the depth and structure of a
countrys financial sector and the magnitude or severity of its macroeconomic
cycle. In contrast to the finance-growth literature where empirical and theo-
retical research is roughly balanced, most work dealing with the finance-cycle
nexus is still theoretical. The substance of this literature is that economies with
highly developed financial markets are superior to financially less-developed
economies in allocating resources and in sharing risks, respectively. As a result,
economies with well-developed financial markets are supposed to serve as shock
absorbers and as such are to be better capable of reducing aggregate output
fluctuations than bank-based economies. Yet, in following Allen and Gale
(2000), there is also a sense in which economies with fewer choices of financial
instruments can offer superior sharing of macroeconomic (or nondiversifiable)
risks. By pointing to countries such as Japan, Germany and France, Allen and
Gale (2000) praise the virtue of holding large amounts of wealth in the form of
bank deposits in order to shield private households from fluctuations in the
value of assets that are marked to market. This view is in line with empirical
research indicating that the risk management and information processing pro-
vided by banks may be particularly important in reducing overall output vola-
tility (Denizer, Iyigun and Owen, 2000).
In this paper, we revisit the link between financial development and macro-
economic volatility by exploring some of the ways through which financial
development may affect business cycle fluctuations. First of all we examine
whether financial development exerts an unambiguous effect on macroeco-
nomic volatility. Building on theoretical work related to at least two different
strands, we then investigate the role financial development has in the propaga-
tion of real and monetary shocks. The latter work suggests overwhelmingly that
the effect of real shocks be dampened by well-developed financial systems while
monetary shocks are magnified.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we give a
short overview of the relevant lines of theoretical work studying the effects of
financial systems on output fluctuations. In section 3, we discuss our estimation
strategy and data. In section 4 we present our main findings and conduct a
sensitivity analysis. Section 5 concludes.
1 I wish to thank Christa Magerl for excellent research assistance on this and related projects.
Franz R. Hahn1)
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2 Theoretical Motivation
2.1 Financial Development, Competition and Insurance
A widely held presumption is that markets tend to accentuate the difference
between the incompetent, the unskilled, or the untalented and the more quali-
fied, thus exacerbating the need for insurance (Rajan and Zingales, 1999a).
Competitive markets are often accused of lightly destroying old relationship-
based structures of insurance while not providing enough protection against
risks which come naturally with a more advanced competitive outside environ-
ment. In general, risks created by the expansion of markets are assumed to be
hard to diversify away.
As to financial markets, it is widely undisputed that market-based financial
systems are better than relationship-based financial systems at supplying invest-
ors with state-of-the-art opportunities for diversifying idiosyncratic risks.
Moreover, market-driven systems are also said to have a greater allocative
efficiency capacity than intermediation-driven systems. In good times, the
advantages of developed financial markets, by making everybody better off,
by far outweigh the disadvantages associated with markets, such as the lack of
insurance, which is of course not considered a loss in times of plenty. In bad
times, however, even almost perfectly hedged positions all too often turn out
not to be much of a cover, since counterpart risks tend to be highly positively
correlated with macroeconomic shocks. This breeds systemic risks which, in
overly market-oriented economies, are said to be particularly hard to cope with
without government assistance. Thus, as put in Rajan and Zingales (1999a),
competition, when coupled with the lack of commitment that leads to incom-
plete contracting and free-riding, makes it hard for markets to provide the
necessary cross-subsidies that mitigate its harshness. In order to provide insur-
ance in countries with market-oriented financial systems, the respective govern-
ments are often called upon to play an active role, or at least convey to the
electorate their firm determination to intervene in the working of markets
whenever shocks occur, triggering trouble too big for a market system to settle
on its own.
Proceeding along this line of reasoning, Allen and Gale (2000) explore a
strategy suitable to hedge for nondiversifiable risks. They argue that where
incomplete markets do not provide for effective intertemporal smoothing,
long-lived financial institutions such as banks can do so. Intermediaries are said
to be capable of providing insurance ex post by making transfers that act as a
substitute for missing markets. However, banks can only supply this service as
long they are not subject to competition from financial markets. The point is
that in good times individuals would rather opt out of the banking system and
invest in the market, so in the long run, intertemporal smoothing by banks is
not viable in the presence of competition from markets (Allen and Gale, 2000,
p. 156).
The substance of this literature is that financial development proceeds along
the lines of more arms length financing at the expense of relationship lending,
of more competition at the expense of crony capitalism, and of higher standards
of disclosure and accountability at the expense of business opaqueness. The
downside is that financial development is assumed to be closely associated with
increasing macroeconomic volatility. That is to say, this view suggests that there
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be an unambiguous, positive relationship between financial development and
business cycle volatility. Among other things, this hypothesis is being tested in
this paper.
2.2 Financial Development and Shock Propagation
An interesting aspect of the relationship between finance and macroeconomic
volatility is the interaction of financial development and real and monetary
volatility and its effect on aggregate output fluctuation. Contrary to the view
just outlined, this strand of work does not propose an unambiguous effect of
financial development on the business cycle volatility. However, as so often
theoretical evidence on shock propagation through financial development (that
is, arms length financing or relationship lending) is rather mixed.
A relevant line of work based on capital market imperfections stresses the
amplifying effects on the propagation of real shocks due to finance. Not sur-
prisingly, the channels through which capital markets imperfections work their
way through the economy depend heavily on the structure of the model. In their
seminal paper, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) argue that the effects of temporary
productivity shocks may be amplified by capital market imperfections which
tend to affect the net wealth of credit-constrained borrowers. Similarly,
Bernanke and Gertler (1990) show that business cycle volatility is very likely
to be exacerbated by shocks to the net worth of borrowers due to an accelerator
effect on investment.
A second strand of literature questions the presumption that capital market
imperfections systematically destabilize the business cycle. This line of research
raises the point that the seemingly exacerbating impact of imperfect capital
markets on business cycle volatility is mainly due to models constructed on
special assumptions. Bacchetta and Caminal (2000) develop a dynamic general
equilibrium macroeconomic model with asymmetric information in credit
markets which allows for analyzing in greater detail the propagation of shocks
by accounting for the nature of the shocks. They show that the output response
to shocks may go either way depending on how the composition of external and
internal funds for credit-constrained firms is affected by the shocks. Beck,
Lundberg and Majnoni (2001) extend this model and show that well-developed
financial intermediaries, while dampening the effect of real sector shocks on
output volatility, magnify the impact of monetary shocks on macroeconomic
volatility (that is, shocks to the banks balance sheet). The latter is explained by
considerations very similar to the credit channel view of monetary policy. Beck,
Lundberg and Majnoni (2001) argue that firms depend more on external
resources in financially developed economies and are thus more exposed to
monetary shocks that are transmitted through the financial sector. As to real
shocks the argument goes that better-developed financial intermediaries alle-
viate the cash-flow constraint on firms which rely on external funding and
therefore dampen the impact of shocks to the production function.
We base our empirical approach mainly on the work of Beck, Lundberg and
Majnoni (2001). Additionally, we attempt to extend it in various ways by
applying a broader set of financial development indicators, such as measures
for stock market size and stock market efficiency, and by including different
interactions of financial markets with different sources of volatility. Though the
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model by Beck, Lundberg and Majnoni (2001) abstracts from channels other
than the bank-based credit channel, there are good reasons to conjecture that
their main findings hold under conditions in which shock propagation is pro-
pelled by the stock or bond market. To be more specific, we will test the
following hypotheses: First, we test if there is an unambiguous effect of the
stock market on the business cycle volatility as suggested by the conjecture
outlined in section 2.1. Second, we check if there is empirical support for the
view that not only the credit market, as predicted by the model of Beck,
Lundberg and Majnoni (2001), but also the stock market magnifies monetary
shocks and dampens real shocks. Further, we also test whether stock market
volatility matters as an independent source of macroeconomic volatility.
Following Beck, Lundberg and Majnoni (2001), we use the standard devia-
tion of terms-of-trade changes as a proxy for real shocks and the standard
deviation of the inflation rate as a proxy for monetary shocks respectively.
Departing from Beck, Lundberg and Majnoni (2001), we use the standard
deviation of the aggregate output gap and the absolute difference between
the maximum and the minimum of the output gap as indicators for macro-
economic volatility. In the sensitivity analysis the set of macroeconomic vola-
tility measures is extended by the standard deviation of annual changes of real
GDP per capita used by Beck, Lundberg and Majnoni (2001) as an output
variability measure. The empirical analysis in this paper is based on a panel
data set for 22 OECD countries while Beck, Lundberg and Majnoni (2001)
cover 63 countries, including the OECD region as subset. We should also add
that the empirical analysis of Beck, Lundberg and Majnoni (2001) is primarily
based on a three-period panel data set aggregated over the periods 1960 through
1972, 1973 through 1985, and 1986 through 1997.
3 Data and Econometric Methodology
3.1 The Data
Our panel data set for 22 OECD countries is built over the period 1970 through
2000. Data quality, data coverage and the high degree of homogeneity of
production technology are the main reasons why we restrict our analysis to
the OECD countries. The empirical analyses are based on a six-period panel
where the data are averaged over nonoverlapping five-year intervals aggregated
over the periods 1971 through 1975, 1976 through 1980, with 1996 through
2000 representing the last period. The size of the interval is supposed to
approximately cover a full length of a normal business cycle. Details about
the OECD countries covered, the variables defined and the data sources
referred to are given in the Annex (table A). To allow for an examination of
the importance of the frequency of the data used, we also average over ten-year
periods between 1971 and 2000 aggregated over the periods 1971 through
1980, 1981 through 1990, and 1991 through 2000.
As indicators for fluctuation, we use ex post measures of volatility based on
the historical data. A few studies choose an ex ante approach, which separates
out the unexpected part of volatility by using some form of forecast or expect-
ation formation procedures (i.e., Ramey and Ramey, 1995). Since ex ante
measures are difficult to construct satisfactorily and, in addition, are likely to
lean towards unintentionally removing valuable information from the data, we
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stick to the ex post approach. Thus, as the dependent variable in our regression
approach, we alternately use, as already mentioned, according to the period
chosen (i. e., five- or ten-year period), the standard deviation of the aggregate
output gap (CY_SD) and the difference between the maximum and the mini-
mum of the output gap (CY_DIFF). Though these indicators are certainly
imperfect output volatility measures they seem to portray sufficiently well those
short-lived shocks which are mainly associated with the business cycle. In the
sensitivity analyses, we additionally use the standard deviation of growth in real
per capita GDP (GDPC_SD) as an indicator for macroeconomic volatility.
Further, we identify CAP (defined as the value of listed shares on domestic
exchanges divided by GDP), LIQ (defined as the value of the trades of domestic
shares on domestic exchanges divided by GDP), and TURN (defined as LIQ
divided by CAP) as indicators for the strength of arms length financing and,
according to the reasoning in the preceding section, as indicators for the level of
overall financial development. CAP measures the size of the stock market while
LIQ and TURN are supposed to capture the liquidity and efficiency level of the
stock market, respectively. CREDIT equals the value of credits by financial
intermediaries to the private sector divided by GDP and is our preferred
indicator for the strength of relationship lending. According to Levine, Loayza
and Beck (2000), CREDIT is a reasonably accurate measure of a countrys level
and sophistication of financial intermediation and relatively unbiased by the
relative importance of state-owned enterprises and the overall level of nation-
alization. In addition, we use as an overall measure of financial development a
conglomerate index of financial structure constructed by Demirgu‹c-Kunt and
Levine (2001). This index, denoted STRUCTURE, is based on measures of size,
activity, and efficiency. Higher values of STRUCTURE indicate that the financial
system is relatively more market-based than bank-based. For the countries
covered STRUCTURE ranges from —0.75 to 2.00.
The set of variables that serves as conditioning information consists of
OPEN (equaling exports plus imports of goods divided by GDP), KQ
(representing the sum of foreign inflows and domestic outflows of capital
divided by GDP), GOV (as measured by government consumption expenditure
divided by GDP), INF (denoting the annual inflation rate) and of INF_SD
(representing the standard deviation of the quarterly inflation rate). The latter
two variables are to reflect demand shocks. Given an upward sloping aggregate
supply curve, inflation and its volatility are correlated with output growth
variability.
OPEN stands for the real outward orientation of an economy and thus for
the overall degree to which a country is exposed to external real shocks while
KQ is taken as a measure of financial openness and capital account liberalization.
Measuring the size of the government, GOV, provides a convenient sum-
mary of the strength of the internally stabilizing economic conditions in a given
country.
According to the volatility measures approach chosen, INF_SD is used as the
main indicator for measuring the magnitude of monetary shocks or monetary
policy volatility and the standard deviation of terms of trade changes (TOT_SD)
is considered to be most suitable to capture the magnitude of real shocks. The
standard deviation of the quarterly changes of the three-month money market
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rate (R3M_A1_SD) also provides valuable information on the size of monetary
shocks and monetary policy interventions, respectively.
The standard deviation of KQ on a quarterly basis, denoted by KQ_SD, is
used as an indicator for the exposure of a country to the variability of inter-
national financing.
Finally, stock market volatility is calculated by (a) the procedure proposed
by Schwert (1989) and (b) the standard deviation of monthly share price
changes. The former is denoted VOL, the latter VOL_SD.
For the purpose of detecting whether financial development has a role in
shock propagation, we also construct a set of interaction terms between finan-
cial development indicators such as CAP, TURN, CREDIT and STRUCTURE
and monetary and real volatility measures such as INF_SD and TOT_SD,
respectively.
An overview of the summary statistics and correlation is given in the Annex,
table B.
3.2 Econometric Methodology
Methodologically, we use two econometric techniques: (a) an instrumental
variable estimator and (b) the standard fixed effects estimator. Obviously, given
the nature of the investigation the application of static panel estimators appears
to be appropriate due to the very small efficiency gains which can be expected
by using dynamic panel estimators such as Arellano and Bonds one-step GMM
estimator in the given context. However, the relationships studied in this paper
suggest that joint endogeneity of most variables involved cannot be excluded for
sure, though it may not be very likely that two-way causality or simultaneity
cause substantial consistency losses. To play it safe we apply a two-stage instru-
mental variable procedure to ensure that the estimates of the coefficients are
consistent. Since GMM-type instruments have not performed well, we rather
apply the IV estimator advocated by Anderson and Hsiao (1982) to our static
setup. In so doing, we control as rigorously as possible for the potential con-
sistency problems caused by simultaneity, omitted variables and unobserved
country-specific effects in the given framework.
Encouraged by various endogeneity checks, we hold that consistency losses
due to joint endogeneity of the explanatory variables are of a minor order and
thus take the computationally simpler standard fixed effects model to be an
appropriate alternative specification. The fixed effects estimator is designed to
capture variation across countries and time periods in simple shifts of the
regression function (i.e. changes in the intercepts). According to Judson and
Owen (1999), the fixed effects estimator compares quite well to other estima-
tors in typical static macro panel setups for two reasons: First, a macro panel
most likely encompasses most of the countries of interest and, second, given
that the individual effect represents omitted variables, the country-specific
characteristics are very likely to be correlated with the other regressors. Under
these preconditions, the fixed effects least squares, also known as least squares
dummy variable estimator (LSDV), generates an unbiased estimate of the
coefficients.
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The basic regression equation estimated by both techniques takes the fol-
lowing form:
i;t ¼ þ  FINANCEi;t þ ½INTERACTING SET i;t
þ ½CONDITIONING SET  þ t þ i þ "i;t ð1Þ
with time periods t ¼ 1; ::::; T ; and countries i ¼ 1; ::::; N. The t and i are
respectively time- and country-specific effects, and "i;t is the remainder sto-
chastic disturbance term. The dependent variable i;t equals either CY_SD, or
CY_DIFF; the regressor FINANCE equals either CAP, TURN, CREDIT, or
STRUCTURE; the INTERACTING SET consists of interaction terms of
FINANCE variables with variables of the CONDITIONING SET such as
INF_SD, TOT_SD, VOL_SD and VOL, respectively. The set of conditioning
information also contains the variables KQ_SD, KQ, OPEN, and GOV. As
already mentioned, the latter three variables are included to control for the
prime external and internal factors closely associated with the magnitude of
output growth fluctuations at the macroeconomic level.
As specification tests for the IV estimator we use a Sargan test of over-
identifying restrictions and a test of lack of residual serial correlation. A per-
sistent serial correlation of the residuals indicates that unobserved group-
specific effects are present.
4 The Findings
4.1 Regressions Results
We start with presenting the regression results from our 22 OECD country
panel, with data averaged over six subperiods from 1971 through 2000, based
on the reduced-form regression similar in spirit to the specification run by
Beck, Lundberg and Majnoni (2001). The specification used in this paper differs
from that in Beck, Lundberg and Majnoni (2001) in that the variables defined to
capture the interaction of financial development and real or monetary volatility
enter the equation lagged by one period in order to avoid instability in the
parameter estimates due to multicollinearity. The latter is caused by the corre-
lation of the interaction terms with their components. In addition, the con-
ditioning information set of our regression approach also contains the logarithm
of GOV, which is an appropriate measure of government size and thus most
suitable to capture the independent and supposedly mitigating impact of a large
government sector on macroeconomic volatility.
The results in table 1 confirm the findings of Beck, Lundberg and Majnoni
(2001) as to the magnifying effect of financial intermediary development on the
propagation of monetary volatility, but show far stronger evidence in favor of a
mitigating effect of financial intermediary development on the propagation of
real shocks. In accordance with Beck, Lundberg and Majnoni (2001), we also
detect no unambiguous relationship between financial intermediary develop-
ment, as represented by the logarithm of CREDIT, and the magnitude of busi-
ness cycle volatility. The regression results also indicate that more open econo-
mies face larger business cycle fluctuations, while countries with a large govern-
ment enjoy the opposite. Both results meet our expectations. Not surprisingly,
inflation and terms of trade volatility enhance macro volatility independently.
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However, when introducing stock market measures as indicators for finan-
cial development, we get partly strong empirical evidence for the popular view
that there is an independent and robust relationship of arms length financing
with the severity of macroeconomic volatility. The results displayed suggest that
both stock market size (less significantly) and stock market efficiency (more
significantly), as measured by the logarithm of CAP and TURN, magnify cycle
fluctuations, even when controlling for interactions terms. In almost all esti-
mations, the used stock market measures CAP and, particularly, TURN enter
positively and mostly significantly at the standard 5% level. The same applies to
their interaction with the standard deviation of inflation and the standard
deviation of terms-of-trade changes, respectively, though with the expected
offsetting signs on the two interaction terms. However, as the results in table
2 show that this evidence weakens when both CREDIT and CAP, or TURN,
Table 1
Fixed Effects Estimation
1971 through 2000, five-year averages
Dependent Variables CY_SD CY_DIFF CY_SD CY_DIFF CY_SD CY_DIFF
Regressors
Constant —0.0022 0.0002 0.0043 0.0163 0.0087 0.0217
(0.687) (0.988) (0.297) (0.086) (0.096) (0.060)
ln(GOV)t —0.0093 —0.0158 —0.0053 —0.0065 —0.0051 —0.0054
(0.004) (0.028) (0.018) (0.215) (0.071) (0.420)
ln(OPEN)t 0.0036 0.0086 0.0038 0.0090 0.0054 0.0115
(0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.013)
INF_SDt 0.0008 0.0029 0.0008 0.0030 0.0008 0.0027
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TOT_SDt 0.0098 0.0290 0.0107 0.0308 0.0110 0.0325
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
ln(CREDIT)t —0.0008 —0.0024
(0.642) (0.586)
interaction 0.0003 0.0008
(ln(CREDIT)*INF_SD)t—1 (0.000) (0.000)
interaction —0.0765 —0.1638
(ln(CREDIT)*TOT_SD)t—1 (0.001) (0.001)
ln(CAP)t 0.0012 0.0037
(0.308) (0.087)
interaction 0.0001 0.0003
(ln(CAP)*INF_SD)t—1 (0.001) (0.000)
interaction —0.0470 —0.1105
(ln(CAP)*TOT_SD)t—1 (0.010) (0.003)
ln(TURN)t 0.0027 0.0054
(0.017) (0.035)
interaction 0.0002 0.0003
(ln(TURN)*INF_SD)t—1 (0.000) (0.013)
interaction —0.0546 —0.1314
(ln(TURN)*TOT_SD)t—1 (0.014) (0.003)
R2 0.426 0.499 0.380 0.473 0.389 0.472
p-values
Wald test for
joint significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
joint group dummy significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
time dummy significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Serial correlation test
AR (1) 0.935 0.969 0.367 0.633 0.812 0.791
AR (2) 0.347 0.413 0.231 0.309 0.478 0.486
Number of observations: 110; countries: 22. — The regressions also include dummy variables for the different time periods that are not reported; p-values in
parentheses; heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are used.
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enter the equation simultaneously. This is most likely due to multicollinearity,
which increases the size of the estimated variance.
The results presented in table 3 and table 4 are obtained by IVestimations of
an augmented version of the basic specification. Empirical evidence suggests
that increasing financial openness tends to decrease short-term macro volatility,
while theory is still rather mixed on this topic (see, among others, Basu and
Taylor, 1999, and Buch, Do‹pke and Pierdzioch, 2002). Financial openness is
assumed to alleviate external funding constraints of leveraged firms and ease
risk diversification for private households, both of which is expected to smooth
out aggregate output growth intertemporally. However, there is also the pre-
sumption that international financial integration favors the flow of highly volatile
short-term capital, thereby increasing business cycle fluctuations. We account
for these seemingly offsetting independent impacts of financial openness on
macro volatility by adding the variables KQ and KQ_SD to the regression
equation. We use these simple measures instead of constructing more complex
Table 2
Fixed Effects Estimation
1971 through 2000, five-year averages
Dependent Variables CY_SD CY_DIFF CY_SD CY_DIFF
Regressors
Constant —0.0008 0.0060 —0.0016 0.0062
(0.890) (0.637) (0.818) (0.661)
ln(GOV)t —0.0079 —0.0119 —0.0091 —0.0134
(0.019) (0.105) (0.011) (0.076)
ln(OPEN)t 0.0035 0.0082 0.0055 0.0116
(0.006) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
INF_SDt 0.0008 0.0029 0.0009 0.0030
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TOT_SDt 0.0103 0.0305 0.0087 0.0284
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
ln(CREDIT)t —0.0022 —0.0067 —0.0013 —0.0045
(0.283) (0.205) (0.526) (0.377)
interaction 0.0008 0.0017 0.0003 0.0007
(ln(CREDIT)*INF_SD)t—1 (0.252) (0.156) (0.349) (0.156)
interaction —0.0705 —0.1276 —0.0480 —0.0792
(ln(CREDIT)*TOT_SD)t—1 (0.061) (0.107) (0.075) (0.164)
ln(CAP)t 0.0009 0.0036
(0.340) (0.056)
interaction —0.0002 —0.0005
(ln(CAP)*INF_SD)t—1 (0.471) (0.392)
interaction —0.0064 —0.0309
(ln(CAP)*TOT_SD)t—1 (0.769) (0.467)
ln(TURN)t 0.0023 0.0046
(0.004) (0.016)
interaction 0.0000 0.0000
(ln(TURN)*INF_SD)t—1 (0.911) (0.929)
interaction —0.0292 —0.0856
(ln(TURN)*TOT_SD)t—1 (0.106) (0.012)
R2 0.448 0.522 0.461 0.531
p-values
Wald test for
joint significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
joint group dummy significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
time dummy significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Serial correlation test
AR (1) 0.715 0.846 0.597 0.666
AR (2) 0.318 0.369 0.383 0.450
Number of observations: 110; countries: 22. — The regressions also include dummy variables for the different time periods that are not reported; p-values in
parentheses; heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are used.
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ones (i.e., based on principal components) because of the poor quality of the
available capital account data. For this reason, we also refrain from controlling
for the interaction of financial openness with the sources of real and monetary
shocks as suggested by theory.
We take it as an encouraging sign that the Sargan and serial correlation tests
support this extended version of our base model.
As to financial openness, the results match the predictions just outlined
while not interfering with the results already established. The degree of finan-
cial integration of a high-income economy as measured by KQ dampens the
business cycle, while the volatility of international capital flows as measured by
KQ_SD magnifies overall macro output fluctuations.
Table 3
Two-Stage Instrument Variable Estimation
1971 through 2000, five-year averages
Dependent Variables CY_SD CY_DIFF CY_SD CY_DIFF CY_SD CY_DIFF
Regressors
Constant —0.0015 0.0029 0.0056 0.0195 0.0065 0.0201
(0.750) (0.792) (0.183) (0.043) (0.244) (0.090)
ln(GOV)t —0.0104 —0.0164 —0.0073 —0.0091 —0.0067 —0.0075
(0.000) (0.012) (0.001) (0.104) (0.004) (0.193)
ln(OPEN)t 0.0059 0.0118 0.0064 0.0130 0.0064 0.0128
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
INF_SDt 0.0008 0.0029 0.0008 0.0030 0.0009 0.0030
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TOT_SDt 0.0190 0.0504 0.0189 0.0495 0.0165 0.0446
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
KQt —0.0385 —0.0856 —0.0336 —0.0749 —0.0235 —0.0515
(0.004) (0.001) (0.014) (0.016) (0.077) (0.078)
KQ_SDt 0.0263 0.0613 0.0221 0.0521 0.0160 0.0380
(0.012) (0.004) (0.036) (0.031) (0.124) (0.100)
ln(CREDIT)t 0.0002 —0.0009
(0.885) (0.814)
interaction 0.0003 0.0008
(ln(CREDIT)*INF_SD)t—1 (0.000) (0.000)
interaction —0.0799 —0.1689
(ln(CREDIT)*TOT_SD)t—1 (0.000) (0.000)
ln(CAP)t 0.0021 0.0051
(0.094) (0.038)
interaction 0.0001 0.0003
(ln(CAP)*INF_SD)t—1 (0.001) (0.000)
interaction —0.0460 —0.1083
(ln(CAP)*TOT_SD)t—1 (0.012) (0.003)
ln(TURN)t 0.0029 0.0063
(0.019) (0.031)
interaction 0.0002 0.0004
(ln(TURN)*INF_SD)t—1 (0.000) (0.000)
interaction —0.0599 —0.1431
(ln(TURN)*TOT_SD)t—1 (0.007) (0.001)
p-values
Wald test for
joint significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
joint group dummy significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
time dummy significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sargan test1) 0.608 0.496 0.503 0.381 0.424 0.471
Serial correlation test
AR (1) 0.578 0.870 0.273 0.615 0.644 0.866
AR (2) 0.096 0.107 0.104 0.135 0.188 0.192
Number of observations: 105; countries: 21. — The regressions also include dummy variables for the different time periods that are not reported; the
endogenous variable lagged one period and fixed investment divided by gross domestic product are added as additional instruments; p-values in
parentheses; heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are used.
1) The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals.
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Building on the results obtained by these estimations we ran various regres-
sions, all of which aimed to search for an independent relationship of financial
development, as measured by the importance of arms length financing, with
overall business cycle volatility. The results are shown in table 5 to table 7 and
mostly confirm the robustness of our main finding that there seems to an
unambiguous effect of financial development on the business cycle in high-
income countries. Most importantly, these results indicate, particularly signifi-
cantly when CY_DIFF is used as the independent variable, that it is the inter-
action of stock market size and stock market volatility that matters as a source of
business cycle destabilization. A noteworthy result is also that monetary shocks
as measured by the monthly variability of the three-month money market rate
Table 4
Two-Stage Instrument Variable Estimation
1971 through 2000, five-year averages
Dependent Variables CY_SD CY_DIFF CY_SD CY_DIFF
Regressors
Constant 0.0010 0.0101 0.0024 0.0114
(0.830) (0.353) (0.697) (0.399)
ln(GOV)t —0.0101 —0.0148 —0.0090 —0.0121
(0.000) (0.020) (0.007) (0.091)
ln(OPEN)t 0.0063 0.0128 0.0062 0.0124
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
INF_SDt 0.0008 0.0030 0.0008 0.0030
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TOT_SDt 0.0207 0.0539 0.0179 0.0478
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
KQt —0.0436 —0.0946 —0.0327 —0.0695
(0.002) (0.001) (0.033) (0.018)
KQ_SDt 0.0290 0.0655 0.0226 0.0508
(0.006) (0.002) (0.059) (0.032)
ln(CREDIT)t —0.0017 —0.0056 —0.0011 —0.0048
(0.339) (0.202) (0.572) (0.325)
interaction 0.0010 0.0021 0.0004 0.0009
(ln(CREDIT)*INF_SD)t—1 (0.107) (0.053) (0.221) (0.062)
interaction —0.0837 —0.1529 —0.0557 —0.0936
(ln(CREDIT)*TOT_SD)t—1 (0.013) (0.034) (0.029) (0.088)
ln(CAP)t 0.0020 0.0053
(0.032) (0.015)
interaction —0.0004 —0.0007
(ln(CAP)*INF_SD)t—1 (0.245) (0.189)
interaction 0.0013 —0.0159
(ln(CAP)*TOT_SD)t—1 (0.952) (0.703)
ln(TURN)t 0.0023 0.0057
(0.042) (0.032)
interaction —0,0000 —0.0001
(ln(TURN)*INF_SD)t—1 (0.867) (0.702)
interaction —0.0234 —0.0741
(ln(TURN)*TOT_SD)t—1 (0.231) (0.044)
p-values
Wald test for
joint significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
joint group dummy significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
time dummy significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sargan test1) 0.599 0.400 0.617 0.525
Serial correlation test
AR (1) 0.469 0.734 0.541 0.760
AR (2) 0.083 0.098 0.148 0.157
Number of observations: 105; countries: 21. — The regressions also include dummy variables for the different time periods that are not reported; the
endogenous variable lagged one period and fixed investment divided by gross domestic product are added as additional instruments; p-values in
parentheses; heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are used.
1) The null hypothesis is that the instruments used are not correlated with the residuals.
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(R3M_A1_SD) increases the amplitude of the cycle. This effect tends to be
stronger in countries with more market-based financial systems.
Table 5
Fixed Effects Estimation
1971 through 2000, five-year averages
Dependent Variables CY_SD CY_DIFF CY_SD CY_DIFF CY_SD CY_DIFF
Regressors
Constant 0.0116 0.0327 0.0110 0.0311 0.0109 0.0317
(0.031) (0.024) (0.039) (0.033) (0.055) (0.033)
ln(GOV_I)t —0.0081 —0.0170 —0.0084 —0.0178 —0.0084 —0.0170
(0.006) (0.028) (0.004) (0.021) (0.011) (0.035)
ln(OPEN_I)t 0.0024 0.0053 0.0025 0.0055 0.0028 0.0065
(0.038) (0.075) (0.033) (0.065) (0.023) (0.042)
INF_It 0.0003 0.0006
(0.000) (0.000)
DEFL_It 0.0003 0.0006
(0.000) (0.000)
R3M_A1_SDt 0.0009 0.0022
(0.000) (0.000)
STRUCTUREt 0.0043 0.0105 0.0044 0.0108 0.0037 0.0091
(0.012) (0.029) (0.014) (0.033) (0.044) (0.079)
interaction 0.0000 0.0005 —0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 0.0006
(STRUCTURE*INF_SD)t (0.339) (0.000) (0.569) (0.002) (0.284) (0.000)
interaction —0.1437 —0.3548 —0.1413 —0.3478 —0.1300 —0.3208
(STRUCTURE*TOT_SD)t (0.011) (0.020) (0.015) (0.026) (0.034) (0.055)
R2 0.335 0.331 0.328 0.322 0.275 0.274
Number of obervations 132 132 132 132 129 129
Countries 22 22 22 22 22 22
p-values
Wald test for
joint significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
joint group dummy significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
time dummy significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Serial correlation test
AR (1) 0.205 0.569 0.208 0.594 0.178 0.433
AR (2) 0.879 0.520 0.906 0.574 0.466 0.256
_I ... Initial values. The regressions also include dummy variables for the different time periods that are not reported; p-values in parentheses;
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are used.
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Table 6
Fixed Effects Estimation
1971 through 2000, five-year averages
Dependent Variables CY_SD CY_DIFF CY_SD CY_DIFF CY_SD CY_DIFF
Regressors
Constant 0.0044 0.0196 0.0024 0.0138 0.0022 0.0134
(0.519) (0.258) (0.744) (0.439) (0.778) (0.472)
ln(GOV_I)t —0.0116 —0.0234 —0.0116 —0.0233 —0.0117 —0.0235
(0.008) (0.030) (0.011) (0.035) (0.010) (0.034)
ln(OPEN_I)t 0.0039 0.0083 0.0042 0.0091 0.0041 0.0089
(0.035) (0.075) (0.034) (0.067) (0.033) (0.067)
INF_It 0.0008 0.0019
(0.001) (0.001)
INFt 0.0766 0.2051 0.0740 0.1993
(0.020) (0.006) (0.018) (0.006)
interaction 0.0002 0.0006 0.0003 0.0007
(ln(CAP)*VOL_SD)t (0.116) (0.062) (0.103) (0.038)
interaction 0.0003 0.0009
(ln(CAP)*VOL)t (0.168) (0.086)
R2 0.239 0.241 0.219 0.224 0.214 0.219
p-values
Wald test for
joint significance 0.000 0.000 0.039 0.017 0.031 0.008
joint group dummy significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
time dummy significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Serial correlation test
AR (1) 0.161 0.113 0.201 0.144 0.218 0.156
AR (2) 0.644 0.519 0.758 0.559 0.791 0.592
_I ... Initial values. Number of observations: 108; countries: 18. — The regressions also include dummy variables for the different time periods that are not
reported; p-values in parentheses; heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are used.
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4.2 Sensitivity Analyses
In order to gauge the robustness of our findings, we carried out a large number
of checks. To this end, we divided our data set in ten-year periods, aggregated
over the periods 1971 through 1980, 1981 through 1990, and 1991 through
2000, included GDPC_SD as an additional measure of macro output volatility,
and reestimated various model specifications with LSDV. To sum up, the results
in table 8 to table 10 show that the presented findings as to the empirical
relevance of an independent relationship of stock market development with
macroeconomic volatility survive many of the robustness tests conducted. More
sensitivity results are available on request.
Table 7
Fixed Effects Estimation
1971 through 2000, five-year averages
Dependent Variables CY_SD CY_DIFF CY_SD CY_DIFF CY_SD CY_DIFF
Regressors
Constant 0.0119 0.0298 0.0172 0.0422 0.0171 0.0421
(0.044) (0.074) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(GOV_I)t —0.0087 —0.0203
(0.012) (0.026)
ln(OPEN_I)t 0.0029 0.0060
(0.038) (0.067)
INFt 0.0742 0.1946 0.0714 0.1884
(0.024) (0.005) (0.022) (0.005)
TOT_SDt 0.0188 0.0484 0.0188 0.0485
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
interaction —0.0961 —0.1988
(STRUCTURE*TOT_SD)t (0.005) (0.055)
interaction 0.0009 0.0023
(STRUCTURE*R3M_A1_SD)t (0.000) (0.003)
interaction 0.0002 0.0006
(ln(CAP)*VOL_SD)t (0.134) (0.043)
interaction 0.0003 0.0008
(ln(CAP)*VOL)t (0.234) (0.107)
R2 0.268 0.245 0.201 0.233 0.197 0.228
Number of observations 129 129 108 108 108 108
Countries 22 22 18 18 18 18
p-values
Wald test for
joint significance 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.001 0.011 0.001
joint group dummy significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
time dummy significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Serial correlation test
AR (1) 0.216 0.510 0.160 0.128 0.177 0.143
AR (2) 0.351 0.217 0.405 0.190 0.427 0.194
_I ... Initial values. — The regressions also include dummy variables for the different time periods that are not reported; p-values in parentheses;
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are used.
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Table 8
Sensitivity Test — Fixed Effects Estimation
1971 through 2000, ten-year averages
Dependent Variables GDPC_SD CY_SD GDPC_SD CY_SD GDPC_SD CY_SD
Regressors
Constant —0.0030 0.0089 0.0082 0.0199 0.0022 0.0145
(0.518) (0.150) (0.239) (0.005) (0.751) (0.048)
ln(GOV)t —0.0114 —0.0044 —0.0095 —0.0015 —0.0109 —0.0058
(0.005) (0.260) (0.053) (0.669) (0.030) (0.170)
ln(OPEN)t 0.0044 0.0015 0.0053 0.0024 0.0048 0.0040
(0.093) (0.353) (0.030) (0.159) (0.115) (0.160)
INF_SDt 0.0035 0.0023 0.0018 0.0010 0.0016 0.0007
(0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
TOT_SDt —0.0307 —0.0343 —0.0553 —0.0614 —0.0756 —0.0704
(0.037) (0.094) (0.013) (0.015) (0.019) (0.092)
ln(CREDIT)t —0.0005 0.0040
(0.898) (0.354)
interaction 0.0018 0.0012
(ln(CREDIT)*INF_SD)t (0.000) (0.000)
interaction —0.1147 —0.1439
(ln(CREDIT)*TOT_SD)t (0.006) (0.020)
ln(CAP)t 0.0037 0.0054
(0.014) (0.019)
interaction 0.0004 0.0002
(ln(CAP)*INF_SD)t (0.102) (0.047)
interaction —0.0916 —0.1091
(ln(CAP)*TOT_SD)t (0.002) (0.003)
ln(TURN)t 0.0014 0.0040
(0.478) (0.093)
interaction 0.0005 0.0002
(ln(TURN)*INF_SD)t (0.001) (0.079)
interaction —0.1040 —0.1009
(ln(TURN)*TOT_SD)t (0.005) (0.046)
R2 0.508 0.410 0.448 0.400 0.467 0.335
p-values
Wald test for
joint significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
joint group dummy significance 0.150 0.003 0.384 0.000 0.491 0.001
time dummy significance 0.142 0.041 0.271 0.026 0.319 0.033
Serial correlation test
AR (1) 0.749 0.816 0.406 0.551 0.624 0.870
AR (2) 0.945 0.414 0.955 0.280 0.485 0.275
Number of observations: 66; countries: 22. The regressions also include dummy variables for the different time periods that are not reported; p-values in
parentheses; heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are used.
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Table 9
Sensitivity Test — Fixed Effects Estimation
1971 through 2000, ten-year averages
Dependent Variables GDPC_SD CY_SD GDPC_SD CY_SD
Regressors
Constant —0.0016 0.0129 —0.0043 0.0081
(0.755) (0.089) (0.511) (0.318)
ln(GOV)t —0.0120 —0.0041 —0.0093 —0.0056
(0.004) (0.325) (0.032) (0.229)
ln(OPEN)t 0.0045 0.0019 0.0028 0.0020
(0.048) (0.269) (0.319) (0.409)
INF_SDt 0.0034 0.0016 0.0036 0.0022
(0.004) (0.045) (0.000) (0.003)
TOT_SDt —0.0313 —0.0493 —0.0314 —0.0255
(0.082) (0.025) (0.342) (0.379)
ln(CREDIT)t —0.0030 —0.0004 —0.0002 0.0036
(0.562) (0.926) (0.954) (0.452)
interaction 0.0021 0.0011 0.0017 0.0013
(ln(CREDIT)*INF_SD)t (0.001) (0.008) (0.000) (0.002)
interaction —0.1088 —0.0909 —0.1026 —0.1601
(ln(CREDIT)*TOT_SDt (0.063) (0.142) (0.033) (0.013)
ln(CAP)t 0.0022 0.0039
(0.259) (0.020)
interaction —0.0002 —0.0002
(ln(CAP)*INF_SD)t (0.676) (0.445)
interaction —0.0029 —0.0456
(ln(CAP)*TOT_SD)t (0.936) (0.053)
ln(TURN)t —0.0015 0.0002
(0.423) (0.890)
interaction 0.0002 —0.0002
(ln(TURN)*INF_SD)t (0.433) (0.390)
interaction —0.0099 0.0190
(ln(TURN)*TOT_SD)t (0.812) (0.597)
R2 0.520 0.440 0.521 0.416
p-values
Wald test for
joint significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
joint group dummy significance 0.170 0.001 0.057 0.016
time dummy significance 0.179 0.030 0.062 0.060
Serial correlation test
AR (1) 0.986 0.951 0.873 0.792
AR (2) 0.989 0.385 0.897 0.356
Number of observations: 66; countries: 22. The regressions also include dummy variables for the different time periods that are not reported; p-values in
parentheses; heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are used.
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5 Concluding Remarks
This paper examined the nature of the linkage between financial development
and economic fluctuation in 22 OECD countries over the period 1970 through
2000. We used two econometric techniques. The first, a cross-sectional instru-
ment variable estimator, deals, to some degree, with the potential problems
caused by simultaneity, omitted variables and unobserved country-specific
effects. In addition, we use the standard fixed effects model. The latter is
designed to capture variation across country and time period in simple shifts
of the regression function (i.e. changes in the intercepts). The results obtained
by these techniques confirm that arms length financing has a role in destabiliz-
ing the business cycle in the OECD countries while relationship lending is
neutral in this respect. The magnitude of the independent impact of the stock
market on output growth fluctuation is significant. In accordance with theory,
there is also a strong indication that both market-based and bank-based financial
systems magnify the impact of monetary shocks on macroeconomic volatility
whereas real shocks are dampened by well-developed financial systems. Finally,
the results indicate that it is the interaction of stock market size and stock
market volatility that matters as a source of business cycle destabilization.
It goes without saying that the presented results are highly preliminary,
emphasizing very clearly that much more investigation is needed before we
can be confident that there is a causal relationship between financial market
development and macroeconomic volatility.
Table 10
Sensitivity Test — Fixed Effects Estimation
1971 through 2000, ten-year averages
Dependent Variables GDPC_SD CY_SD GDPC_SD CY_SD GDPC_SD CY_SD GDPC_SD CY_SD
Regressors
Constant 0.0163 0.0115 0.0180 0.0169 0.0177 0.0175 0.0158 0.0116
(0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008)
INFt 0.1216 0.1385 0.1224 0.1439
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
INF_SDt 0.0026 0.0019 0.0027 0.0019
(0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.006)
TOT_SDt 0.0190 0.0195 0.0199 0.0209 0.0199 0.0210 0.0188 0.0194
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
interaction 0.0006 0.0005 0.0007 0.0006
(ln(CAP)*VOL_SD)t (0.002) (0.046) (0.000) (0.003)
interaction 0.0010 0.0007 0.0008 0.0005
(ln(CAP)*VOL)t (0.001) (0.017) (0.008) (0.166)
R2 0.266 0.272 0.284 0.217 0.300 0.238 0.278 0.298
p-values
Wald test for
joint significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
joint group dummy significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
time dummy significance 0.534 0.008 0.141 0.145 0.252 0.076 0.699 0.001
Serial correlation test
AR (1) 0.422 0.522 0.763 0.772 0.977 0.644 0.629 0.608
AR (2) 0.094 0.103 0.060 0.069 0.069 0.063 0.117 0.097
Number of observations: 54; countries: 18. The regressions also include dummy variables for the different time periods that are not reported; p-values in parentheses; heteroskedasticity-consistent standard
errors are used.
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Annex
Table A
Variables and Sources
Variable Definition Original source Second source
CAP Market capitalization of domestic shares divided by gross domestic product FIBV (gross domestic product:
WIFO database)
Own calculations
for 1970 through
1973
CREDIT Claims on private sector divided by gross domestic product IMF International Financial
Statistics (lines 22d + 42d)
CY_DIFF Difference betweenminimum andmaximumoutput gap (defined as deviation
of real gross domestic product from potential gross domestic product divided
by potential gross domestic product)
OECD Economic Outlook
DEFL Annual changes of gross domestic product deflator WIFO database
GDPC Real gross domestic product per capita OECD Economic Outlook
GOV Government consumption divided by gross domestic product OECD National Accounts
(gross domestic product:
WIFO database)
INF Annual changes of consumer price index OECD Main economic indicators
KQ Direct investment abroad and in reporting economy plus portfolio invest-
ment assets and liabilities divided by gross domestic product
IMF Balance of Payments Statistics
(lines 4505+4555+4602+4652;
gross domestic product:
WIFO database)
LIQ Values of domestic share trading divided by gross domestic product FIBV (gross domestic product:
WIFO database)
Own calculations
for 1970 through
1983
OPEN Exports of goods plus imports of goods divided by gross domestic product IFS (gross domestic product:
WIFO database)
R3M Interbank 3-month interest rate WIFO database
STRUCTURE Conglomerate index of financial development, constructed by
Demirgu‹c-Kunt and Levine (2001)
TOT Terms of trade (export prices divided by import prices) IMF International Financial
Statistics
TURN LIQ divided by CAP
VOL Share price volatility, based on Schwert (1989)
CY_SD Standard deviation of output gap
GDPC_SD Standard deviation of quarterly real gross domestic product per
capita changes
INF_SD Standard deviation of quarterly inflation rate
KQ_SD Standard deviation of KQ
R3M_A1_SD Standard deviation of quarterly changes of R3M
TOT_SD Standard deviation of quarterly terms of trade changes
VOL_SD Standard deviation of monthly share price changes
Countries Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, USA.
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Table B
Summary Statistics
Cross-section 1971 through 2000
CY_SD CY_DIFF GDPC_SD GOV OPEN KQ CAP LIQ CREDIT
Descriptive
statistics
Means 0.0242 0.0947 0.0210 0.1999 0.4784 0.0893 0.3720 0.1587 0.7224
Standard
deviation 0.0071 0.0320 0.0055 0.0416 0.2413 0.0886 0.2013 0.0942 0.2604
Correlations
CY_SD 1.0000 0.9648 0.8623 0.0006 —0.0067 —0.0328 0.0942 —0.0809 —0.2568
CY_DIFF 1.0000 0.8882 —0.0779 —0.0568 —0.0828 0.1498 —0.0226 —0.2788
GDPC_SD 1.0000 —0.3255 —0.1802 —0.1777 0.0441 —0.0162 —0.1466
GOV 1.0000 0.5273 0.2823 —0.1420 —0.2120 —0.4091
OPEN 1.0000 0.8427 —0.2108 —0.3803 —0.2368
KQ 1.0000 0.0035 —0.2465 —0.1320
CAP 1.0000 0.8584 0.2636
LIQ 1.0000 0.5367
CREDIT 1.0000
TURN
STRUCTURE
INF
INF_SD
TOT_SD
KQ_SD
R3M_A1_SD
VOL
VOL_SD
Table B
Summary Statistics (cont.)
TURN STRUC-
TURE
INF INF_SD TOT_SD KQ_SD R3M
_A1_SD
VOL VOL_SD
Descriptive
statistics
Means 0.3227 0.0869 5.7741 4.0771 0.0591 0.1439 1.1619 3.4840 5.1294
Standard
deviation 0.1566 0.7160 1.6165 1.2270 0.0312 0.2242 0.2173 0.6585 0.9492
Correlations
CY_SD —0.2753 —0.0447 0.4454 0.4161 0.0722 —0.0263 0.2098 0.2228 0.2557
CY_DIFF —0.2614 0.0278 0.4668 0.4709 0.1052 —0.0724 0.3126 0.1174 0.1543
GDPC_SD —0.0253 —0.0639 0.2683 0.3277 0.2416 —0.1433 0.2420 —0.0650 —0.0421
GOV —0.3209 0.1215 0.0394 —0.3026 —0.6488 0.2506 0.0579 0.2162 0.1715
OPEN —0.3704 —0.3940 —0.2385 —0.3012 —0.4695 0.7978 —0.0892 —0.0670 —0.0305
KQ —0.3809 —0.2520 —0.2113 —0.1737 —0.3757 0.9837 —0.1516 —0.1350 —0.1335
CAP 0.1835 0.7180 0.0144 0.2650 0.0165 —0.0929 0.2928 —0.4377 —0.4275
LIQ 0.6176 0.6947 —0.2093 0.0557 0.1008 —0.3193 0.1414 —0.5025 —0.4803
CREDIT 0.5435 0.0174 —0.4453 —0.0944 0.2526 —0.1317 —0.3006 —0.2251 —0.2193
TURN 1.0000 0.2294 —0.4570 —0.3048 0.3038 —0.3986 —0.1777 —0.3787 —0.3346
STRUCTURE 1.0000 0.0386 —0.0562 —0.1298 —0.2888 0.3144 —0.3248 —0.3915
INF 1.0000 0.8218 0.2432 —0.1851 0.5830 0.6829 0.6169
INF_SD 1.0000 0.4220 —0.1651 0.5041 0.4296 0.3838
TOT_SD 1.0000 —0.3397 0.2749 0.3034 0.3193
KQ_SD 1.0000 —0.1678 —0.0801 —0.0997
R3M_A1_SD 1.0000 0.1338 0.0206
VOL 1.0000 0.9566
VOL_SD 1.0000
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1 Introduction
The series of financial crises over the last decades has provided valuable lessons
on the behavior of banks. It was found that financial liberalization, which has
occurred in many parts of the world, is especially fraught with risks. Financial
liberalization — like high inflation — is a major monetary shock. The reaction of
the financial system to such a shock reveals important information about its
general behavior. More importantly, this behavior can be shown to differ
depending on the financial structure of a particular country.
This paper complements the literature on financial liberalization, which has
so far been biased towards crisis episodes. It analyzes the case of Austria, where
the odds for a financial crisis were strong. Like Sweden or Finland, Austria
started out with a severely repressed financial system, and political influence
was pervasive. Austria had a currency peg, and its firms relied to a much larger
extent on bank financing than their Scandinavian counterparts. Shocks to the
banking system could thus be expected to propagate more vigorously in Austria.
Yet no boom-bust cycle appeared, and the country managed a successful and
smooth financial liberalization. In the end, Austria benefited strongly from the
reforms. Apparently, the same shock — financial liberalization — elicited very
different responses in the financial systems of Austria and Scandinavia. The
Austrian experience is even more unusual in a wider context. In emerging
markets, financial liberalization almost invariably led to financial crises.
This paper seeks out possible reasons of the Austrian success. Since financial
liberalization is a complex process, several dimensions need to be analyzed.
Some factors are linked to policy, others are linked to financial structure. The
latter are given special attention in this paper, since they reveal information
about the transmission mechanism of monetary shocks. It turns out that the
large Austrian banking sector tends to dampen monetary shocks, through a
system of endogenous buffers. There is thus evidence for a financial decelerator.
On the part of economic policymaking, three implications emerge from the
study: First, in the comprehensive reforms of Austria, gradualism worked well.
The slicing of reforms into manageable pieces avoided a cumulation of risk
factors and the emergence of financial bubbles. The remaining symptoms of
distress could be isolated and dealt with one at a time. Second, the sequencing
broadly followed todays consensus view — even without the benefit of hind-
sight. And third, the cyclical potential of financial reforms was managed well. In
Austria, financial reform was timed in a countercyclical manner, and other
policy tools were used to offset and smooth over the cyclical effects. Liberal-
ization coincided with episodes of weak demand, and regulations were tightened
during upswings.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives a brief outline of the main
reform steps. Section 3 asks whether the Austrian experience was indeed
successful compared to that of other countries. Then, section 4 discusses
reasons for success linked to economic policy. Section 5 discusses potential
1 I would like to thank Eduard Hochreiter for suggesting this research project and the OeNB for its generous
financial support. I am indebted to Peter Brandner, Heinz Glu‹ck, Harald Grech, Sylvia Kaufmann, Markus
Knell and Martin Summer for helpful comments and suggestions. Further thanks go to participants of the
IAEA conference in September 2002 in Washington, D.C., where the paper was presented.
Benedikt Braumann1)
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contributions from Austrias financial structure. Like other papers on this issue,
this one follows a case-study approach on a broad range of variables. It seeks to
raise economic issues and encourage further research.
2 Financial Liberalization in Austria — A Summary
Compared to developments in other countries, financial reform in Austria was
late, lengthy and comprehensive. Austrias financial markets ranked among the
most repressed in Europe until the late 1970s. The degree and nature of
regulation were comparable to that in Scandinavia and many developing coun-
tries. In particular, the financial sector had to cope with entry barriers, branch-
ing restrictions, credit ceilings, interest controls, pervasive state ownership and
tight controls of international capital movements. Table 1 gives an overview of
the most important restrictions.
Financial liberalization in Austria began with the abolition of branching
restrictions in 1977, and ended with the privatization of the last major state-
owned bank in 2000. A detailed survey of events and the changes in regulation is
given by Braumann (2002). The liberalization process and its effects are sum-
marized below. Table 2 then presents a timetable of the main regulatory
reforms. Without undue simplification, the process of financial liberalization
in Austria can be divided into nine distinct stages:
Stage 1: 1977-78. The liberalization of branching set off a branching boom,
which was accompanied by a lending boom that led to overheating of the
economy and a sharp deterioration of the current account.
Stage 2: 1979-81. High inflation led to a collapse of the inflexible interest
rate cartel and to a de facto liberalization of interest rates.
Stage 3: 1980-86. Loan quality progressively deteriorated during the last
stages of the lending boom. With government support, uncompetitive state-
owned industries stepped up distress borrowing. A serious banking crisis was
averted when the government bailed out the insolvent public enterprises in
1986 and assumed their debt service.
Stage 4: 1985-87. A reversal in the process of financial liberalization: In
order to strengthen bank finances after the distress of the early 1980s, the
government temporarily reestablished the interest rate cartel.
Stage 5: 1987-93. To ensure sound banking on a long-term basis, the author-
ities tightened prudential standards. Higher capital requirements dampened
credit supply significantly.
Table 1
The Most Important Financial Restrictions
— Opening new branches is subject to government approval.
— Savings banks and credit cooperatives are subject to regional constraints.
— Savings banks are not allowed to perform certain investment banking activities.
— Entry is subject to approval by bankers association and government.
— Minimum deposit rates are set by government. Detailed structure of deposit and lending interest rates is fixed
by banking cartel.
— Credit ceilings apply relative to deposit and credit growth.
— Capital flows are subject to approval by central bank.
— Public ownership of 60% of banking assets.
— Prohibition of advertising consumer loans.
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Stage 6: 1988-91. The capital account was liberalized in anticipation of
future EU membership. This led to significant capital inflows and an asset price
boom, but not to exuberant lending.
Stage 7: 1995-2000. EU accession removed the last financial restrictions.
Entry was freed, and the government privatized most state-owned banks. This
set off a process of mergers and concentration.
Stage 8: 1995-2001. Privatizations and mergers upset the competitive equi-
librium in the credit market. This led to intensified competition as banks fought
for their positions. Fiscal adjustment allowed for a rapid expansion of private
sector credit and crowding in of private demand.
Stage 9: 1995-2001. Banks discovered foreign currency loans as a device of
competition. These low-interest loans rapidly increased their market share to
20%, making Austria the economy with the highest degree of currency sub-
stitution in Western Europe. The speculative element of foreign currency loans
carries significant prudential risks.
3 How Successful Was Austrian Financial Reform?
In their survey of financial liberalization and financial crises, Lindgren, Garcia
and Saal (1996) draw a map of the world and markgray the countries that
experienced financial crises over the last 20 years. Very few white spots remain,
and most of them are due to a lack of data. However, Austria appears as a true
exception to the worldwide pattern, an island of stability amid an ocean of
financial crises. This section examines the first of two related questions: (1) Was
Austrias financial liberalization really a success? The next section asks (2) If
liberalization was a success, what were the reasons? In brief, answer to (1) is
yes. The answer to (2) will be given in four propositions below. In part, the
government followed a sensible sequencing of reforms, and timed reforms in a
gradual and countercyclical manner. On the other side, Austria was fortunate to
count on a competitive and agile private banking sector, which had a long-term
business perspective. This financial sector developed endogenous buffers against
shocks that tended to smooth fluctuations, even without government inter-
ference.
Table 2
Main Liberalization Measures
1977 Abolition of branching restrictions
1980 Liberalization of interest rates
1981 Abolition of credit controls
1985 Re-establishment of interest controls through interest rate cartel
1987 Prudential reforms; Capital requirements tightened; Comprehensive data reporting
1988—1991 Liberalization of the capital account
1993 approx. Interest rate cartel expires
1994 Free entry
1992—2000 Privatization of state-owned banks
Source: Braumann (2002).
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Proposition 1: In contrast to many other countries, Austria accomplished financial
liberalization at a low cost and reaped high benefits.
Financial liberalization has somewhat of a bad reputation. It has too often
been associated with disruptive financial crises, especially when liberalization
was profound. Chart 1 illustrates this observation. It combines the results of two
large cross-country studies, a survey of financial liberalization by Williamson
and Mahar (1998) and a survey of financial crises by Lindgren, Garcia and Saal
(1996). The chart shows the change in liberalization between 1973 (horizontal
axis), and 1996 (vertical axis). The index of liberalization ranges from 0 (finan-
cially most repressed) to 18 (most liberal). Liberalization is a movement up
from the diagonal, and was most profound in countries clustering the north-
western corner of the diagram. Diamonds denote financial crises, while circles
denote smooth transitions. It is evident that financial liberalization is a risky
business. Of 40 liberalizing countries in the sample, three quarters (29) expe-
rienced financial crises. Most of the remaining quarter deregulated little. This
was either because they already had liberal financial systems (upper right) or
because they chose to retain controls (lower left).
Austria thus represents the rare case of a country with sweeping financial
reforms but no financial crisis. All other sweeping reformers in the upper left
corner of chart 1 experienced a financial crisis during 1973-96. Spain suffered a
crisis during the early 1980s, when banks holding 20% of deposits had to be
rescued. New Zealand experienced serious difficulties in the late 1980s, as a
quarter of all deposits were in danger. Norway, Finland and Sweden went
through a classical boom-bust cycle around 1990, which has become a textbook
example of financial crisis. Many more crises happened in emerging markets.
The banking busts in Chile and Argentina in the early 1980s cost over a third of
GDP. Paraguay and Mexico experienced systemic crises in the mid-1990s. The
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late 1990s saw crashes in Russia, Turkey and East Asia, which are not included
in the chart.
Austria could thus have fared much worse. And apart from being spared a
systemic financial crisis, Austria reaped tangible economic gains from financial
liberalization. Financial markets have become deeper, more sophisticated and
mature. Chart 2 shows a measure of financial deepening, the ratio of credit to
the private sector to GDP. This ratio more than doubled from 52% to 106%
between 1973 and 2001, which represents one of the largest increases world-
wide. Only Malaysia had its ratio increase by more. Finland also experienced
fast financial deepening after deregulation, but this was reversed in the crisis of
the early 1990s. There, private sector credit rose from 45% of GDP in 1973 to
94% in 1991, but fell back to 57% in 2001.
	

$
.,-,.
;
	
3	

	5	
#	#	


5
*
%


## #5 * *% *) ) ) 5 5#  % )* ) 55 )
	

-2!/
#




#
)
 
	2


? 
-	/

	5	
#	#		:%	*	%	#	A,11<-	4E3F	%	4	A,11B-	%#	A,111-	##

%	5	A,11B-	*'#2	A,111-	
=? 
-	/
9
2
	
-	
>	/
0
-+ /


D	
-+		/
;
	
=	
A Financial Decelerator in Europe?
Evidence from Austria
Focus on Austria 1/2003 137
Chart 3 summarizes some key variables of financial health. It contrasts
median values of all 40 sample countries to Austria. Between 1973 and
2000, the ratio of private sector credit to GDP grew 3.7 times faster in Austria
than in the sample average. The ratio of M2 to GDP, another indicator of
financial depth, expanded twice as fast as the average. The cost of intermedia-
tion can be gauged by the interest margin. The interest margin has always been
relatively low in Austria, and financial liberalization reduced it further still. It
declined by —0.6 percentage points in Austria, three times more than the sample
average. Thus, Austria enjoys a rather efficient banking system today. The
absence of a crisis also meant that Austria had a low ratio of nonperforming
loans, and low fiscal rescue costs. Nonperforming loans peaked at 4.7% of total
loans, compared to 13% on average. And bailouts were exceedingly rare. The
government injected 0.8% of GDP of fresh capital into banks, compared to a
sample average of 6.4% of GDP. These were tangible savings for the taxpayer.
4 Policy Measures to Smooth the Effects of Liberalization
Proposition 2: Austria largely followed the recommended sequencing of financial reforms.
However, the fiscal sector lagged behind.
Much has been written about the proper sequencing of reforms.1) Sequenc-
ing errors are often blamed for precipitating financial crises, as they may create
incentives for excessive risk taking and moral hazard. According to conventional
wisdom, macroeconomic stabilization, trade liberalization, privatization and
prudential regulations should be in place before financial reform. Once this
groundwork is laid, the authorities should first deregulate interest rates and
credit controls, allow free entry and then liberalize the capital account (see table
3). Austria followed the conventional wisdom for an important part of reforms.
However, the weakest link proved to be the fiscal sector. Fiscal adjustment and
privatization were postponed for a long time and came very last in the process.
Nevertheless, the sequencing of trade reforms, internal and external deregu-
lation was correct and contributed importantly to the success of the project.
Austrias government incurred considerable risk when it widened the fiscal
deficit in the years prior to reform. Adjustment was postponed until the late
1990s, and fiscal deficits exceeded 5% of GDP in 14 out of 20 years from 1975
to 1995. This led to a rapid build-up of public debt, which rose from 17% of
GDP in 1975 to 68% in 1995. Eventually, tax increases brought the deficit back
under control, and the budget recorded a slight surplus in 2001. Large fiscal
deficits carry the risk of triggering a debt spiral or high inflation, which may
lead to political unrest. This was the case in Chile, Argentina and Turkey, where
financial reforms were aborted after an unsustainable fiscal stance had thrown
the economy into disarray. Fortunately for Austria, high private savings
absorbed public debt without causing inflationary pressures.
1 For a recent survey, see Caprio et al. (2001).
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Also against the conventional wisdom, privatization started late and remains
incomplete. Large banks were privatized in the late 1990s, and the government
retains a considerable stake in industry today. The Asian crisis and many other
experiences worldwide warn against political influence in banking. The man-
agers of Austrian public banks were similarly subject to political pressure,
especially during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Large bank loans propped
up loss-making state industries. However, a systemic crisis was averted when the
government assumed the industrial debt in the mid-1980s, and ensured that
obligations were met on time.
Overall, however, Austria followed textbook sequencing for an important
part of reforms. This has certainly helped avoid perverse incentives and allowed
agents to adapt to a more market-oriented environment over time. Large banks
in particular were well prepared for account liberalization thanks to their
privileged access to trading permits. Weak public finances and slow privatiza-
tion were the soft spots of the reform process.
Proposition 3. Gradualism impeded the accumulation of distress symptoms and averted
a general financial bubble. However, it also made reforms vulnerable to reversals.
It is apparent from chart 1 that Austria undertook comprehensive reforms.
However, Austrian financial liberalization was exceedingly slow. Chart 4 com-
pares the speed of reforms in Austria and Finland.1) The slope of the line
indicates the speed of reforms, the dark shaded area denotes their duration
in Finland, the light shaded area their duration in Austria. Reforms in Finland
were completed after nine years. In contrast, financial liberalization in Austria
took a total of 23 years (1977-2000). This is slow even in a wider international
context. For instance, Williamson and Mahar find that a group of gradual
reformers took between 10 and 15 years to liberalize completely.2) Fast
reformers, which include Latin American and Scandinavian countries, Turkey
and South Africa, took between 3 and 10 years.
Table 3
Sequencing of Financial Liberalization
Conventional Wisdom Austria
1. Fiscal adjustment 1. Trade reforms
2. Trade reforms 2. Domestic financial liberalization
3. Prudential supervision 3. Prudential supervision
4. Privatization 4. External financial liberalization
5. Domestic financial liberalization 5. Privatization
6. External financial liberalization 6. Fiscal adjustment
1 Information on Finland is based on Drees and Pazarbasioglu (1998). The numerical interpretation corre-
sponds to the classification of Williamson and Mahar (see chart 1).
2 Japan, Israel and Sri Lanka took 15 years, France, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines around
10 years.
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Gradualism can reduce the risk of systemic financial crises. Braumann
(2002) shows that all common symptoms of financial distress were present in
Austria at one time or another: lending booms, asset price bubbles, politically
directed lending, decapitalization of banks, foreign currency exposure and
excessive competition. However, none of these symptoms got completely out
of control. The gradualist and finely sequenced approach of reforms kept the
disruptions sufficiently far apart so that they could not combine into a full-
blown crisis.
Chart 5 illustrates the experience of Finland, which is quite typical for the
pitfalls of financial liberalization. A lending boom got underway shortly after
restrictions on the domestic market were removed in 1982—86. The capital
account was opened in 1986, and capital inflows inflated asset prices. This
accelerated the lending boom, as collateral increased in value, making
credit less expensive to the borrower. The credit and asset price bubble burst in
1990—92 and triggered a sharp recession.
Chart 6 illustrates the Austrian case. The same imbalances as in Finland were
present, as were a lending boom, an asset price bubble and a large foreign
currency exposure. However, these phenomena were separated in time and
could not combine into a vicious circle and a general financial bubble. Domestic
reforms set off a lending boom in the late 1970s, but no capital inflows
occurred, since capital controls remained in place. The lending boom was
starved of substance and brought under control by high real interest rates
and the imposition of credit ceilings. When the capital account was liberalized
in the late 1980s, capital inflows led to a surge in asset prices. However, credit
growth remained modest because (1) prudential regulations were tightened at
the same time, forcing banks to restrict lending (2) diversified collateral with a
low share of real estate weakened the effect of asset prices on credit supply, and
(3) high real interest rates dampened credit demand. Finally, a boom in foreign
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currency lending was balanced by a large fiscal adjustment in the late 1990s. The
three episodes were separated by almost ten years each.
The downside of gradualism was a vulnerability to reversals. This happened
during the mid-1980s, as the bad financial health of the banking sector alarmed
government and banks alike. As a reaction, the authorities resuscitated the
cartel on interest rates, in order to quell exaggerated and ruinous competition
and restore profits. The collusive arrangement resulted in an immediate
improvement of interest margins, profits and capital ratios. As chart 7 shows,
interest margins increased from 1.5% to 2.5% between 1985 and 1993, sug-
gesting that competition was in fact curbed. The capital-asset ration began to
recover rapidly, increasing by 8% in 1986 and 18% in 1987. The recapitalization
of banks was thus primarily financed by borrowers, who had to pay higher
lending rates. Thus, the recovery of the banking sector was bought at the
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expense of a temporary reversal in the process of financial liberalization. This
was the price that Austria paid for gradualism.
Proposition 4: The cyclical effects of financial liberalization were balanced by tight
monetary, fiscal and prudential policies. The timing of this tightening was highly
fortunate if not always intentional.
Monetary policy, fiscal policy and financial reform can all be regarded as
cyclical tools of the government. In Austria, these tools frequently canceled out
each others cyclical effects. Financial liberalization has effects that are similar to
expansionary monetary policy, while prudential tightening resembles contrac-
tionary monetary policy. The main difference is that monetary changes take
place in the private-sector monetary aggregate (i.e. money created by commer-
cial banks), and not in the monetary base. Thus, financial liberalization and
prudential regulation often translate into changes of the money multiplier. This
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relation is illustrated nicely by Paraguays financial liberalization during the
1990s. By contrast, Austrias M2 multiplier increased continuously throughout
time, without any visible turning points. This is remarkable, because it is not
due to the absence of destabilizing financial shocks. Both economic policy and
internal buffers of the banking system played together to offset the shocks. We
first turn to economic policy.
Monetary policy was used actively to offset the expansionary impulses of
financial reform. Chart 10 and 11 show that real interest rates were higher on
average during years of financial reform (1977—81, 1986—92, 1994, 2000) than
otherwise after 1970. Real money market rates, which the central bank controls
most directly, increased by 250 basis points during periods of reform. This
propagated to other parts of the financial system, e.g. to government bond
yields, lending and deposit rates. To some extent, monetary policy was imposed
from abroad, as Austria followed German policies due to its peg to the Deutsche
mark. However, the timing of international monetary restrictions was quite
fortunate as well.
The final expansionary phase of financial liberalization was marked by a
boom in foreign currency lending during the late 1990s. During this period,
restrictive fiscal policy kept the banking sector in check. In order to fulfill the
criteria of the Stability and Growth Pact, the government carried out a fiscal
adjustment of 6% of GDP between 1995 and 2001, and reduced bank lending
by almost 30% in real terms. This created room to increase private lending
without destabilizing overall credit growth.
Finally, prudential reform exerted important countercyclical effects. The
first wave of financial reforms had led to intense competition and a dangerous
decline in bank profitability and capital endowments. The government tried to
arrest the deterioration in the mid-1980s first by reestablishing the interest rate
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cartel, then by tightening prudential standards, in particular by raising capital
requirements. Both measures had a restrictive effect on bank lending, making
credit more expensive and interest margins wider. This reduced the expan-
sionary impulse from opening the capital account and surging capital inflows.
Whether intentionally or not, shocks to economic policy often canceled
each other out, or were tuned appropriately to economic growth. Chart 13
shows that liberalization episodes mostly occurred in times of economic weak-
ness. The chart combines GDP growth rates (three-year moving averages) with
changes in the liberalization index described above. Domestic financial liberal-
ization was carried out when the economic environment was weakened by
OPEC oil price shocks, an international recession. Privatization and the surge
in foreign currency loans took place in a period of fiscal adjustment and sluggish
growth during the late 1990s. Capital flows were liberalized during an eco-
nomic upswing, but their effect was offset by a parallel tightening of prudential
standards. In sum, Austria was fortunate to liberalize at the right time, and to
contain the effects of liberalization with the right cyclical policies.
5 Structural Buffers in the Financial System
Proposition 5: Many Austrian banks have a long time horizon and buffer cyclical shocks.
Their financial decelerator dampens economic fluctuations. While unusual, this fits in a
hump-shaped relation between the financial accelerator and the banking system size in
Europe.
Monetary shocks — such as financial liberalization — wield their effects on the
real economy through the so-called transmission mechanism. The large number of
financial crises has recently led to a closer examination of transmission channels
worldwide, as exemplified by Kashyap and Stein (1995), Ehrmann et al. (2001)
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and Angeloni et al. (2001). In many countries, it was found that the financial
sector magnifies monetary shocks and business cycles in general. This behavior
has been termed financial accelerator.
The magnitude of the financial accelerator depends on the microeconomic
structure of the transmission mechanism. Three channels have been identified:
(1) The interest rate channel of monetary transmission works with perfect capital
markets and regardless of banks. Higher interest rates lead to intertemporal
substitution of investment and consumption, and to a decline in aggregate
demand. This channel is familiar from the textbook IS-LM model, and turns
out to be symmetric across most OECD countries, see Angeloni et al. (2001).
It can thus not account for the observed cross-country differences. (2) A second
mechanism is the balance sheet channel, which is based on changes in the value of
collateral, especially real estate. This effect is likely to be small in Austria, since
collateral is well diversified and real estate plays a minor role. Austrian banks
prefer deposits, bonds and inventory stocks for collateral. (3) The bank lending
channel, which transforms interest rate changes into changes in credit supply.
Increases in the central bank rate lead to a decline in deposits, as deposit rates
are slow to adjust. Unless banks have alternative sources of liquidity, the drain in
deposits forces them to curtail credit. This channel was found to operate
strongly among small and medium-sized banks in the U.S.A. It could be
expected to operate even more strongly in Europe, where the banking sector
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is much larger in relation to GDP, and especially in Austria. A priori, Austria
would therefore seem vulnerable to a large financial accelerator.
However, this is not the case. Empirically, a financial accelerator would
imply a negative relationship between credit growth and interest margins. This
pattern is explained by the risk-taking behavior of banks, and by a need to
maximize profits over the short term.1) Upturns generate optimistic expect-
ations about future returns, and banks eagerly extend loans. Competition heats
up, interest margins narrow and enhance credit demand further. During down-
turns, banks lose interest income as loans become nonperforming. They widen
interest margins and curtail credit supply, and shift their portfolio towards low-
risk assets. Short-term profit maximization thus tends to amplify the business
cycle.
Chart 13 shows the relation between real credit growth and the interest
margin for several countries. Interest margins are calculated as the difference
between lending and deposit rates in annual IFS data for 1955-2000. Canada,
the U.S.A. and Sweden represent the general case of a financial accelerator. The
plots show a negative correlation between credit growth and interest margins.
In contrast, Austria shows a positive correlation: the interest margin widens
when credit growth is high. This is rare evidence for a financial decelerator, i.e.
for bank behavior that dampens the business cycle.
Several factors may contribute to a weakening of the bank lending channel in
Austria. First, state influence in banking was pervasive until recently. Up to the
mid-1990s, more than half of all banking assets were controlled by the state.
Second, Austrian banks were organized in a cartel, at least until the entry into
the EU in 1995. Cartelization implies rigidities in interest rates and may
diminish the transmission of interest rate signals. Third, most banks are part
of networks that perform an internal liquidity management. Savings banks and
cooperatives can borrow liquidity from a large central institution whenever they
face a shortage of deposits. Thus, a central element of the bank lending channel
is invalidated.
Finally, the cyclical behavior of Austrian banks can be related to their own-
ership structure and its incentives for bank managers. Austria is the country
with the highest share of nonprofit banks in the OECD. Savings banks and
cooperatives comprise two thirds of the Austrian banking sector. These banks
are not primarily interested in short-term profits. Their goal is to ensure a
stable value of their assets over the long run, and to provide constant credit to
their clients, who may be their owners. Close relationship banking has the
additional advantage of reducing asymmetric information. Borrowers receive
loans with very long maturities. Managers have thus an incentive to pursue a
strategy of intertemporal smoothing, as described by Allen and Gale (2000):
they accumulate reserves during good times, and liquidate them during bad
times. This is consistent with widening interest margins when credit demand is
high, and narrowing them in a downturn. Banks relax credit conditions and help
borrowers stay afloat, at the price of a temporary decline in profits. By pursuing
intertemporal smoothing, banks provide an implicit insurance to borrowers and
help dampen the business cycle.
1 See BIS (2001), p. 139—160.
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These observations confirm the findings of Kaufmann (2001) and
Valderrama (2001) on the absence of a bank lending channel in Austria. Set
in a wider context of industrialized countries, Austria has one of the largest
banking sectors relative to GDP and one of the smallest financial accelerators. A
larger banking sector therefore does not necessarily mean more financial
instability. Maybe the opposite is true. Chart 15 illustrates the findings of a
series of ECB papers surveyed in Angeloni et al. (2001). The papers attempted
to test the proposition that the bank lending channel is stronger in Europe than
in the U.S.A., due to its bank-dominated financial system. Surprisingly, the
bank lending channel was found to be weaker in most European countries. In
addition, there seems to be evidence that the bank lending channel disappears
when the ratio of private sector credit to GDP grows very large.
Thus, the relation between size of the banking system and the financial
accelerator seems to be a hump-shaped curve like in chart 15. Countries with
small and poorly developed financial systems (on the left) would have small
financial accelerators. As the banking sector grows relative to the economy, the
bank lending channel becomes more significant, and the financial accelerator
increases. However, beyond a certain threshold the banking system grows only if
it develops strategies to overcome information asymmetries. Two such strat-
egies are long-term relationship banking and liquidity networks. Both encour-
age intertemporal smoothing and lead to the development of internal buffers
that diminish the effects of shocks. The financial accelerator may thus decline at
the right end of the scale, and eventually vanish. A large banking system is more
diversified and contains a larger number of internal buffers. This may be a
comforting thought for the ECB.
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Conclusions
The series of financial crises over the last decades has provided valuable lessons
on the behavior of banks. An especially interesting monetary shock is financial
liberalization: it has occurred many parts of the world and implies a severe test
on the financial system. Depending on their financial structure, countries
exhibited completely different reactions to financial liberalization.
This paper seeks to complement the literature on financial liberalization,
which was biased towards crisis episodes. It analyzes the case of Austria, where
the odds for a financial crisis were strong. Like Sweden or Finland, Austria
started out with a severely repressed financial system, and political influence
was even pervasive. Austria had also had a currency peg, and its firms relied to
large extent on bank financing. Shocks to the banking system could thus be
expected to have important real effects in Austria.
Yet no boom-bust cycle happened, and the country managed a successful
and smooth financial liberalization. This paper presents two sets of explanations
for this unusual experience, one linked to policy, the other linked to financial
structure. The latter deserves special attention, since it yields information about
the transmission mechanism of monetary shocks. It turns out that the large
Austrian banking sector does not magnify monetary shocks, but seems to
contain a system of built-in buffers to dampen them. There is thus evidence
for a financial decelerator. Set in a wider European context, a picture emerges
whereby countries with a very large banking sector, such as Austria, are less
susceptible to financial instability. This may be good news for monetary policy
in Europe, where the banking sector in general is much larger than in other
parts of the world.
On the side of economic policy, three implications emerge from the study:
First, in comprehensive reforms, gradualism works well. The slicing of reforms
into manageable pieces avoided a cumulation of risk factors and the emergence
of financial bubbles. The remaining symptoms of distress could be isolated and
dealt with one at a time. Second, sequencing followed broadly todays consensus
view — albeit without the benefit of hindsight. And third, the cyclical potential
	
#
2	#%	#
/
'

#

#

 #  # 
%			
	*4+

	"		
		'2	#%	#		2	
	#
		#	A.//,-	'#	B			#	
	
		(!	
		
		
	%	
		
#			"			
		
		'2	#%	#	+	
	%	
	*4+	%

	
"90D
0
A
23
9
 
3
D ;

	
>

A Financial Decelerator in Europe?
Evidence from Austria
148 Focus on Austria 1/2003
of financial reforms was managed well. In Austria, financial reform was timed in
a countercyclical manner, and other policy tools were used to offset and smooth
some of its cyclical effects. Liberalization coincided with episodes of weak
demand, and regulations were tightened during upswings.
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1 Introduction
At the heart of the financial accelerator theory of investment is the idea that due
to capital market imperfections the investment decision of the firm is not
independent of its financing decision. In this framework financial development,
and therefore the cost and availability of external finance, is important for
growth due to its effect on investment.3) In the same fashion, the institutional
framework plays an important role by the way in which it reduces financial
constraints that would otherwise restrict investment. However, no clear
answers have been attained about whether a market-based or a bank-based
financial system is better at promoting growth, neither empirically nor theo-
retically.4) One of the reasons often mentioned is that despite the shortcomings
of bank-based systems, there are advantages due mainly to the possibility of
establishing long-term lending relationships5), which help overcome asymmet-
ric information, moral hazard, and adverse selection problems.
The goal of this paper is to test first, whether the existence of a house bank
influences investment after controlling for other relevant variables such as
internal funds, size and age; and second, whether given that there is a house
bank, the characteristics of the house bank influence the firms investment.
Theoretical and empirical studies about lending relationships (Petersen, 1994,
1995; Ongena and Smith, 1998; Houston and James, 1999; Boot, 2000) have
mainly found that the presence of a house bank does not decrease the sensitivity
of investment to the cost of capital but allows firms to be less dependent on
their internal funds.
The structure of the banking system has also been found to be relevant for
investment. The interest on the effect of the banking structure on investment
has risen due to increasing merger and acquisition activities and the consolida-
tion of the banking system. Some authors (Berger and Udell, 1994, 1998;
Berger et al., 2001; Bonaccorsi and DellAriccia, 2000; Bonaccorsi and Gobbi,
2000; Cole and Walraven, 1998) argue that market concentration and market
consolidation are detrimental to lending relationships since large banks or banks
with large market power will have less interest in building narrow lending
relationships, especially with small or young firms. Thus, there is an implicit
fear that developments in the banking structure will curtail the existence of
lending relationships.
This paper partly confirms these results. The presence of a house bank does
not reduce the cost of capital for all firms, but depending on the size of the firm,
it may help reduce the financial constraints the firm faces. Contrary to expect-
1 Thanks go to Gerhard Fiam and Wolfgang Schu‹ller for preparing and providing the data. I would also like to
thank Helene Schuberth and Fabio Rumler for very helpful comments and suggestions. I bear the responsibility
for remaining errors.
2 Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Economics Analysis Division, Otto-Wagner-Platz 3, 1090 Vienna, Austria,
Tel.: (43 1) 40420-7412, Fax: (43 1) 40420-7499; e-mail: Maria.Valderrama@oenb.at. The views
presented here do not necessarily reflect those of the OeNB.
3 See Tsuru (2000) for a survey of the literature on the relationship between financial constraints and firm-level
investment.
4 Levine (2002).
5 This is the existence of a house bank.
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ations, however, small and young firms benefit more from having a large bank as
their house bank.
The paper is organized as follows: the next section motivates the empirical
specification. Section 3 describes the data and indicators used in the empirical
part. Section 4 presents the results of the estimations. The summary and
conclusions follow.
2 Theoretical Framework
In a world of perfect capital markets, the investment decision of a firm would be
independent of its financing decision.1) However, in a world with asymmetric
information, moral hazard, agency costs, adverse selection, and other market
imperfections, internal and external funds are not perfect substitutes and there
is no perfect substitution between bank loans and other sources of funds. Thus,
if capital market imperfections exist, both the supply and the cost of external
funds a firm faces will depend not only on the financial structure of the firm but
also on other characteristics that determine the firms access to external funds.
These may include among others size, age, and the existence of a narrow
lending relationship with a bank.
Under these circumstances, investment of firms with limited access to
capital markets will depend more on internal funds and will be more sensitive
to the user cost of capital, because the premium on external funds will grow
faster for firms that are financially constrained. In addition, financial interme-
diaries may ration some creditors out of the market.2) In other words, if a firm
has limited access to the capital market due to market imperfections and does
not have sufficient internal funds to finance its desired level of investment, it
will be financially constrained and will have to cut down on investment.
For the same reason the financial system in which a firm operates may have
an influence on the amount of investment, depending on whether capital market
imperfections are overcome more easily or not. In the literature of finance for
growth, no clear answers to the question of which financial structure is better at
promoting growth have been found yet.3) One of the reasons often mentioned is
that despite the problems that arise in a bank-based system, this system has
advantages over the market-based system due mainly to the possibility of estab-
lishing long-term lending relationships, which help overcome many asymmetric
information, moral hazard and adverse selection problems existent in imperfect
markets.4)
In order to find empirical evidence for the effects of financial factors on
investment, a number of studies have tested whether the sensitivity of invest-
1 That is, if the Modigliani-Miller theorem holds.
2 See Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Hubbard (1994), Cecchetti (2000), and Oliner and Rudebusch (1996).
3 The results are robust to an extensive array of sensitivity analyses that employ different measures of financial
structure, alternative statistical procedures, and different datasets. The conclusions are also not altered when
looking at extremes: countries with very well developed banks but poorly developed markets do not perform
notably differently from those with very well developed markets but poorly developed banks, or than those
with more balanced financial systems: cross-country comparisons do not suggest that distinguishing between
bank-based and market-based is analytically useful for understanding the process of economic growth.
(Levine, 2002).
4 Another reason is the intertemporal risk sharing practiced by banks with tight lending relationships.
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ment of firms with different access to capital markets reacts differently to its
determinants, such as the user cost of capital and the availability of internal
funds.1)
The influence of the financial system on investment has usually been inves-
tigated by looking at the role that lending relationships play on facilitating
investment. The study of the relationship between firms and banks has been
done either by studying the investment behavior of the firms as proposed here,
or by looking at the credit demand of these firms. Research on the credit
channel and financial accelerator theory has concentrated on the effect of
financial constraints on investment (Bernanke et al., 1994; Bond et al.,
1994, 1997). Most of the literature that has merged bank and firm data has
related the credit demand of (or bank lending to) nonfinancial firms with the
characteristics of banks (Berger, 1995 to 2001; Bonaccorsi et al., 2000).2) Only
few studies, such as Gibson (1995, 1997) have included bank characteristics on
the investment function equation.3)
The advantage of using microeconomic data in studies of finance for growth
is that this type of data is more appropriate to circumvent the problem of
causality because firm performance is unlikely to shape an economys financial
development. One obvious advantage of using firm-level data is that the struc-
ture of the financial system can be considered exogenous with respect to the
performance of individual firms, especially if data on small and medium-sized
firms are used.
The starting point is an investment demand specification derived from the
optimization problem of the firm. Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion the desired capital stock of firm i at time t, Kit will be given by the first-
order conditions for profit-maximizing behavior, which is that the marginal
productivity of capital should be equal to its marginal cost. The marginal cost
is taken here to be the user cost of capital. Thus, rewriting:4)
Kit ¼ i
Sit
UCit
ð1Þ
1 For literature surveys, see Hubbard (1994), Mojon et al. (2000). For studies done for Austria, see Valderrama
(2001), Wesche (2000) and Kaufmann (2001).
2 This is not trivial, since there is an identification problem that has to be solved. Assuming that there is always
some degree of credit rationing, credit demand is not observed, only credit supply.
3 Gibson finds that the health of the banks was an important determinant of investment demand for bank-
dependent firms in Japan.
4 For detailed derivations of the profit maximizing behavior, see for example Bond et al. (1997) and Mairesse et
al. (1999).
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Where Sit is output or net sales, UCit is the firm-specific user cost of
capital1) and i the share of capital in the production function. Writing the
logarithms of Kit
2) and Sit3) with small letters, using  for the log of the user
cost of capital and relaxing the constraints of a proportional reaction of capital
to output and to the user cost, equation (1) can be linearized by:
kit ¼ i þ sit  it ð2Þ
The accelerator specification for investment demand is obtained by taking first
differences and using the following expression as an approximation for invest-
mentkit  Iit=Kit1   (with Iit and  denoting investment and depreciation,
respectively).
Since the adjustment to the desired capital stock is not instantaneous, this
equation is generally expressed as an autoregressive distributed lag specification,
where it denotes a firm specific constant and 	it represents the error term:
Iit=Kit1 ¼ ðIit1=Kit2Þ þ
XT
j¼0
jsitj 
XT
h¼0
hith þ it þ 	t ð3Þ
Due to asymmetric information and agency costs, lenders will charge a higher
premium to firms for which they have less information. This premium will be
lower the larger the net worth of the firm is, since net worth can be used as
collateral. Under this view, the cost of external funds will depend on the
financial structure of the firm, and the demand for investment will depend as
well on the financial position of the firm. This empirical specification is based on
the financial accelerator theory of investment, which states that weak balance
sheets can amplify adverse shocks on firm investment.4)
In this framework, the investment demand equation in (3) is augmented by
factors that account for the net worth of the firm, such as the ratio of liquid
assets to capital. Thus, an augmented investment demand equation can be
written as:
Iit=Kit1 ¼ ðIit1=Kit2Þ þ
XT
j¼0
jsitj 
XT
h¼0
hith
þ
XT
m¼0
!mCitm=pItmKt1m þ it þ 	t ð4Þ
where Cit represents the cash level and pIt represents the economy-wide price
deflator of gross investment. The hypothesis is that if finance matters, then the
availability of internal funds will affect not only investment, but also the total
1 The firm-specific user cost of capital is defined as: UCit ¼ ðpIt =PtÞðrit pItþ1=pIt þ Þwhere rit is
the apparent interest rate, which is defined as the ratio of interest and similar charges to gross debt, pIt is the
economy wide price deflator for gross investment, Pt is the GDP deflator, and  is the economic depreciation
rate. This definition of the user cost of capital includes three additive elements: the opportunity cost of capital
given by the apparent interest rate, a forward-looking inflation component given by the term pItþ1=p
I
t and
economic depreciation.
2 The stock of capital was calculated using the perpetual inventory method with a depreciation rate of 10%.
3 Output is defined as net sales.
4 Bernanke and Gertler (1995).
Banking Structure and Investment in Austria:
Some Empirical Evidence
Focus on Austria 1/2003 153
effect of the user cost of capital on investment. Additionally, to allow for
heterogeneity and control for different access to external funds, the sample is
split according to age and size.
The Role of Lending Relationships
Lending relationships are important for investment because through long-stand-
ing relationships both lenders and borrowers may overcome some of the asym-
metric information problems found in imperfect capital markets. Thus, firms
that otherwise would be financially constrained, such as small or young firms,
may have greater access to external funds by building a lending relationship. The
certainty that the firm will have access to funds even in bad times may come at a
cost for the firm. First, the bank may apply monopolistic pricing on the loans,1)
and second, strong dependence on a bank which may not have enough funds
may curtail investment for the client firms.2)
The investigation of the importance of lending relationships for investment
is done by including a dummy variable that accounts for the presence of a house
bank3) in the regression. Other studies have usually found that bank lending
relationships have a positive effect not on the price but rather on the availability
of external funds and also that this benefits especially young and small firms.4)
Some studies have also dealt with the characteristics of the lender. Petersen
and Rajan (1995) for example find that borrowing from banks with large
market power facilitates inter-temporal sharing of rent surplus and hence
increases the value of a single relationship5) at the same time there is also
evidence that small banks are better at providing finance to small firms, because
they are better at collecting and processing soft information.6) Other reasons
why the characteristics of the lender may matter for the borrower are that when
the house bank suffers a liquidity shock like in Detragiache et al. (1997) it will
cut financing, forcing a bank-dependent firm with low internal funds to seek
expensive outside financing or to cut investment.7) Kashyap and Stein (1997)
and Cecchetti (2000) argue that smaller banks, for example, are more likely to
reduce lending in case of a monetary contraction.
Thus, once it is determined whether a firm has a house bank, cross sectional
variations are investigated by splitting the sample according to house bank
groups. Banks are categorized according to their size as explained in the next
section.
1 This is the so-called hold-up problem. See Ongena and Smith (1998), and DellAriccia and Marquez (2001).
2 See Ongena and Smith (1998) for a more detailed account of all possible effects of lending relationships on
firms.
3 This is explained below.
4 Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995), Ongena and Smith, (1998), Houston and James (1999), Boot (2000).
5 Ongena and Smith (1998).
6 Petersen and Rajan (1994), Berger et al. (2002).
7 Gibson (1995, 1997), Kang and Stulz (2000), Ongena et al. (2000), and Tsuru (2000) argue, for example,
that relationship lending increases the effects of a banking crisis on the economy.
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3 Data and Indicators
The aim of this project is to investigate the effect of the banking structure and
lending relationship on the investment function of nonfinancial firms simulta-
neously. This can be done by taking advantage of the wealth of information of
the OeNB database by merging the information from 1) balance sheets and
income balances of nonfinancial firms, 2) the data obtained by the Major Loans
Register database and 3) information about banking structure obtained from the
banking statistics of the OeNB. By doing this, it is possible to study how
characteristics of the lender, such as size, influence the investment behavior
of the borrower.1)
The Oesterreichische Nationalbank collects data on balance sheets and
income statements of Austrian firms in the course of its refinancing activities.
To check the solvency of nonfinancial enterprises involved in the collateraliza-
tion of monetary policy operations, the OeNB asks for annual accounts. These
annual accounts are submitted to the OeNB by the enterprises themselves or by
commercial banks doing business with the enterprises in question. Consolidated
financial statements are collected in exceptional cases only.2)
The database contains annual data for the years 1979 to 2000, which
provides 42,870 observations. Although from 1987 more than 2,000 firms a
year have submitted financial statements, the time series dimension is compa-
ratively small for most firms, e.g. only 88 firms were observed over the whole
sample period and 3,959 firms appear only once in the data.
After having cleaned the database (removing observations with negative
values of sales, total assets, the stock of capital, total debt and the number of
employees), removing outliers3) and selecting a sample with firms present for at
least five years in a row, only 13,703 observations for the years 1990 to 2000
remain.
Due to the special structure of the source material, the OeNBs sample is
not a statistical sample, and there is a bias in the database. Commercial banks
usually present collateral from companies that they expect will satisfy the
OeNBs solvency requirements. Sound enterprises are thus overrepresented
in the sample. Moreover, the bias becomes more severe when only those firms
are regarded for which longer time series exist, since these are comparatively
large firms.
Additionally, another OeNB database with data starting in 1990 is used to
construct a proxy for the existence of a house bank. In the Major Loans
Register, the OeNB collects monthly data from banks that give credit to firms
for more than EUR 350,000. As part of the information collected, the OeNB
calculates the largest share on total loans of the firm from one single bank.
Usually, lending relationships are proxied by the duration of the lending
relationship.4) However, due to the short time span of this database it is not
1 The data from the balance sheet and income balances of firms are available since 1979. The data from the
Gro§kreditevidenz are available since 1990 and the data from the banking statistics of the OeNB are
available since 1990.
2 The individual data are strictly confidential and have to be aggregated for any publication in order to comply
with data secrecy legislation.
3 It was done by excluding data, which exceeded five times the interval between quartiles from the median.
4 Conigliani et al. (1997), Berlin and Mester (1998), Ongena and Smith (1998), and Boot (2000).
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possible to construct such an indicator. There is no information either about the
kind of services, besides loans, the bank provides to the firm. Thus, the
indicator of the existence of a house bank was constructed in the following
way: the share of the bank with the largest share of total loans of the firm is
taken from the Major Loans Register. If during the years the firm is represented
in the sample the name of bank with the largest share is always the same and this
share is larger than 45%, this firm is categorized as having a house bank. If the
name of the bank with the largest share changes during the period under study,
or if the banks share of total loans of the firm is under 45%, the firm is
considered to have no narrow lending relationship with any bank.1) Thus, the
indicator of a house bank enters the regression as an interactive dummy
variable. The reason to use this indicator to measure lending relationships is
that given the large number of banks per inhabitant in Austria and the strong
competition in this sector, a high share of a single bank in total debt could be
taken as an indicator of a narrow lending relationship. If this share is maintained
over several years, there is reason to believe that the firm has a close relationship
with this bank. Using this classification scheme, 59.2% of firms in the sample
have a house bank and 50.8% of the banks in the sample are house banks for at
least one firm in the sample used.
Because the interest here lies in the effect that bank size has on investment,
the sample of banks is split according to its assets. Three groups of banks are
formed: large banks, medium-sized banks and small banks. Large banks are
banks with assets of more than EUR 24.1 million, while assets of small banks are
less than EUR 3.2 million. According to this split, 44.1% of the observations
corresponding to firms with a house bank in the sample correspond to a large
house bank, 30.1% to a medium-sized bank, and 25.8% to a small bank.2)
Tables 1a to 1d show some descriptive statistics of the sample used in this
study. The mean of the investment ratio is 9.66% for the whole sample. As
expected, large firms show the highest investment ratio (10.29%) and small
firms invest the least (7.31%), while there are no significant differences in the
investment ratio of young and old firms.3) Since we are interested in the effects
of the existence of a house bank on investment, we split the sample according to
the indicator of a house bank described above. It is interesting to see that the
investment ratio of firms that do not have a house bank is larger for all groups
except for small firms. Since the second part of our investigation analyzes the
effects of bank characteristics on investment, we split the sample again accord-
ing to the size of the bank. We found the following pattern: When the house
bank is a large bank, the investment ratio is always lower, except for young
firms. When the house bank is medium-sized, the investment ratio is always
larger. If the house bank is a small bank, the investment ratio is always smaller
except in the case of small firms.
The mean of the user cost of capital for the whole sample shown in table 1c
is 11.76%. This value is much larger for small (12.28%) and young (11.9%)
1 Since firms used in the sample should be present for at least five consecutive years, the shortest lending
relationship measured will be five years.
2 Data for merged banks are calculated backwards as data for one single bank.
3 Small firms are firms with less than 55 employees, while young firms are those established in the last ten years.
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firms and slightly lower for large and old firms (11.62% and 11.72%, respec-
tively). The existence of a house bank increases slightly the mean of the user
cost of capital for the whole sample as well as for old and small firms (11.77%
and 12.32%, respectively).1) Since the second part of our study deals with the
effect that the banks characteristics have on investment, we look again at the
differences in user cost of capital splitting the sample according to the house
banks characteristics. According to the size of the bank, the following pattern is
found: When the house bank is large, the average user cost of capital is the
lowest except for young and small firms, while when the house bank is small the
average user cost of capital is the highest, except for large firms.
The mean of the liquid assets ratio is 44.7% for the whole sample. Accord-
ing to expectations, this ratio is smaller for large firms (43.5%) than for small
firms (49%) and smaller for old firms (43.9%) than for young firms (47.8%).
Taking into account whether the firm has a house bank gives the following
picture: the liquidity ratio of firms without a house bank tends to be slightly
lower or equal to that of the whole sample and to that of firms which have a
house bank. Depending on the size of the house bank, the following pattern is
found: firms whose house bank is considered a large bank show a higher average
of liquid assets ratio than firms with medium-sized or small banks. The excep-
tion is the case of young firms, which show the highest liquid assets ratio when
the house bank is classified as small.
4 Estimation and Results
The estimation of the investment function was done using two-step Arellano-
Bond-GMM-type estimators, which control for biases due to unobserved firm-
specific effects and lagged endogenous variables.2) The estimations were done
using first differences of the logarithm to remove the firm-specific effects it,
and time dummies were included to control for exogenous shocks in the data.
Several estimations that are not presented here were carried out to determine
the number of lags of the dependent variables. All lagged levels are used as
instrumental variables. Due to the nature of the investment function, all var-
iables are treated as predetermined variables. The validity of the instruments
was tested with a Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions and tests of serial
correlation in the residuals.
First we analyze whether the presence of a house bank makes a difference
for the whole sample and then for different groups of firms. In the second part
we investigate the effects that splitting banks according to their size has on the
investment function of the whole sample of firms and then again for groups of
firms.
The tests show that the investment equation is well specified, with the
expected signs and mostly significant coefficients for firms with a house bank,
whereas for the group of firms without a house bank most coefficients are
1 This is consistent with the idea that banks use their monopolistic pricing power in these lending relationships,
but when firms are young they do not use it so that they can establish a long-standing relationship that will
reap benefits in the future. On the other hand, large firms may have a better bargaining position with banks
and therefore banks cannot use their monopolistic power fully.
2 Arellano and Bond (1991).
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insignificant, except for the group of small firms. Surprisingly, the coefficient
for net sales for firms with a house bank is in most cases positive and significant,
although the value is relatively low compared to similar studies done for other
countries. Thus, in general investment seems to be well specified with this model.
Effect of the House Bank on Groups of Firms
As the summary table shows, the total long-term elasticity of the user cost of
capital is —12.1% for firms without a house bank and —6.3% for firms with a
house bank.1) However, in the latter case the coefficient is insignificant. In
general, this elasticity is lower for firms with a house bank except for young
firms, but this coefficient is often insignificant. In the case of small firms the
long-run elasticity of the user cost of capital is significantly lower for firms with
a house bank (—6.9% instead of —17.6% for firms without a house bank).
Although no strong conclusions can be made about the effect of lending rela-
tionships on the sensitivity of investment to the user cost of capital, it seems that
as it is predicted by the theory, small firms benefit the most by establishing long-
term relationships with a bank.
As is usually found in this type of study, the liquid assets ratio is positive and
always significant. Contrary to expectations, however, the long-run elasticity of
the liquid assets ratio is higher for all groups of firms, except for large firms,
when the firm has a house bank. Also contrary to expectations, the lowest long-
run elasticity of the liquidity ratio is shown by small firms, while the highest is
shown by old firms.
Most theoretical and empirical studies on lending relationships have found
that the effect of lending relationships for firms was to increase both the
Summary Table
Long-Run Elasticities
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
all young old small large
Growth in net sales
No house bank 0.002 0.072* —0.001 —0.009* 0.037
All house banks 0.010 0.032 0.016 0.018** 0.029
Large house bank 0.103* —0.028 0.085* 0.026* 0.059*
Medium-sized house bank 0.058* 0.086* 0.066* 0.044* 0.089*
Small house bank —0.019 —0.012 —0.009 —0.031* 0.028*
Change in user cost of capital
No house bank —0.121* 0.044 —0.126* —0.176* —0.085
All house banks —0.063 —0.128* —0.071 —0.069* —0.058
Large house bank —0.091* —0.181* —0.032 —0.160* —0.105*
Medium-sized house bank —0.002 0.054* —0.041 —0.189* —0.050*
Small house bank —0.150* —0.349* —0.088* 0.002 —0.203*
Liquidity Ratio
No house bank 0.194* 0.125* 0.166* 0.058* 0.204*
All house banks 0.222* 0.181* 0.224* 0.147* 0.163*
Large house bank 0.093* 0.176* 0.117* 0.083* 0.105*
Medium-sized house bank 0.215* 0.177* 0.201* 0.184* 0.200*
Small house bank 0.193* 0.224* 0.175* 0.259* 0.124*
Note: * Indicates significance at the 95% level. ** Indicates significante at the 90% level.
1 Detailed results are presented in tables 2 to 5 in the annex.
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availability of external funds as well as the cost of those funds. In the Austrian
case, on the contrary, firms with a house bank seem to be more dependent on
internal funds than firms which do not have a house bank. However, contrary to
expectations, the sensitivity of investment to changes in the user cost of capital
decreases when the firm has lending relationships or this variable becomes
insignificant.
Effect of the Size of the House Bank on Groups of Firms
According to theoretical and empirical results of previous studies, it is expected
that small firms whose house bank is a large bank will not benefit from this
lending relationship because of the inability or willingness of large banks to
invest in firms in which asymmetric information is large. In contrast, when the
house bank is small, small firms should show lower sensitivities of investment to
both the user cost of capital and to the liquidity ratio. In this section, we test this
hypothesis for the Austrian case.
With respect to the sensitivity of investment to the user cost of capital, the
results of these regressions show that for the different groups of firms, having a
small bank as a house bank comes at a cost. If the lack of significance of this
variable in the investment function can be interpreted as the firm not reacting to
changes in the user cost of capital, then small firms do seem to benefit from
having a small bank. However, most other groups of firms show lower sensi-
tivities to the user cost of capital when the house bank is a large bank. The
exception is large firms, which benefit most when their house bank is a
medium-sized bank. For old firms, it seems that the user cost of capital is
not an important determinant of the investment decision since this coefficient
is insignificant most of the time. Due to the frequency of insignificant coeffi-
cients, however, it is, difficult to draw strong conclusions about the effect of the
size of the bank on the sensitivity of investment to the user cost of capital.
The analysis of the sensitivity of investment to the liquidity ratio allows a
clearer picture of the effects of different banks. In all cases, the long-run
elasticity of the liquidity ratio is lower when the house bank is a large bank.
This is particularly surprising in the case of small firms. The sensitivity of
investment to the liquidity ratio falls from 25.9% when the house bank is small
to only 8.3% when the house bank is large. Another surprising result is that for
large firms it does not seem to matter very much whether the house bank is
large or small, reflecting perhaps the negotiating power a large firm can have
over its house bank.
5 Summary and Conclusions
Due to capital market imperfections the investment decision of the firm is not
independent of its financing. Thus, the financial position of a firm and the
financial system in which this firm operates will partly determine the invest-
ment outcome and will therefore influence growth.
The study here goes beyond establishing whether financial variables are
important determinants of investment and examines the role that lending
relationships play in investment. The results confirm that financial variables,
in this case the liquid-assets-to-capital-ratio, are an important determinant of
investment, even more important than the user cost of capital.
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The investigation of the role of lending relationships yielded some puzzling
results. First, it is not clear that all firms benefit from having a house bank. The
effect of a house bank on investment depends on the type of firm but also on the
type of house bank. In general, firms seem to benefit most when the house bank
is large measured by its assets. However, as has been often found in this kind of
study, firms benefit mostly by depending less on their liquid assets than on a
lower elasticity of the user cost of capital.
These results contradict some of the findings for the U.S.A., as for example
that small banks are better house banks to small firms. The opposite is true for
Austria: small banks have a negative effect on the investment of young and small
firms and a positive effect on old and large firms while, surprisingly, young and
small firms benefit more from having a house bank that is large.
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Annex
Table 1a
Descriptive Statistics: Investment Ratio
all young old small large
Observations 11,450 2,339 9,111 2,414 9,036
%
Mean 9.66 9.88 9.61 7.31 10.29
Standard deviation 9.50 10.37 9.26 9.63 9.36
Minimum  3.42  3.42  0.51  0.51  3.42
Maximum 57.24 57.17 57.24 57.24 57.17
without a house bank
Observations 4,809 1,035 3,774 803 4,006
%
Mean 9.99 10.11 9.95 7.26 10.53
Standard deviation 9.61 10.25 9.42 9.45 9.54
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Maximum 57.14 57.14 57.13 56.81 57.14
with a house bank
Observations 6,641 1,304 5,337 1,611 5,030
%
Mean 9.43 9.70 9.36 7.34 10.10
Standard deviation 9.41 10.46 9.14 9.73 9.21
Minimum  3.42  3.42  0.51  0.51  3.42
Maximum 57.24 57.17 57.24 57.24 57.17
with a large house bank
Observations 3,140 707 2,433 597 2,543
%
Mean 9.07 9.74 8.88 6.16 9.76
Standard deviation 9.04 10.19 8.67 8.98 8.92
Minimum  0.51 0.04  0.51  0.51 0.06
Maximum 57.17 57.17 55.97 53.73 57.17
with a medium-sized house bank
Observations 1,908 351 1,557 459 1,449
%
Mean 10.09 9.84 10.14 8.27 10.67
Standard deviation 9.81 10.71 9.60 9.81 9.75
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02
Maximum 56.88 55.34 56.88 53.08 56.88
with a small house bank
Observations 1,593 246 1,347 555 1,038
%
Mean 9.34 9.38 9.33 7.85 10.13
Standard deviation 9.61 10.90 9.36 10.31 9.12
Minimum  3.42  3.42 0.00 0.00  3.42
Maximum 57.24 52.95 57.24 57.24 56.92
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Table 1b
Descriptive Statistics: Growth in Net Sales
all young old small large
Observations 11,570 2,364 9,206 2,416 9,154
%
Mean 3.40 5.12 2.95 2.28 3.69
Standard deviation 16.51 17.77 16.14 18.30 16.00
Minimum  74.92  68.67  74.92  74.92  74.79
Maximum 81.38 81.12 81.38 79.51 81.38%
without a house bank
Observations 4,844 1,045 3,799 798 4,046
%
Mean 3.60 5.38 3.11 3.00 3.72
Standard deviation 15.86 16.95 15.51 18.50 15.29
Minimum  71.60  66.40  71.60  71.12  71.60
Maximum 79.82 73.88 79.82 78.59 79.82
with a house bank
Observations 6,726 1,319 5,407 1,618 5,108
%
Mean 3.25 4.92 2.84 1.93 3.67
Standard deviation 16.97 18.40 16.57 18.20 16.54
Minimum  74.92  68.67  74.92  74.92  74.79
Maximum 81.38 81.12 81.38 79.51 81.38
with a large house bank
Observations 3,156 709 2,447 582 2,574
%
Mean 3.23 4.82 2.77 1.82 3.55
Standard deviation 16.84 19.02% 16.13 19.55 16.16
Minimum  74.79  68.67  74.79  68.67  74.79
Maximum 81.12 81.12 80.45 75.62 81.12
with a medium-sized house bank
Observations 1,937 355 1,582 467 1,470
%
Mean 3.32 5.65 2.79 2.05 3.72
Standard deviation 16.59 16.84 16.49 16.57 16.58
Minimum  73.23  57.03  73.23  62.03  73.23
Maximum 81.38 76.93 81.38 70.92 81.38
with a small house bank
Observations 1,633 255 1,378 569 1,064
%
Mean 3.21 4.18 3.03 1.96 3.88
Standard deviation 17.65 18.80 17.43 18.08 17.39
Minimum  74.92  60.83  74.92  74.92  70.06
Maximum 79.51 71.23 79.51 79.51 78.93
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Table 1c
Descriptive Statistics: User Cost of Capital
all young old small large
Observations 13,612 3,067 10,545 2,908 10,704
%
Mean 11.76 11.90 11.72 12.28 11.62
Standard deviation 2.16 2.09 2.17 2.38 2.07
Minimum 6.96 6.96 6.96 6.96 6.96
Maximum 25.42 24.90 25.42 24.90 25.42
without a house bank
Observations 5,683 1,353 4,330 988 4,695
%
Mean 11.75 12.04 11.66 12.19 11.66
Standard deviation 2.13 2.15 2.12 2.46 2.04
Minimum 6.96 6.96 6.96 6.96 6.96
Maximum 25.42 24.90 25.42 24.90 25.42
with a house bank
Observations 7,929 1,714 6,215 1,920 6,009
%
Mean 11.77 11.79 11.77 12.32 11.59
Standard deviation 2.17 2.04 2.21 2.34 2.09
Minimum 6.96 7.31 6.96 6.96 6.96
Maximum 24.77 21.62 24.77 24.77 22.21
with a large house bank
Observations 3,499 878 2,621 692 2,807
%
Mean 11.62 11.77 11.56 12.25 11.46
Standard deviation 2.09 2.00 2.12 2.29 2.01
Minimum 7.02 7.67 7.02 7.62 7.02
Maximum 21.93 20.98 21.93 21.10 21.93
with a medium-sized house bank
Observations 2,445 490 1,955 550 1,895
%
Mean 11.85 11.74 11.88 12.22 11.75
Standard deviation 2.21 2.04 2.25 2.44 2.12
Minimum 6.96 7.31 6.96 6.98 6.96
Maximum 23.79 20.32 23.79 23.79 22.15
with a small house bank
Observations 1,985 346 1,639 678 1,307
%
Mean 11.94 11.89 11.95 12.48 11.65
Standard deviation 2.26 2.13 2.28 2.30 2.18
Minimum 6.96 7.32 6.96 6.96 7.00
Maximum 24.77 21.62 24.77 24.77 22.21
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Table 1d
Descriptive Statistics: Liquidity Ratio
all young old small large
Observations 11,757 2,407 9,350 2,478 9,279
%
Mean 44.7 47.8 43.9 49.0 43.5
Standard deviation 30.2 31.5 29.8 35.6 28.5
Minimum 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0
Maximum 204.2 204.2 203.2 204.2 203.2
without a house bank
Observations 4,921 1,060 3,861 821 4,100
%
Mean 44.1 44.9 43.9 49.1 43.1
Standard deviation 30.1 29.1 30.3 36.2 28.6
Minimum 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1
Maximum 203.2 192.3 203.2 202.1 203.2
with a house bank
Observations 6,836 1,347 5,489 1,657 5,179
%
Mean 45.1 50.1 43.9 49.0 43.9
Standard deviation 30.3 33.1 29.5 35.3 28.4
Minimum 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.8 0.0
Maximum 204.2 204.2 203.2 204.2 203.2
with a large house bank
Observations 3,210 726 2,484 602 2,608
%
Mean 48.0 51.7 46.9 55.3 46.3
Standard deviation 32.1 34.0 31.4 39.7 29.8
Minimum 0.3 0.4% 0.3 3.2 0.3
Maximum 203.2 201.1 203.2 201.1 203.2
with a medium-sized house banknumber
Observations 1,974 365 1,609 479 1,495
%
Mean 42.9 45.7 42.3 45.4 42.1
Standard deviation 28.3 31.5 27.5 31.2 27.2
Minimum 0.0 4.0 0.0 1.2 0.0
Maximum 204.2 204.2 182.8 204.2 182.8
with a small house banknumber
Observations 1,652 256 1,396 576 1,076
%
Mean 42.0 52.1 40.2 45.3 40.3
Standard deviation 28.7 32.5 27.5 32.7 26.1
Minimum 0.8 8.0 0.8 0.8 2.3
Maximum 197.1 188.8 197.1 197.1 188.8
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Table 2
Investment Function
All Banks GMM—two step estimator in first differences
Coefficient P>lzl Coefficient P>lzl Coefficient P>lzl Coefficient P>lzl Coefficient P>lzl
all young old small large
Number of observations 7,150 1,126 6,024 1,345 5,805
Number of firms 1,728 430 1,434 451 1,386
Investment ratiot—1 0.143 0.0 0.006 0.89 0.024 0.60 —0.152 0.00 0.136 0.00
Growth in net salest —0.009 0.7 0.079 0.00 —0.019 0.40 —0.030 0.00 0.023 0.31
Growth in net salest—1 0.011 0.2 —0.008 0.69 0.018 0.05 0.019 0.00 0.009 0.34
Change in user cost of capitalt —0.051 0.2 —0.022 0.61 —0.068 0.09 —0.090 0.00 —0.038 0.34
Change in user cost of capitalt—1 —0.052 0.0 0.066 0.00 —0.054 0.00 —0.113 0.00 —0.036 0.01
Liquidity ratiot 0.120 0.0 —0.057 0.22 0.110 0.00 0.013 0.01 0.082 0.00
Liquidity ratiot—1 0.046 0.1 0.181 0.00 0.052 0.06 0.054 0.00 0.094 0.00
Investment ratiot—1* HB —0.089 0.3 —0.070 0.32 0.104 0.17 0.145 0.00 —0.092 0.21
Growth in net salest* HB 0.007 0.8 —0.055 0.10 0.023 0.47 0.039 0.00 —0.007 0.82
Growth in net salest—1* HB 0.000 1.0 0.018 0.43 —0.008 0.49 —0.010 0.16 0.004 0.76
Change in user cost of capitalt* HB 0.031 0.4 —0.019 0.68 0.032 0.40 0.052 0.00 0.021 0.58
Change in user cost of capitalt—1* HB 0.013 0.5 —0.161 0.00 0.029 0.11 0.081 0.00 —0.003 0.84
Liquidity ratiot* HB 0.030 0.4 0.139 0.01 0.025 0.52 0.022 0.04 0.038 0.31
Liquidity Ratiot—1* HB 0.014 0.7 —0.070 0.25 0.009 0.82 0.060 0.00 —0.058 0.19
Sargan test: 279.7 1.0 127.8 1.00 265.4 1.00 246.3 1.00 293.8 0.98
m1: — 14.7 0.0 — 5.7 0.00 — 13.5 0.00 — 5.2 0.00 — 13.7 0.00
m2: 0.3 0.8 — 0.6 0.55 — 0.3 0.78 — 0.7 0.48 0.3 0.73
Long-run elasticities:
Growth in net sales 0.002 0.9 0.072 0.04 —0.001 0.97 —0.009 0.05 0.037 0.22
Growth in net sales * HB 0.010 0.8 0.032 0.27 0.016 0.63 0.018 0.08 0.029 0.32
Change in user cost of capital —0.121 0.0 0.044 0.40 —0.126 0.02 —0.176 0.00 —0.085 0.13
Change in user cost of capital * HB —0.063 0.2 —0.128 0.01 —0.071 0.15 —0.069 0.00 —0.058 0.20
Liquidity ratio 0.194 0.0 0.125 0.01 0.166 0.00 0.058 0.00 0.204 0.00
Liquidity ratio * HB 0.222 0.0 0.181 0.00 0.224 0.00 0.147 0.00 0.163 0.00
Note: Time dummies and a constant were included but not reported.
Instrumental variables: all lagged levels of endogenous and predetermined variables.
Small firms are firms with less than 55 employees; young firms are firms established in the last ten years.
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Table 3
Investment Function
Large Banks GMM-two step estimator in first differences
Coefficient P>lzl Coefficient P>lzl Coefficient P>lzl Coefficient P>lzl Coefficient P>lzl
all young old small large
Number of observations 3,427 601 2,826 521 2,906
Number of firms 939 249 762 191 788
Investment ratiot-1 0.081 0.0 —0.012 0.73 —0.004 0.91 —0.106 0.00 0.069 0.06
Growth in net salest —0.043 0.0 —0.017 0.25 —0.045 0.01 0.011 0.00 0.003 0.88
Growth in net salest-1 0.009 0.4 0.016 0.31 0.014 0.15 0.012 0.00 0.007 0.53
Change in user cost of capitalt —0.091 0.0 —0.072 0.07 —0.088 0.01 —0.051 0.00 —0.095 0.00
Change in user cost of capitalt-1 —0.021 0.1 —0.010 0.64 —0.029 0.04 —0.091 0.00 —0.022 0.11
Liquidity ratiot 0.015 0.4 —0.005 0.87 0.032 0.08 —0.019 0.00 0.029 0.07
Liquidity ratiot-1 0.090 0.0 0.292 0.00 0.060 0.00 0.041 0.00 0.138 0.00
Investment ratiot-1* HB —0.022 0.7 —0.080 0.06 0.100 0.05 0.090 0.00 —0.023 0.69
Growth in net salest* HB 0.126 0.0 —0.010 0.60 0.114 0.00 0.027 0.00 0.047 0.07
Growth in net salest-1* HB 0.005 0.7 —0.019 0.27 —0.007 0.61 —0.024 0.00 0.000 0.99
Change in user cost of capitalt* HB 0.026 0.5 —0.021 0.71 0.065 0.05 —0.062 0.00 0.028 0.40
Change in user cost of capitalt-1* HB 0.000 1.0 —0.095 0.00 0.022 0.22 0.041 0.00 —0.011 0.55
Liquidity ratiot* HB —0.039 0.2 0.065 0.05 —0.038 0.16 0.023 0.00 —0.054 0.04
Liquidity ratiot-1* HB 0.021 0.5 —0.159 0.00 0.052 0.08 0.040 0.00 —0.012 0.70
Sargan test: 265.3 1.0 115.4 1.00 228.1 1.00 161.1 1.00 263.1 1.00
m1: — 10.0 0.0 — 4.2 0.00 — 8.6 0.00 — 3.3 0.00 — 9.2 0.00
m2: 0.1 0.9 — 0.6 0.53 0.4 0.69 — 1.0 0.32 0.5 0.60
Long-run elasticities:
Growth in net sales * HB 0.103 0.0 —0.028 0.21 0.085 0.00 0.026 0.00 0.059 0.02
Change in user cost of capital * HB —0.091 0.0 —0.181 0.00 —0.032 0.46 —0.160 0.00 —0.105 0.01
Liquidity ratio * HB 0.093 0.0 0.176 0.00 0.117 0.00 0.083 0.00 0.105 0.00
Note: Time dummies and a constant were included but not reported.
Instrumental variables: all lagged levels of endogenous and predetermined variables.
Small firms are firms with less than 55 employees; young firms are firms established in the last ten years.
Large banks are banks with assets of more than EUR 24.1 million.
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Table 4
Investment Function
Medium-Sized Banks GMM-two step estimator in first differences
Coefficient P>lzl Coefficient P>lzl Coefficient P>lzl Coefficient P>lzl Coefficient P>lzl
all young old small large
Number of observations 2,184 328 1,856 378 1,806
Number of firms 708 154 581 151 583
Investment ratiot-1 —0.171 0.0 —0.152 0.00 —0.136 0.00 —0.240 0.00 —0.166 0.00
Growth in net salest 0.040 0.0 0.092 0.00 0.019 0.17 0.008 0.28 0.016 0.21
Growth in net salest-1 0.006 0.6 0.064 0.00 0.007 0.38 0.011 0.09 —0.003 0.74
Change in user cost of capitalt 0.008 0.8 0.071 0.00 0.003 0.90 —0.042 0.04 —0.025 0.29
Change in user cost of capitalt-1 0.011 0.4 0.090 0.00 —0.021 0.13 —0.138 0.00 0.001 0.95
Liquidity ratiot 0.082 0.0 0.092 0.00 0.119 0.00 0.189 0.00 0.092 0.00
Liquidity ratiot-1 0.069 0.0 0.203 0.00 0.076 0.00 0.110 0.00 0.079 0.00
Investment ratiot-1* HB 0.311 0.0 —0.076 0.00 0.215 0.00 0.169 0.00 0.269 0.00
Growth in net salest* HB -0.014 0.5 —0.030 0.00 0.016 0.33 0.011 0.16 0.040 0.01
Growth in net salest-1* HB 0.017 0.2 —0.020 0.08 0.018 0.08 0.017 0.01 0.027 0.02
Change in user cost of capitalt* HB 0.012 0.7 0.095 0.00 —0.029 0.33 —0.072 0.00 —0.005 0.85
Change in user cost of capitalt-1* HB —0.033 0.1 —0.190 0.00 0.009 0.58 0.049 0.00 —0.015 0.36
Liquidity ratiot* HB 0.012 0.7 —0.015 0.22 -0.040 0.06 —0.120 0.00 —0.061 0.01
Liquidity ratiot-1* HB 0.021 0.4 —0.063 0.01 0.031 0.10 0.019 0.20 0.069 0.00
Sargan test: 262.7 1.0 98.9 1.00 255.4 1.00 121.6 1.00 293.9 0.98
m1: — 8.2 0.0 — 2.5 0.01 — 7.3 0.00 — 2.5 0.01 — 7.5 0.00
m2: 0.0 1.0 — 1.1 0.30 0.7 0.49 — 0.7 0.52 — 0.2 0.85
Long-run elasticities:
Growth in net sales * HB 0.058 0.0 0.086 0.00 0.066 0.00 0.044 0.00 0.089 0.00
Change in user cost of capital * HB —0.002 1.0 0.054 0.00 —0.041 0.15 —0.189 0.00 —0.050 0.03
Liquidity ratio * HB 0.215 0.0 0.177 0.00 0.201 0.00 0.184 0.00 0.200 0.00
Note: Time dummies and a constant were included but not reported.
Instrumental variables: all lagged levels of endogenous and predetermined variables.
Small firms are firms with less than 55 employees; young firms are firms established in the last ten years.
Medium-sized banks are banks with assets of more than EUR 3.2 million and less than EUR 24.1 million.
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Table 5
Investment Function
Small Banks GMM-two step estimator in first differences
Coefficient P>lzl Coefficient P>lzl Coefficient P>lzl Coefficient P>lzl Coefficient P>lzl
all young old small large
Number of observations 1,539 197 1,342 446 1,093
Number of firms 487 91 424 162 359
Investment ratiot-1 —0.260 0.0 —0.551 0.00 —0.233 0.00 —0.383 0.00 —0.175 0.00
Growth in net salest 0.029 0.0 0.021 0.61 0.048 0.00 —0.037 0.00 0.054 0.00
Growth in net salest-1 0.022 0.0 —0.177 0.00 0.059 0.00 0.005 0.41 0.010 0.01
Change in user cost of capitalt —0.066 0.0 —0.108 0.01 —0.009 0.35 —0.082 0.00 0.009 0.23
Change in user cost of capitalt-1 —0.053 0.0 0.131 0.00 —0.071 0.00 —0.195 0.00 —0.025 0.00
Liquidity ratiot 0.119 0.0 0.069 0.04 0.115 0.00 0.174 0.00 0.105 0.00
Liquidity ratiot-1 0.110 0.0 0.271 0.00 0.052 0.00 —0.055 0.00 0.122 0.00
Investment ratiot-1* HB 0.333 0.0 0.460 0.00 0.315 0.00 0.181 0.00 0.203 0.00
Growth in net salest* HB —0.040 0.0 —0.007 0.89 —0.060 0.00 0.034 0.00 —0.049 0.00
Growth in net salest-1* HB —0.027 0.0 0.151 0.00 —0.056 0.00 —0.040 0.00 0.012 0.00
Change in user cost of capitalt* HB —0.020 0.3 —0.171 0.04 —0.031 0.04 0.105 0.00 —0.103 0.00
Change in user cost of capitalt-1* HB 0.000 1.0 —0.232 0.00 0.030 0.05 0.174 0.00 —0.078 0.00
Liquidity ratiot* HB —0.062 0.0 0.003 0.91 —0.036 0.00 —0.027 0.33 —0.066 0.00
Liquidity ratiot-1* HB 0.011 0.5 —0.099 0.03 0.031 0.03 0.220 0.00 —0.040 0.00
Sargan test: 259.7 1.0 50.3 1.00 254.7 1.00 138.7 1.00 239.7 1.00
m1: — 6.2 0.0 — 1.8 0.08 — 5.8 0.00 — 2.4 0.02 — 5.4 0.00
m2: — 2.1 0.0 — 0.4 0.67 — 2.5 0.01 — 1.3 0.19 — 2.2 0.03
Long-run elasticities:
Growth in net sales * HB —0.019 0.2 —0.012 0.57 —0.009 0.50 —0.031 0.00 0.028 0.00
Change in user cost of capital * HB —0.150 0.0 —0.349 0.00 —0.088 0.00 0.002 0.66 —0.203 0.00
Liquidity ratio * HB 0.193 0.0 0.224 0.00 0.175 0.00 0.259 0.00 0.124 0.00
Note: Time dummies and a constant were included but not reported.
Instrumental variables: all lagged levels of endogenous and predetermined variables.
Small firms are firms with less than 55 employees; young firms are firms established in the last ten years.
Small banks are banks with assets of less than EUR 3.2 million.
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1 Introduction
Financial sector development can affect growth mainly via three channels.2)
First, a deepening of the financial sector can raise the fraction of savings
funnelled to investment by reducing the costs of financial intermediation
through increased competition. Second, financial sector development can
contribute to economic growth by allocating capital more efficiently to those
investment projects with the highest risk-adjusted returns. Third, it can
influence the saving rate of households, thereby affecting investment and
growth. This paper is primarily concerned with the first and second channels:
it tests the influence of cash-constraints on the investment decisions of the firm.
One of the main roles of the financial system is to transfer funds from agents
with a surplus of resources to agents with a deficit of resources. By discrim-
inating between firms that potentially underinvest and firms that potentially
overinvest on the basis of the corporate governance structure, we throw light on
the efficiency of firms when deciding on investment. This entails important
policy conclusions for policymakers and financial sector regulatory bodies alike.
For investment efficiency it matters which type of firms gets less resources and
which type of firm gets more funds for investment. Thus, in the course of
financial sector development, policymakers should make sure that it is under-
investing firms that get more liquid funds for investment and overinvesting firms
be constrained in their use of funds.
This paper asks whether the corporate governance characteristics of a firm
affect the efficiency of corporate investment. We find significant and robust
differences of the investment-cash flow relation across different control cate-
gories. For nonfinancial Austrian firms, this relationship depends on the identity
of the controlling owners. In particular, we find positive investment-cash flow
sensitivities for family-controlled firms indicating cash constraints and under-
investment. Family control is likely to induce information asymmetries between
inside controlling shareholders and outside financiers concerning the quality and
riskiness of investment driving a wedge between the costs of external and
internal financing. State control also induces informational asymmetries
between (ultimate) shareholders (i.e. the citizens) and firm managers. How-
ever, the positive investment-cash flow elasticities we find for these firms
suggest managerial discretion and overinvestment. Banks as large controlling
shareholders appear to reduce both asymmetric information and managerial
discretion. Rates-of-return calculations corroborate these conclusions.
We interpret this evidence as being consistent with corporate governance
features affecting both the discretion that managers have to use available funds,
and their ability to acquire additional funds for investment. Thus, corporate
1 Klaus Gugler — University of Vienna, Department of Economics, BWZ — Bru‹nner Stra§e 72, A 1210 Vienna,
Austria, Tel.: (0043-1) 4277/37467, Fax: (0043-1) 4277/37498, e-mail: klaus.gugler@univie.ac.at.
I am indebted to Dennis C. Mueller for various comments and suggestions. I also thank Paul Geroski, Andrea
Gaunersdorfer, and Maria Valderrama for helpful comments.
2 The literature on the effects of financial development generally reaches the conclusion that financial deepening
indeed increases the growth rate of the economy; see King and Levine (1993), Rajan and Zingales (1998),
and Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001) among others.
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governance features of bank-based (Edwards and Fischer, 1994) or insider
(Franks and Mayer, 1997)1) systems of finance must not be neglected when
testing hypotheses about capital market efficiency.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a short description of our
two main hypotheses, the cash constraints hypothesis (CCH) and the managerial
discretion hypothesis (MDH), and links them to the ownership and control
structure of firms. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the main
results, while section 5 concludes.
2 Cash Constraints, Managerial Discretion,
and Corporate Governance
Chart 1 presents the two main hypotheses. With perfect capital markets, the
supply of funds, S, is a horizontal line at r, the risk-adjusted market rate of
interest. Internal and external funds are perfect substitutes. The demand for
capital investment, D, is assumed to be downward sloping. In the neoclassical
theory a firms investment depends only on this demand and its cost of capital,
and is independent of the size of its cash flow. A neoclassical firm invests up to
I, where the expected marginal profitability of investment equals its marginal
cost. In this Modigliani/Miller (1958) world, financial factors are irrelevant.
The more developed a financial system is, the more firms will resemble neo-
classical firms in a given country.
In contrast to the neoclassical theory, the Cash Constraints Hypothesis (CCH)
posits a rising cost of capital schedule once a firm enters the external capital
market due to asymmetric information causing adverse selection.2) With rising
costs of external capital the supply of capital, S, is dependent on the level of
cash flows. At cash flow CFa the firm is constrained to invest Ia. It under-
invests. If cash flow increases from CFa to CFb, the cost of funds schedule shifts
from SðCFaÞto SðCFbÞand the firm invests Ib. Thus, the CCH implies a
positive sensitivity of investment to cash flow.3) Other empirical predictions
are (1) dividends should (essentially) be zero, (2) the marginal return on invest-
ment should exceed the firms cost of capital.
A positive investment cash-flow sensitivity is also expected according to
the Managerial Discretion Hypothesis (MDH).4) Following Marris (1964, 1998),
1 Franks and Mayer (1997) characterize an insider system of corporate governance as one with (1) few listed
companies, (2) a large number of substantial share stakes and (3) large intercorporate equityholdings. The
Austrian system is characterized by all of these features (see Gugler, 2002, and Gugler et al., 2001).
2 Myers and Majluf (1984) posit that firms may be cash-constrained because outside investors have less
information than the owner-managers about the true value of assets or investment opportunities. Cash-
constrained managers maximize incumbent shareholder wealth by foregoing some positive NPV projects rather
than issue equity, which is currently undervalued due to asymmetric information. Adverse selection can also
lead to credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Uncollateralized credit could be denied to firms if adverse
selection of loan applicants leads banks to choose an interest rate at which the market does not clear.
3 Indeed, if none of the companies could raise any external capital, S would be a vertical line at the firms cash
flow. Their investments should exactly equal their cash flows, and the coefficient on cash flow in an investment
equation would equal 1.0.
4 Managerialist theories of the firm (Baumol, 1959; Williamson, 1963; Marris, 1963, 1964; Grabowski and
Mueller, 1972) and the principal agent literature (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986) question the
profit maximization assumption. For a recent survey of the influence of asymmetric information and agency on
the efficiency of corporate investment, see Stein (2001).
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managers utility U ¼ UðgðIÞ; pðdÞÞ is an increasing function of growth g, which
rises with investment, and a decreasing function of the probability of corporate
governance intervention, p. This probability is assumed to be zero at the
optimal investment I, where the value of the firm is at its maximum,
V  ¼ Djr, equal to the discounted present value of optimum dividends. As
I increases beyond I the value of the firm falls and p rises with the difference
between optimum and actual dividends, d ¼ V   V ¼ ðD DÞjr. In Anglo-
Saxon market-based systems external controls such as hostile takeovers, may
be triggered by such overinvestment. In insider systems, such as those in
Continental Europe, dominant shareholders may step in. Managerial invest-
ment, Im in chart 1, and dividends, CFm  Im, are chosen to maximize
managerial utility by equating the marginal gain in utility derived from increas-
ing growth by increasing investment to the marginal decline in utility from the
increase in the probability of corporate governance intervention caused by the
corresponding reduction in dividends. That is, the optimization problem of the
manager is max U ¼ U ½gðIÞ; pððD DÞjrÞ s:t: CF ¼ Dþ I with respect to
I.1) Im is determined by the intersection of the managers indirect marginal
utility of investment schedule and the indirect marginal (dis)utility schedule,
MU1 ¼ ðU=gÞðdg=dIÞ ¼MDI ¼ ðU=pÞðdp=dIÞ. A cash-flow increase
from CFm to CFm0 shifts MDI to MDI 0 in chart 1: The decline in managerial
utility from incremental investment is now lower at every investment level,
because the threat of governance intervention is lower when dividends are
higher. The optimal investment for managers increases from Im to Im0 and
dividends increase from CFm  Im to CFm0  Im0. A cash-flow increase is like
a shift in the managerial budget constraint, and allows managers to increase both
investment and dividends. Control failure leads to cheap internal finance and
managers overinvest. The MDH implies that (1) the investment-cash flow
coefficient is positive (but less than one), (2) dividends are positive, and
(3) the marginal return on investment is below the cost of capital.2)
In what follows we discuss the dependency of the CCH and the MDH on the
ownership and control structure of the firm, by portraying the four most
important categories of controlling shareholders in Austria, i.e. banks, the state,
families, and foreign firms.3)
Potentially, bank equity holdings reduce the asymmetry of information
between shareholders and financiers and/or managers. Banks can gain an infor-
mational advantage from equity holdings in commercial firms via ownership
disclosure rights, representation on the supervisory board, nominating manag-
1 This managerial budget constraint assumes for simplicity that internal cash flow is the only source of funds,
i.e. that new debt and new equity issues are zero.
2 The CCH and the MDH are also in line with a life-cycle model of the firm (Mueller, 1972, and Grabowski
and Mueller, 1975) according to which young, fast growing firms use internal finance to mitigate transaction
costs of external finance, and large, mature firms use internal finance to maximize growth at the expense of
shareholder wealth. See also Kathuria and Mueller (1995) and Carpenter (1995).
3 Institutional investors, such as pension funds, are unimportant in Austria. It has been possible to form pension
funds only since 1990 (see Jud, 1993). Very similar ownership patterns are observed especially in Germany (see
Boehmer, 1998) but also many other countries worldwide (see La Porta et al., 1997, 1999, and Barca and
Becht, 2001).
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ers, or information acquisition through bank lending. When a bank owns a large
stake in a firm to which it lends, its residual control rights lead it to monitor the
firms investments more closely (Gertner et al., 1994). Therefore, we hypothe-
size that bank-controlled firms do not exhibit positive investment-cash flow
sensitivities.
The government is a large controlling shareholder in many corporations
worldwide.1) The MDH is expected to hold for state-controlled firms, because
citizens can be viewed as very dispersed ultimate owners (the principals) with
insufficient incentives and an ability to monitor the state (the first agent),
which in turn has mixed incentives to monitor managers (the ultimate agents).
The de facto control rights belong to managers, bureaucrats, or politicians who
typically have goals very different from firm value maximization (Shleifer and
Vishny, 1997; Mueller, 1998). Overspending, short-run employment gains (and
thereby buying votes) are likely incentives in state-controlled firms. On the
other hand, cash constraints are not expected, if the state is a major shareholder
because the incentive alignment between controlling managers and citizens (as
ultimate owners) is weak. There is no reason for managers of state-controlled
firms to favor existing over new shareholders and not issue equity, as hypothe-
sized in the asymmetric information hypothesis of Myers and Majluf (1984).
Nor does credit rationing seem likely, since the risk of bankruptcy is low and
there is no adverse selection of loan applicants.2) Therefore, any positive invest-
ment-cash flow coefficient for state-controlled firms must be attributed to the
managerial discretion hypothesis.
Cash constraints should be most severe for family-controlled firms, where
owner-managers maximize existing shareholder wealth. Hadlock (1998),
extending Myers and Majluf (1984), demonstrates that investment-cash flow
sensitivities rise with managerial incentive alignment for firms with good invest-
ment opportunities. Almost by definition, managerial incentive alignment is
very high in family-controlled firms. Furthermore, information transfer to the
capital market is most difficult in these closely held firms. This increases
asymmetry of information and security mispricing. Thus, family owner-man-
agers are expected to forgo an investment rather than sell an underpriced
security.3)
Managerial discretion, on the other hand, is not expected in family-con-
trolled firms. Managers and large family shareholders are either the same
persons, and therefore, the residual claimants bearing (nearly) all of the costs
and receiving (nearly) all of the benefits of their actions (incentive alignment),
or the large shareholder has the incentive and ability to monitor the managers.
Therefore, any positive investment-cash flow sensitivity for family-controlled
firms can be attributed to the cash constraints hypothesis.4)
1 La Porta et al. (1999) report that the state on average controls 20% of the twenty largest corporations in
27 countries in 1995; selected figures are Italy 40%, Germany 25%, France 15%, Japan 5%, US 0%, and
UK 0%.
2 Historically, in Austria banks converted debt to equity and took control of state-influenced companies in cases
of financial distress (Mathis, 1990).
3 Gugler (2001) shows that Austria has the smallest stock exchange as measured by the market capitalization to
GDP ratio in a sample of OECD countries.
4 Family owned/managed firms may, however, suffer from a lack of professionalism (see Chandler, 1990,
particularly for the UK).
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Ultimate owners of foreign firms may be banks, a foreign state or families,
and so no clear-cut a priori expectations are formed.1) Since foreign-controlled
firms are very important in Austria, we have left them in the analysis. Table 1
summarizes our predictions about cash-flow coefficients.
3 The Data and Ownership and Control Concepts
An unbalanced panel of firms is assembled to test these hypotheses. It includes
214 Austrian nonfinancial companies and spans the period 1991 to 1999. The
sample is drawn from the 600 largest corporations in Austria (the criterion for
inclusion is data availability). Balance sheet data sources are the Wirtschafts-
Trend-Zeitschriftenverlagsgesellschaft m.b.H, the Arbeiterkammer O‹ ster-
reich and Compass Verlag. Ownership data were gathered from Der Finanz-
compass and Hoppenstedts Gro§unternehmen in O‹ sterreich (several annual
editions). The sample covers around 10% of Austrian private sector employ-
ment.
To determine the ultimate owners of a corporate pyramid, one must identify
the owners at each consecutive level until the top layer of the pyramid is
reached. Direct ownership stakes are aggregated into bank (BA), state (ST),
family (FAM), nonbank domestic firm (NBD), foreign firm (FF), and dispersed
(DI) ownership. State ownership includes central, federal, and local levels of
government. Bank ownership includes equity-holdings of corporations oper-
ating in the financial sector (mostly banks). Nonbank domestic and foreign
firm ownership are holdings of nonfinancial domestic and foreign firms,
respectively. The criterion for nationality is the location of the headquarters.
Family ownership includes ownership stakes of families and individuals. Equity
holdings smaller than 5% are defined as dispersed.
Ultimate ownership is defined as the percentage equity ownership of a
shareholder at the top of the pyramid including direct ownership and indirect
ownership via other corporations. An indirect ownership stake arises through
a multiplicative ownership chain in a pyramid. An indirect ownership stake
of, for example, the state is defined as the multiplicative ownership chain,
ST;NBD2  NBD2;NBD3NBDm1;j, where ik is the direct ownership of share-
holder i in firm k and m is the layer of sample firm j (or Hierarchy, see
below). The five ultimate ownership categories are state, banks, families, foreign
firms, and dispersed. The state, families, and dispersed ownership are natural
ultimate categories. Banks are included as an ultimate category to test hypoth-
eses about bank control. Because ownership data for foreign firms are lacking,
they are also defined as an ultimate category.
Direct and ultimate ownership measure cash-flow rights, i.e. the right to
receive a proportional stake of the cash flows of the company. The degree of
control is likely to follow a step function, however. The third concept, therefore,
is the largest ultimate shareholder (LUS). Full control over a company is attributed to
the LUS, who is either the state, a bank, a family, or a foreign firm. A LUS must
meet the constraint that each individual holding in its ownership chain is larger
than 25%. (By definition, therefore, control cannot be attributed to dispersed
shareholders.) By far the largest part of LUSs in Austria (90%) maintain a chain
1 Unfortunately, we have no data about these ultimate owners.
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of majority ownership stakes. This guarantees a controlling influence in each
layer of the pyramid.
Chart 2 helps clarify the concepts. OMV AG is the largest Austrian corpo-
ration as measured by turnover. It is located at the third layer of the pyramid
(Hierarchy = 3). The ownership structure of OMV AG is simple but repre-
sentative for the whole sample. Direct ownership by O‹ IAG (O‹ sterreichische
Industrieholding Aktiengesellschaft, classified as a nonbank domestic firm) is
49.9%. IPIC, a company from Abu Dhabi, holds 19.6% directly. The rest,
30.5%, is freely circulating on the Vienna stock exchange and classified as
direct dispersed ownership. The Republic of Austria does not hold equity
directly; however, the state ultimately holds 49.9% of OMVAG since it wholly
owns O‹ IAG. A foreign firm ultimately holds 19.6% of the cash-flow rights, and
the 30.5% freely circulating also translates into the same amount of ultimate
ownership. Banks and families have neither direct nor indirect holdings. OMV
AG is ultimately controlled by the Republic of Austria (the LUS) and therefore
classified as a state-controlled company, since all stakes in the controlling chain
are larger than 25%.
Table 2 exhibits summary statistics of direct and ultimate ownership and of
who ultimately controls Austrian firms. The two most important ownership
categories are nonbank domestic firms with 37.2% of the equity and foreign
firms. Another nonbank domestic firm has a large stake in 100 of the 214 firms.
Foreign firms own 32.8% of the equity directly, 35.6% ultimately, and are the
largest ultimate shareholders in 80 firms (37.4%). The largest difference
between ultimate and direct ownership arises with family-owned firms. While
families hold only 8.9% of the shares directly, their holdings increase to 24.6%
once indirect shareholdings are included. Families ultimately control 27.1% of
the firms.
Ownership concentration is very high in Austria (see table 3). The largest
shareholder holds on average 78.5% of equity (median 90%). Only 9.8% of the
firms are notmajority-controlled. Ownership concentration remains high across
owner categories. Pyramid structures tend to be simple with one or two large
owners at each level. The average pyramid consists of 4.6 levels of companies
including the top level (see Pyr.layers). The average sample firm is located at
layer 3.1 (see Hierarchy). Only one quarter of firms are listed on a stock
exchange. This makes the sample ideal for testing for cash constraints, since
asymmetry of information may be large for unlisted companies.
Table 4 exhibits means and medians of important balance sheet variables.
State-controlled firms have significantly smaller cash flow to capital stock ratios,
are significantly larger, have lower dividend payout ratios, and lower indebted-
ness than other firms. Family-owned firms are the smallest. Their high bank-
debt-to-total-debt and total-debt-to-total-asset ratios suggest that they fully
exploit their credit limits. One indicator of the importance of internal capital
markets is group debt, defined as debt owed to other corporations in the same
group.1) Internal capital markets allocate much more resources in foreign-con-
1 According to paragraphs 224 and 225 Handelsgesetzbuch (Commercial Code) and ⁄ 224 Rechnungslegungs-
gesetz (Financial Reporting Act), i.e. the two main laws governing annual financial statements in Austria,
companies are obliged to provide this information. Corporations in the same group are defined as either
connected corporations (e.g. subsidiaries) or corporations in which a substantial equity participation exists.
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trolled than in family-controlled firms. The mean (median) group-debt-to-
total-debt ratios for foreign-controlled firms are 13.0 (9.5) percentage points
higher and significantly different from those of the rest of the sample.
4 Regression Analysis
4.1 An Econometric Model of Investment
If the firm maximizes the discounted flow of profits over an infinite horizon
absent delivery lags, adjustment costs, and vintage effects, capital depreciates at
a geometric rate and assuming a CES production function with  the constant
elasticity of substitution between capital and variable inputs, the relationship
between the desired (optimal) capital stock K, the level of output Y , and the
cost of capital C can be written as
Kt ¼ Ct Yt ð1Þ
where C is a function of the purchase price of new capital relative to the price of
output (see Chirinko, 1993, and Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger, 1995).
Some authors have argued that net investment is related to a distributed lag
on changes in the optimal capital stock to recognize the complexity of the
adjustment process.1) One may also introduce error-correcting behavior of
investment, i.e. investment is likely to be higher if the firm is further away
from the desired capital stock and investment spending may be less, ceteris
paribus, if the installed capital is viewed as being above the desired level. Since
from (1) it is reasonable to assume thatK and Y are cointegrated in the long run
while adjustment costs may prevent the firm from attaining the target level in
the short-run, we will follow that approach next.
Taking logs of (1), denoting logarithms with lower case letters and a ¼ ln,
we get
kt ¼ a ct þ yt ð2Þ
If there are no adjustment costs, kt would be the optimal capital stock for a
profit-maximizing firm with a constant-returns-to-scale CES production func-
tion. Adjustment processes may be complex, and one way to arrive at a tract-
able model and account for adjustment costs is to nest (2) within an autore-
gressive-distributed lag model, for example an ADL (1,1) model of the form
kt ¼ 0 þ 1kt1 þ 0yt þ 1yt1  ’0ct  ’1ct1 þ ut ð3Þ
If we further assume that the change in the capital stock can be described by
a simple partial adjustment process of the form
kt ¼ 
ðkt  kt1Þ þ "t ð4Þ
1 E.g. Bean (1981), Bond et al. (1999); but see Anderson (1981). For a comparison of different investment
models, see Mairesse et al. (1999).
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where some constant fraction 
 of the gap between the actual and the
desired levels of the capital stock is closed in each period, we get the error
correction specification as
kt ¼ 
0  
ð1 1Þkt1 þ 
0yt þ 
ð0 þ 1Þyt1
 
’0ct  
ð’0 þ ’1Þct1  
ð’0 þ ’1Þct2 ð5Þ
 
ð1 
1Þðkt2  yt2Þ þ ½
ð0 þ 1  ð1 
1Þyt2 þ  1
with  t ¼ 
ut þ "t  1"t1. Assuming again that (5) holds for every firm, that
the variation in the user cost of capital can be controlled for by including
additive year-specific effects ðtÞ and firm-specific effects ðiÞ, that s captures
y, that the cash-flow terms enter additively, and finally using the approximation
that kit  Iit=Ki;t1  i, we get the dynamic investment equation
Igit
Ki;t1
¼ i þ t þ 
Igi;t1
Ki;t2
þ 	0sit þ 	1si;t1 þ !ðk sÞi;t2 þ si;t2
þ 0Pi;t1
Ki;t1
þ 1Depi;t1
Ki;t1
þ  it ð6Þ
If ! < 0 error correction leads to more future investment in case of the capital
stock being below the desired level, and  ¼ 0i is consistent with long-run
constant returns to scale.
Profits and depreciation, the components of cash flow, are supposed to test
our predictions as presented in table 1. The main critique of investment-cash
flow regressions is that current cash flow may proxy for future investment
opportunities and not availability of internal funds (Kaplan and Zingales,
1997).1) To accommodate that critique, we apply a number of controls in
our estimation strategy: Depreciation and profits enter the regression models
individually and lagged one period. Depreciation seems less likely to proxy for
future investment opportunities. If cash constraints are present, it should not
matter whether additional funds come from profits or depreciation, and their
coefficients should be equal. With capital stock as a deflator, the firm-specific
intercept terms can be interpreted as the constant rates of depreciation. There-
fore, if replacement needs are picked up by these fixed firm effects, depreci-
ation is left to serve as a cash-flow variable.2) Moreover, fixed firm effects
subtract firm-specific means from all variables removing all time invariant
determinants of firm level investment from (6). Thus, fixed firm effects control
for investment opportunities differing systematically across firms, leaving the
cash-flow terms to pick up the effects of within firm variation in internal funds
on investment.
Additionally, equation (6) is estimated separately for bank-, state-, family-,
and foreign-controlled firms. Thus we stress the differences in cash-flow
coefficients across control categories, which are unbiased estimates of the true
1 See also the discussion in Fazzari et al. (2000), and Kaplan and Zingales (2000).
2 Tests for fixed effects are highly significant. A Hausman test indicates that a random effects model would be
inappropriate. Our basic results are not changed if we introduce two-digit ISIC industry dummies instead of
fixed firm effects. These results are available upon request.
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differences. This holds true even if the internal firm variation in cash flow
(partially) proxies for future investment opportunities if our cash flow measures
are equally correlated with expected future profits across control categories. We
shall present evidence that this is indeed the case in section 4.4.
Equation (6) contains a lagged dependent variable, and OLS (ordinary least
squares) would be inconsistent in the presence of unobserved firm-specific
effects. Therefore, we estimate (6) by a systems GMM (general method of
moments) estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). This estimator eliminates firm
effects by first-differencing; it also controls for possible endogeneity of current
explanatory variables. Endogenous variables lagged two or more periods will be
valid instruments provided there is no second-order autocorrelation in the first-
differenced idiosyncratic error terms. We present tests for autocorrelations and
the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions in the tables that follow.
4.2 Basic Results
Table 5 presents our estimation results for equation (6), which includes a lagged
dependent variable and assumes error-correcting behavior, using Arellano and
Bonds one-step GMM estimator. The error-correction term is correctly signed
except for state-controlled companies, which do not display error-correcting
behavior. There is no evidence of a significant deviation from a constant returns
to scale technology, since the two-period lagged sales terms are all insignificant.
The Sargan tests do not suggest rejection of the overidentifying restrictions at
conventional levels for either control category. Finally, while there is evidence
of first order serial correlation in the residuals, the AR(2) test statistics reveal an
absence of second order serial correlation in the first differenced errors and
thus that the instruments are valid.
In general, the evidence in favor of our hypotheses as outlined in table 1 is
very strong. The cash flow-related coefficients of family- and state-controlled
firms are significant at the 5% level or better. The cash-flow terms for bank-
controlled firms do not attain significance. All control categories display statisti-
cally significantly different cash-flow sensitivities from bank-controlled firms.
The largest differences in the effect of cash flow on investment are obtained for
family-controlled firms.
The results of table 5 suggest that the corporate governance structure of the
firm has an important effect on the sensitivity of investment to cash flow. Cash-
flow sensitivities consistently vary across control categories. In particular, both
family- and state-controlled firms exhibit positive and different sensitivities
from bank-controlled firms. Agency theory suggests that cash constraints are
responsible for the findings for family-controlled firms, while managerial dis-
cretionary spending may explain the investment-cash flow sensitivity for state-
controlled firms.
Investment-cash flow regressions face the criticism that current cash flow
merely predicts future values of sales or cash flow and thus investment, and is
not (only) a flow of funds variable. We tackle this criticism in the next section.
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4.3 Does Cash Flow Proxy for Differential Investment Profitability?
This paper has already applied several ways of circumventing the major criticism
of using cash flow as a proxy for the internal availability of funds: First, cash
flow was divided into its components depreciation and profits, and the individ-
ual coefficient estimates compared; second, the components were lagged one
period to account for availability and time needed for managerial information
processing; third, fixed-firm effects were included to capture firm-specific
depreciation rates and investment opportunities, and fourth, differences in
cash-flow coefficients from the base category bank-controlled firms are more
likely to be invariant to future returns on investment.
This section explores this last argument in greater detail. Similar in spirit to
Bond et al. (1999), we ask whether cash flow is a differently informative pre-
dictor of future sales or cash flows across control categories. In particular, our
conclusion that family-controlled firms are more likely to be cash-constrained
than bank-controlled firms would be undermined if family-controlled firms
cash flows merely better predict future values of sales or cash flow and thus
investment. We perform this exercise by estimating a sales and a cash-flow
equation. The independent variables in the sales equation include lagged sales
and cash-flow terms up to period t 2. Thus a joint test of significance of the
cash-flow coefficients in the sales equation can be interpreted as a conventional
Granger causality test (see recently Hall et al., 1999). The time series proper-
ties of cash flow are explored using an AR(2) process.
Table 6 presents the results. Since both equations contain lagged dependent
variables and firm-specific effects, we estimate by Arellano and Bonds one-step
GMM estimator. We allow all coefficients to differ across control categories by
interacting all explanatory variables with dummies indicating the identity of the
controlling owner. In the sales equation, the sum of the cash-flow terms of
family-controlled firms is smaller than the sum of the cash-flow terms of bank-
controlled firms. In the cash-flow equation, cash flow does not predict future
cash flow differently across control categories. These findings contradict the
hypothesis that cash flow proxies better for demand expectations or future
profitability of investment for family-controlled firms than for other firms.
5 Conclusions
This paper presents evidence supporting both the managerial discretion and
cash constraints hypotheses. The support for each hypothesis is directly related
to the governance structure of the firm. Many family-controlled firms appear to
suffer from cash constraints. Family owners seem to be unwilling to issue
underpriced equity and give up control of the companies they founded to
finance investment. In contrast, agents of the state have incentives for short-
term asset and employment maximization. They appear to invest their free cash
flow rather than paying it out to shareholders or citizens. From agency theory
this comes as no surprise, since ultimate owners of state-controlled firms (i.e.
the citizens) are very weak monitors. Banks as providers of equity appear to
improve the governance of companies, since we do not find cash flow-induced
investment for bank-controlled firms. A number of robustness checks corrob-
orate these conclusions.
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This paper started from the assumption that financial sector development
can affect growth mainly via three channels. We presented microeconomic
evidence that the financial sector is likely to influence the efficiency with which
investment funds are allocated to investment projects. We stress that there exist
important differences in the efficiency of investment across types of firms. We
find that some firms potentially underinvest and at the same time in a given
country, some firms potentially overinvest. Thus, underinvesting firms should get
more liquid funds for investment and overinvesting firms should be constrained in
their discretionary use of funds. Financial regulatory bodies should keep this in
mind in the course of European capital market reform.
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Table 1
Predictions about Cash-Flow Coefficients
Identity of Large and
Controlling Owner
The Cash Constraints
Hypothesis
The Managerial
Discretion
Hypothesis
Banks 0 0
State 0 +
Family + 0
Foreign firms ? ?
Note: A 0 means that we predict a zero cash-flow coefficient and, therefore, that the hypothesis is not valid for the respective subsample of firms, a +
means that the prediction is a positive and significant cash-flow coefficient and that the hypothesis is valid for the respective subsample of firms, and a ?
means an indeterminate prediction.
Table 2
Who Controls Austria?
(Number of firms where stake of respective category is positive in parentheses)
Banks State Family Foreign Firms Nonbank
domestic
firms
Dispersed
owners
Direct Ownership1) 5.2 8.7 8.9 32.8 37.2 7.4
(Percent of total equity) (23) (23) (33) (90) (100) (58)
Ultimate Ownership1) 8.7 17.6 24.6 35.6 — 13.3
(Percent of total equity) (40) (55) (68) (98) — (80)
Largest Ultimate Shareholder1) 14.5 21.0 27.1 37.4 — —
(Percent of firms) (31) (45) (58) (80) — —
1) Sample A: 214 firms.
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Table 3
Ownership Concentration and Pyramiding
Ownership concentration Pyramiding Percent listed
Stake 1 (%) Stake 2 (%) Stake 3 (%) Pyr. layers Hierarchy
ALL (214) 78.5 11.3 1.6 4.6 3.1 24.6
Bank-controlled firms (31) 63.4 20.2 3.6 5.3 3.0 35.5
State-controlled firms (45) 77.7 9.3 0.6 4.7 3.1 17.8
Family-controlled firms (58) 74.3 12.1 3.2 4.0 3.1 24.1
Foreign-controlled firms (80) 87.8 8.5 0.9 3.4 2.5 11.3
1) Note: Pyr.layers and Hierarchy for foreign-controlled firms are not literally comparable to the other categories since we do not know the ultimate
owners of these foreign firms. Stake 1, 2, 3 ... Largest second, third average stake. Pyr.layers ... Average of total number of layers in the pyramid. Hierarchy ...
Average of hierarchical layers of the sample firm.
Table 4
Means and Medians of Annual Values
Control All1) Banks State Family Foreign
No. of firms 214 31 45 58 80
Total Sales in ATS million
Mean 2,680 2,007 (a) 4,638 (a) 1,467 (a) 2,720 ( )
Median 1,325 1,281 ( ) 2,776 (b) 1,103 (b) 1,245 ( )
Number of Employees
Mean 1,050 1,113 ( ) 1,480 (a) 766 (a) 990 ( )
Median 673 689 ( ) 1,075 (b) 570 (b) 571 (b)
Sales Growth Rate (%)
Mean 4.0 2.2 ( ) 4.8 ( ) 5.0 ( ) 3.5 ( )
Median 2.1 1.6 ( ) 3.1 ( ) 1.8 ( ) 1.9 ( )
I/K (%)
Mean 21.5 23.7 (a) 13.0 (a) 21.0 ( ) 25.9 (a)
Median 19.1 23.0 (b) 10.6 (b) 19.1 ( ) 23.1 (b)
CF/K (%)
Mean 34.8 27.2 (a) 25.5 (a) 29.7 (a) 46.8 (a)
Median 27.8 26.7 ( ) 11.1 (b) 27.3 ( ) 36.9 (b)
Div/CF (%)
Mean 16.2 17.4 ( ) 12.9 (a) 10.4 (a) 21.9 (a)
Median 12.5 14.1 ( ) 10.0 (b) 9.2 (b) 17.6 (b)
Bank Debt/Total Debt (%)
Mean 41.8 36.5 (a) 52.2 (a) 53.0 (a) 29.8 (a)
Median 44.8 29.6 (b) 61.5 (b) 59.5 (b) 26.8 (b)
Group Debt/Total Debt (%)
Mean 13.8 12.6 ( ) 12.5 ( ) 6.9 (a) 19.9 (a)
Median 5.5 6.0 ( ) 2.0 (b) 2.4 (b) 11.9 (b)
Total Debt/Total Assets (%)
Mean 45.6 47.5 ( ) 42.1 (a) 51.3 (a) 42.8 (a)
Median 46.4 47.1 ( ) 42.0 (b) 52.1 (b) 44.2 (b)
1) 214 firms 1991 to 1999.
Variables: Total Sales ... annual total sales, Number of Employees ... annual average of total number of employees, Sales Growth Rate ... annual growth
rates of total sales; I ... investment in physical capital; K ... capital stock obtained by applying a perpetual inventory method; CF... cash flow; Div ... dividend
payments; Bank Debt ... debt owed to banks irrespective of term at the date of balance, Group Debt ... debt owed to other corporations in the same group
irrespective of term at the date of balance, Total Debt ... total debt of the firm irrespective of term at the date of balance, Total Assets ... total assets at the
date of balance.
Comparison tests: (a) ... Mean of respective subsample is significantly different (at least at the 5% level) to the mean of the other firms, respectively. (b) ...
Sample is frompopulation with a significantly different (at least at the 5% level) distribution than the sample of the other firms, respectively (Wilcoxon rank
sum test). () No significant difference.
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Table 5
GMM Estimates for Equation 6
(z-values in parentheses)
Control/Independent Variables All Banks State Family Foreign
Igi;t1=Ki;t2 0.206 —0.14 0.16 0.122 0.249
(4.24)*** (0.73) (1.63) (1.17) (2.94)***
sit 0.054 0.080 0.060 0.090 0.055
(3.25)*** (0.92) (2.15)** (2.49)** (2.96)***
si;t1 0.036 0.150 0.008 0.014 0.057
(1.25) (1.99)** (0.55) (1.68)* (2.07)**
ðk sÞi;t2 —0.013 —0.080 0.014 —0.060 —0.095
(2.18)** (1.88)* (0.66) (1.83)* (2.47)**
si;t2 —0.000 —0.07 0.061 —0.028 —0.038
(0.01) (0.80) (1.55) (0.67) (0.90)
Pi;t1=Ki;t1 0.054 —0.051 0.071 0.195 0.020
(2.38)** (0.70) (2.56)** (4.64)*** (1.10)
Depi;t1=Ki;t1 0.060 —0.034 0.090 0.226 0.180
(3.43)*** (0.42) (3.95)*** (2.85)*** (3.24)***
Number of firms 214 31 45 58 80
Number of observations 1,208 176 246 331 455
Waldtest of joint significance of CF coefficients X2(1)=11.75*** X2(1)=0.28 X2(1)= 23.70*** X2(1)= 14.31*** X2(1)= 3.95**
Difference of CF coefficient(s)
from bank-controlled firms1) — — 0.12*** 0.25*** 0.11***
Sargan test 0.20 0.45 0.32 0.24 0.22
AR (1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR (2) 0.77 0.79 0.11 0.68 0.58
1) Estimated differences and Waldtests in this row are from the pooled regression with interaction terms for all explanatory variables with all control categories, and constraining the profits and depreciation
coefficient to be equal for each control category.
Note: All regressions include a full set of time dummies. The estimation method is one-step GMM. This method eliminates firm fixed effects by first differencing. Sargan test is the p-value of a Sargan-Hansen
test of overidentifying restrictions; AR(k) is the p-value of a test that the average autocovariance in residuals of order k is zero. Instruments include lagged levels of the dependent and the predetermined variables
dated t-2 or earlier, i.e. instruments begin with Igi;t2=Ki;t3;si;t2; si;t2; ðk sÞi;t3; Pi;t2=Ki;t2; Depi;t2=Ki;t2 .
* significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level.
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Table 6
Does Cash Flow Proxy Differently for the Future Profitability
of Investment?
Dependent variable Sit ðCF=KÞit
Independent Variables Coefficient z-value Coefficient z-value
si;t1 DBA 0.752 5.85
si;t2 DBA —0.201 —2.33
si;t1 DST 0.581 4.53
si;t2 DST —0.037 —0.32
si;t1 DFAM 0.674 6.55
si;t2 DFAM —0.139 —1.48
si;t1 DFF 0.447 2.84
si;t2 DFF 0.149 1.41
ðCF=KÞi;t1 DBA 0.109 1.70 0.256 2.11
ðCF=KÞi;t2 DBA 0.044 0.61 —0.020 —0.20
ðCF=KÞi;t1 DST 0.141 2.08 0.115 0.51
ðCF=KÞi;t2 DST 0.027 0.37 0.286 1.85
ðCF=KÞi;t1 DFAM 0.079 1.79 0.507 2.39
ðCF=KÞi;t2 DFAM —0.026 —0.46 —0.092 —0.61
ðCF=KÞi;t1 DFF —0.009 —0.28 —0.474 —0.99
ðCF=KÞi;t2 DFF —0.061 —1.29 0.289 1.25
Number of firms 214 214
Number of observations 1,208 1,208
Waldtest of joint significance of CF coefficients:
Bank control 2.40 3.13*
State control 5.29** 5.99**
Family control 0.88 4.04**
Foreign control 1.14 0.13
Wald test of difference of CF coefficients from bank-controlled
firms:
State control 0.01 0.64
Family control 0.79 0.55
Foreign control 3.49* 1.04
Note: The dependent variables are the logarithm of sales and the cash flow to capital stock ratio, respectively. DBA, DST, DFAM and DFF are dummies
equal to one, if a bank, the state, a family or a foreign firm is the largest ultimate shareholder, zero else. All regressions include a full set of time dummies.
The estimation method is one-step GMM. This method eliminates firm fixed effects by first differencing. Sargan tests do not reject overidentifying restric-
tions and autocorrelation tests do not detect second order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals. Instruments include lagged levels of the right
hand-side variables dated t-3 or earlier.
* significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level
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Moderator: Martin Schu‹rz
Ladies and gentlemen, the question to the panel is: What kind of financial
system works best for Europe?
Please share your views on the sort of financial system you consider
adequate for Europe. What problems can we expect a financial system to solve?
Are regulatory frameworks in Europe well equipped to cope with the growing
market orientation of financial systems?
Engelbert Stockhammer
Principally, I consider functional efficiency (James Tobin) to be the key pur-
pose of a financial system. In other words, what matters is how efficiently capital
is allocated for investment. On a more general note, I would like to offer some
ideas on how the goals of the financial system should tie in with overall eco-
nomic policy objectives.
Different financial systems tend to have different distribution effects, which
should be adequately reflected in the design of economic policy. What is
important in this respect is that there has been a big change in the functional
distribution of income between wages, profits, rents and interest income on
financial capital.
Household income is a case in point. Interest and dividend income of
households as a share of household income has risen strongly across countries.
In western Germany, it rose from 2% in the 1960s to roughly 7% in the mid-
1990s. In the United States, it climbed from 9% in the 1960s to 14% in the mid-
1990s.
Turning to the share of the financial sectors operating surplus (based on
national accounts data) in profits, we see that it has also increased visibly during
the same period. Again, there are marked differences among countries. In
Germany this ratio rose from 3% in the 1960s to 7% in the 1990s; in the
United States it jumped from 30% to close to 50%.
While I do not wish to imply that a fair income distribution should be an
explicit goal of financial system design, I believe that the distribution effect of
the various financial systems and structures does represent an important aspect.
Going beyond the key purpose of a financial system, another important issue
is what kind of financial system is compatible with active national economic
policies. Robert Pollin has argued that national economic policies are easier to
implement in bank-dominated financial systems, as banks can be influenced
more readily than financial markets. Beyond the need to provide functional
efficiency and to solve information and incentive problems, I would rate a good
fit with national economic polices to be a requirement for financial systems.
As to whether regulatory frameworks in Europe are well equipped to cope
with the growing market orientation of financial systems, let me quote Minsky,
who stated that financial markets are naturally unstable and that it therefore
takes government involvement — Big Government in Minskys words — to
stabilize the economy. Basically, it takes a sector that is comparatively immune
to pressure on the financial sector and thus in a position to contain crisis
situations. This ties in with the evidence presented by Franz Hahn: government
consumption dampens macroeconomic volatility. It follows that, if we accept
the deregulation and liberalization of financial sectors in Europe, we would at
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the same time need to reinforce governments fiscal functions to enable them to
effectively deal with prospective financial turbulences.
Peter Mooslechner
Much as I agree with Engelbert Stockhammer on the significance of functional
efficiency, I believe that, in order to be viable in the future, a financial system
will have to address multidimensional functions. In other words, simply priori-
tizing functions will no longer be enough. Much like economic policies, finan-
cial systems may have to be designed to optimize multiple goals; otherwise the
sheer variety of objectives and possible solutions might simply become unman-
ageable. Existing financial systems have, of course, evolved against widely differ-
ing backdrops. Even leaving aside the debate pitching the Anglo-American
system against the continental European system, it is a tall order to put forward
a proposition for a financial system for Europe as a whole, given the strong
regional differences that exist within the European continent. After all, the
financial structures and functions needed in a country such as Austria, where the
capital market is underdeveloped, will differ from those required in, say, France
or the Netherlands.
There is a danger that we expect too much of financial systems, or that
financial systems control too much in an economy. At any rate, I would consider
sudden sweeping systemic changes to be basically unfavorable, which is why
such steps should be avoided. An important issue linked with the evolution of an
economy and its degree of economic development is a sharp rise in company
size coupled with a high turnover rate of businesses (owing to changes in
ownership, insolvency, etc.). Assuming that we can adequately pin down the
requirements in the first place, which financial systems deliver best? How, for
instance, can differences in preferences across (continental) Europe be
reflected? What can be done about a financial system under which the use of
risk capital has evidently been promoted for 20, 30 years at a huge cost for a
small overall gain?
Ultimately, the preferences of the business sector are equally problematic.
Can we actually blame companies for failing to invest their internal funds
adequately? This is more or less one of the conclusions at which Hahn arrives
in his paper when stating that the best way to use these funds would for one
(kind of) company be to invest less, but for another to invest more — which
implies that in different cases it takes significantly different investment decisions
to produce the best result.
In my opinion, a financial system that we would consider capable of pro-
ducing optimum results would, overall, control too much in an economy.
Perhaps we should concentrate on letting financial markets execute their multi-
dimensional functions within safety margins rather than seek an optimum, and
perhaps our steering efforts should above all be aimed at generally avoiding
negative effects on the economy.
Franz Hahn
I consider the difference between the Anglo-American financial system and the
continental European system to be overrated. When it comes to the function of
financing, there are no truly relevant differences: in both systems internal
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financing plays the key role, and the differences that exist in external financing
reflect above all regulatory differences. Basically, U.S. companies tend to tap the
bond market, whereas their continental European counterparts will in most
cases take out bank loans.
I see the primary role of financial markets in allocating and diversifying risk.
When risks are concentrated or when financial intermediaries or the private
sector (households, businesses) have assumed too many risks, they will want to
diversify these risks — which is something they can do on markets as long as the
risks are idiosyncratic.
Particularly in the field of pension provision, many governments appear to
be shedding their traditional insurance function, thereby transferring the under-
lying risks to the private sector. While under the pay-as-you-go system, the
state, being the pension provider, also had to bear funding risks, it has now
transferred those risks to households. Now it is increasingly up to individuals to
minimize these risks through reallocation.
In this process financial markets are gaining importance as markets for risks
because banks — under the effect of deregulation, financial innovations and
increased competition — are keen on de-allocating the risks they assume. This
holds true also (or even more so) for European banks, which implies that in
Europe financial markets stand to gain the kind of position they already have in
the United States.
Finally, let me briefly comment on why the Austrian stock market is so
underdeveloped. The root cause is not a scarcity of demand but a scarcity of
supply. Austrian businesses are mostly family-run and as such have specific
governance structures that shut out any influence of outsiders. Family-run
businesses do not have an interest in a functioning, liquid stock market; for
similar reasons they also reduce the influence of the banks from which they
borrow by providing sufficient collateral.
Peter Mooslechner
Financial systems have, at certain points in history, provided congruent func-
tions, for instance combining the functions of risk allocation and funding, thus
causing basic financing instruments to evolve the very way they have. But what
was the underlying economic rationale, or what might have been the rationale?
Taking the huge investments made in canals or railways as an example, for real
investors it was of course a matter of survival to have long-term funding at their
disposal. Otherwise they would never have been able to implement these
projects. This implies that investors were prepared to accept a mechanism that
unambiguously allocated risks from the moment the money was put up. In other
words, a system was created that provided the necessary funding while, con-
gruently, providing for a reliable system of risk allocation.
As financial markets developed and additional functions were added, this
congruence weakened or even became dissociated. Today the initial elements
and the many new elements that have been added build a loose network whose
underlying systematic relations have become all but blurred. In continental
Europe in general and in Austria in particular, the government has broadly
filled this gap. Thus an implicit risk allocation has evolved between the state
and financial market agents, partly as a result of regulatory measures, partly as a
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result of investor and borrower preferences. It should be noted that, measured
by the efficiency with which financial markets fulfilled their financing function,
notably Germany and Austria fared quite well with this setup for decades.
However, we may now have arrived at a point where — for whatever reasons
— this implicit compromise no longer works and is no longer considered accept-
able. After all, it was not a foregone conclusion for rich investors to risk putting
their money in investment projects even when funding and risk allocation
functions were congruent.
Just like at the time a compromise in risk allocation had to be sought
between the state and private investors in the first place, today the debate
appears to be so difficult because an encompassing substitute must be found
for the erstwhile compromise, in a wide range of areas, including pension
provision. Above all, however, such a substitute is necessary for the efficiency
of the financial system as a whole, for the efficiency of prudential supervision
and for the sake of financial stability. Having to safeguard financial stability
significantly adds to the difficulty, because financial stability is definitely a public
good that cannot be secured efficiently by private efforts alone.
For a long time attempts were made to gloss over the public-good problem
of financial stability — and many another problem — with Coase-type solutions.
The recommendation to establish extensive derivatives markets may be the most
notable example. However, the lesson we learned was that this did not solve the
problems at hand; such an approach may even have created additional problems.
However, if policymakers were to jump to the conclusion now that the
financing function — that is, functional efficiency — should prevail, there is still
the danger that, for instance, underlying governance inefficiencies might exert a
negative influence on the system, which might, in turn, adversely affect the
financing function. We do, however, appear to have learned one lesson from the
more recent past, as conclusively evidenced by Engelbert Stockhammer: The
attempted concentration on shareholder value has shown that it is highly prob-
lematic to limit the financial market perspective to a single aspect, to a single
function of the financial market.
Franz Hahn
If we look at the transfer of risks originally borne by the state to households:
Could we not see this as part of the way societies tend to evolve? Why should
enlightened citizens accept to be patronized, say, when it comes to how they
provide for retirement? And there is even more to that: While the state can
transfer risks to households, the financial markets — on which only idiosyncratic
risks can be diversified — are by definition not capable of efficiently distributing
systemic risks. Such risks are, however, the kind that ultimately matter. Should
the private pension provision system be shaken by large systemic risks, the state
must and will come to the rescue under political pressure and compensate the
losses, at least to some extent. By bailing out beneficiaries, the state thus acts as
an anchor, as it would, in fact, in any public crisis. Which begs the question: so
what?
Turning to the proposition made by Peter Mooslechner regarding the multi-
functionality of the financial system, I believe that, at the end of the day, there
are only two relevant functions that modern financial markets can fulfill, namely
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the financing function and the risk allocation function. While the governance
function is often attributed to financial markets, I do not see it as a key function.
In all businesses the governance structure is shaped by insiders who are leaning
toward instrumentalizing outsiders. Outsiders tend to be aware of this; they
know that, unless in exceptional cases, they will not be able to exert any
effective influence on businesses. If they are rational, they will understand that
they are at a structural disadvantage to insiders (managers, owners) when it
comes to information, power and profit possibilities. This explains the predi-
lection of rational investors, notably rational institutional stockholders, for
short-term investment. And it also sheds light on banks behavior in East Asia
or Russia in the second half of the 1990s. Given big power and information
asymmetries (which usually exist in international loan transactions), banks will,
as a rule, invest short-term in order to retain their chances of profit-taking or of
leaving an unsafe market fast in case of danger. Which leads me to say that,
among the functions of financial markets, there is nothing that would warrant
the label governance.
Financial stability — and here I say something that is not politically correct —
is generally overrated. To paraphrase Stigler, regulation has typically served the
interests of the banks they regulate. The Basel II accord is a case in point. Basel II
materially advances the interests of bank managers, specifically the managers of
the larger banks (smaller banks managers know that Basel II raises the like-
lihood of a hostile takeover). The logic of Basel II implies: the more regulatory
capital a bank has, the safer the position of its management is, i.e. the less efforts
the managers will have to make. This is the tradeoff that Basel II facilitates. The
more stable a bank is, the greater the inefficiency it will get away with is. While
too much stability tends to be fatal for financial markets in general, and for
banks in particular, financial crises, or the increasing likelihood of crisis, may
have a beneficial effect. Take for instance Finland or Scandinavia, which plunged
into a severe crisis at the beginning of the 1990s but now have a remarkable
economic performance. Of course I do not know whether such a strong
performance is inextricably linked with financial markets proneness to crisis,
but a minor incident of crisis would certainly do no harm to the reform process
and the restructuring of the Austrian financial market.
Engelbert Stockhammer
It is a mere historical fact but nonetheless important to stress that a financial
system is a product of the society it serves and a framework of institutions. This
setup can, of course, be changed, but it takes a genuine will to change. For
change to be effected, it takes a political will to change, because after all this is a
distribution issue where a balance must be struck between interest groups.
Mind you, I do not wish to belittle the significance of the risk allocation function
of financial systems; I simply want to add that financial systems have implica-
tions for the distribution of incomes.
Apparently, however, there are distribution matters that are not normally
put at issue in economic theory. We have become so used to talking about
allocation and not about distribution that we are at a loss for concepts with
which to debate issues of distribution.
Finance for Growth Panel Discussion:
What Kind of Financial System
Works Best for Europe?
Focus on Austria 1/2003 193
I agree that the state, if adequately empowered, may get things wrong, as has
happened often enough. However, the mistake that has been made in many a
financial sector reform was to put governments into a straitjacket, squeezing
their room for maneuver. Going beyond economic theory, in a democratic setup
it is simply not desirable to deprive the state of control functions in deregulated
financial markets and to bank on financial markets ability to regulate them-
selves. To me such an approach appears unreasonable and undemocratic. There-
fore I would insist that governments must retain the possibility to take correc-
tive action. This has come to the fore in the debate on strengthening the global
financial architecture, and this is naturally a driving force behind the IMFs
intention to create an international bankruptcy procedure, thus basically creat-
ing room for maneuver for governments.
Another issue is how much government should spend as a share of GDP to
combat financial crises. My guess is that a government spending ratio like that of
the U.S.A. suffices to cushion financial markets against relatively many shocks.
Like Franz Hahn, I am surprised how little happens these days when stock
prices fall. This observation must not be used, however, as an argument in the
debate on shifting pension provision away from the government toward the
private sector. Following a switch to private pension provision, stock price
changes would certainly entail real effects as the incomes of many people would
then be affected directly by valuation changes of the assets they have built up.
Franz Hahn
Responding to the argument put forth by Stefan Schulmeister that stock market
prices have nothing to do with fundamentals, I agree that they have actually
nothing to do with static fundamentals. But they do not need to. Much rather,
price developments imply expectations of future fundamentals, which may
materialize or not. In other words, asset prices reflect expectations, which
may be well-founded or far-fetched. I think that it is important not to confuse
these aspects in the debate.
To conclude, I am convinced that it is a natural process for European
financial markets to embrace more and more elements of the Anglo-American
system as they become more developed. From a philosophical perspective, the
development of the financial system is closely related with the development of
civic society. That is, the development of the financial system must be seen in
the context of a societys identity. Put briefly, Anglosaxon societies — people
with a Protestant background — have tended to be more risk-friendly than their
Catholic central European counterparts. In most central European societies the
church and government would typically fulfill tasks that are up to the individual
citizens in Anglosaxon countries. Put differently, the development of financial
markets is also a process of emancipation, which is basically to be welcomed,
although I share most doubts about the effectiveness of financial markets.
Financial markets seldom deliver what they are generally expected to do in
the political discussion. After all, various interests play a big role.
Generally speaking, my assessment is: the higher the degree of financial
deregulation, the better — even more so if financial market supervision is
strengthened at the same time. Economic policymakers or regulators would
thus be well advised not to impose too stringent provisions on modern financial
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markets or not to put them into a political straitjacket. Instead, they should
monitor developments very closely and take care not to be outsmarted by the
markets. Thus, the buck in fact stops with state financial and capital market
regulators. They must be adequately equipped to monitor financial markets
effectively and, above all, draw the right conclusions. Moreover, they must
have adequate jurisdiction and appropriate resources to intervene at the right
moment (and they must be willing to do so).
Peter Mooslechner
In a longer-term perspective, the 1950s and the 1960s may well prove to have
been a historic exception. But since we cannot — and had better not — turn back
the hands of time, we should much rather try to single out the elements of
financial market development that have proved useful and that can be integrated
into todays systems. This appears indispensable because the framework con-
ditions have since changed fundamentally in many respects. What strikes me is
that, given the kind of asset economy that we have reached and given the
persistent crisis rhetoric, astonishingly few and minor incidents have actually
occurred.
As is evident from the example of pension provision, financial assets are not
tangible goods, but simply a mechanism for rationing resources over time. By
building up financial assets, we accumulate claims on future output. However,
the decisive question is: How much output will the economy produce at a given
point in the future to allow all claims to be satisfied, even if the benefits are
distributed unevenly, and how will todays financial system — by financing the
investments that must be made in order to satisfy future claims — affect output,
say, in 10 to 20 years time?
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AMS Arbeitsmarktservice O‹ sterreich
(Austrian Public Employment Office)
ARTIS Austrian Real Time Interbank Settlement
BWA Bundes-Wertpapieraufsicht
(Federal Securities Supervisory
Authority)
BWG Bankwesengesetz
(amendments to the Banking Act)
CAD Capital Adequacy Directive
CEECs Central and Eastern European Countries
COICOP Classification of Individual Consumption
by Purpose
CPI Consumer Price Index
EC European Community
ECB European Central Bank
EEA European Economic Area
EEC European Economic Community
EGVG Einfu‹hrungsgesetz der
Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetze
(Introductory Act to the Administrative
Procedure Acts)
EMU Economic and Monetary Union
EQOS Electronic Quote and Order Driven
System
ERM Exchange Rate Mechanism
ERP European Recovery Program
ESCB European System of Central Banks
ESNA European System of National Accounts
EU European Union
Eurostat Statistical Office of the European
Communities
GDP Gross Domestic Product
HICP Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices
IHS Institut fu‹r Ho‹here Studien
(Institute for Advanced Studies)
IIP International Investment Position
IMF International Monetary Fund
NACE Nomenclature ge«ne«rale des Activite«s
e«conomiques dans les
Communaute«s Europe«ennes (Statistical
Classification of Economic Activities)
O‹ CPA Austrian Version of the Classification
of Products by Activities
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development
OeKB Oesterreichische Kontrollbank
OeNB Oesterreichische Nationalbank
O‹ NACE Austrian Version of the Statistical
Classification of Economic Activities
RTGS Real Time Gross Settlement System
SDR Special Drawing Right
SNA System of National Accounts
TARGET Trans-European Automated Real-time
Gross settlement Express Transfer
TEU Treaty on European Union
WIFO O‹ sterreichisches Institut fu‹r
Wirtschaftsforschung
(Austrian Institute of Economic Research)
WWU Wirtschafts- und Wa‹hrungsunion
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— = The numerical value is zero
. . = Data not available at the reporting date
x = For technical reasons no data can be indicated
0 = A quantity which is smaller than half of the unit indicated
ﬂ = Mean value
_ = New series
Note: Apparent arithmetical discrepancies in the tables are due to rounding.
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issue no
Official Announcements
Regarding the Foreign Exchange Law
DL 1/91 Promulgation of the new Official Announcements
regarding the Foreign Exchange Law;
general provisions Sept. 24, 1991 4/1991
1. Issuance of new Official Announcements
2. Definitions
3. Fees
DL 2/91 Granting of general licenses Sept. 24, 1991 4/1991
1. General license
2. Waiver of obligation to declare; release
3. Nonbanks
4. Banks not engaged in foreign business
5. Foreign exchange dealers
6. Exchange bureaus
7. Special banks and financial institutions
8. Provisions applying to both banks
and financial institutions
DL 3/91 Reporting requirements Sept. 24, 1991 4/1991
1. General provisions
2. Exemptions from the reporting obligation
3. General reports
4. Reports by banks
5. Reports by nonbanks and financial institutions
6. Special reports
DL 4/91 Assets of nonresidents with residence
(domicile) in Iraq Oct. 29, 1991 4/1991
DL 2/93 Modification of the Official Announcement
DL 3/91 May 5, 1993 2/1993
DL 1/95 Repeal of the Official Announcement
DL 1/93; SC Resolution 1022 (1995)
Concerning the suspension of the sanctions
of the United Nations against the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Dec. 21, 1995 4/1995
DL 1/96 Modification of Official Announcement
DL 3/91 Sept. 3, 1996 3/1996
DL 1/99 Modification of Official Announcements
DL 2/91 and DL 3/91
to the Foreign Exchange Act Dec. 21, 1998 4/1998
DL 2/99 Abrogation of Official Announcement DL 3/93
Sanctions of the United Nations
against Libya April 30, 1999 1/1999
DL 3/99 Modification of Official Announcement DL 3/91
with respect to the Foreign Exchange Act Dec. 16, 1999 3/1999
DL 1/01 Modification of Official Announcement DL 3/91
with respect to the Foreign Exchange Act June 19, 2001 2/2001
Please see the German-
language publication
Berichte und Studien
for a list of all Official
Announcements in
German.
Official Announcements
of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank
198 Focus on Austria 1/2003
Authentic
German text
published in the
Official Gazette
(Amtsblatt zur
Wiener Zeitung)
Translation
published in
Reports and
Summaries and
Focus on Austria
issue no
Official Announcements
Regarding the Foreign Exchange Law (cont.)
DL 1/02 Modification of Official Announcements DL 1/91
and DL 3/91 with respect to the
Foreign Exchange Act Feb. 25, 2002 1/2002
DL 2/02 Amendment to Official Announcement DL 2/91;
UN Security Council
Resolution No. 1373 (2001) Sept. 2, 2002 3/2002
DL 3/02 Modification
of Official Announcement DL 2/02 Jan. 20, 2003 4/2002
Official Announcements
Focus on Austria 1/2003 199
Published in the
Official Journal
of the
European
Communities
Minimum Reserve Regulations
No 2531/98 Council Regulation (EC)
concerning the application of minimum
reserves by the European Central Bank Nov. 23, 1998
No 2532/98 Council Regulation (EC)
concerning the powers of the
European Central Bank
to impose sanctions Nov. 23, 1998
No 2818/98 Regulation (EC) of the European Central Bank
on the application of minimum reserves Dec. 1, 1998
Council Regulations
of the European Communities
200 Focus on Austria 1/2003
Published in
Focus on Austria
Oesterreichische Nationalbank
and Selected Monetary Aggregates
Official Announcements Regarding the Foreign Exchange Law
and Minimum Reserve Requirements — see preceding page
Calendar of Monetary Highlights 2/1999
The Possibilities and Limitations of Monetary Policy —
Results of the OeNBs 27th Economics Conference 3/1999
Calendar of Monetary and Economic Highlights 4/1999
Calendar of Monetary and Economic Highlights 1/2000
Calendar of Monetary and Economic Highlights 2/2000
Calendar of Monetary and Economic Highlights 3/2000
The New Millennium — Time for a New Economic Paradigm? —
Results of the OeNBs 28th Economics Conference 3/2000
Calendar of Monetary and Economic Highlights 4/2000
Calendar of Monetary and Economic Highlights 1/2001
Calendar of Monetary and Economic Highlights 2/2001
The Single Financial Market: Two Years into EMU —
Results of the OeNBs 29th Economics Conference 2/2001
Calendar of Monetary and Economic Highlights 3—4/2001
Calendar of Monetary and Economic Highlights 1/2002
Calendar of Monetary and Economic Highlights 2/2002
Calendar of Monetary and Economic Highlights 3/2002
Austrian Financial Market
Austrias Major Loans Register in 1998 2/1999
Money and Credit in the First Half of 1999 3/1999
Banking Holidays in Austria 4/1999
Money and Credit in the First Three Quarters of 1999 4/1999
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